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PREFACE 
This study mas c a r r i e d out within the -framework of an 
Agreement in e f f e c t between B r a z i l ' s I n s t i t u t e for Economic and 
Soc ia l Planning (IPEA) and the Economic Commission for La t in 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). It i s the product of a second 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n of the two i n s t i t u t i o n s in an empi r i ca l study of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between market s t ructure and export performance. 
The f i r s t study, which was publ ished in 1971, appeared only in 
Portuguese. For t h i s reason i t rece ived l i m i t e d c i r c u l a t i o n 
outs ide B r a z i l . Me are pub l i sh ing the present report 
s imultaneously in Eng l i sh and Portuguese in order to assure i t s 
wide d i f f u s i o n . The purpose of the research was to provide 
pol icymakers with an a n a l y s i s of the e f f e c t s of i n d u s t r i a l and 
commercial p o l i c i e s on export performance. Nonetheless, the 
f i n d i n g s w i l l be of i n t e r e s t to students of B r a z i l ' s economy and 
to a l l those concerned with i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and i n d u s t r i a l 
economics. 
A number of i n d i v i d u a l s and i n s t i t u t i o n s contr ibuted to the 
e l a b o r a t i o n of t h i s study. Professor Helson Braga of the Foreign 
Trade Foundation (FUNCEX) in Rio de Jane i ro assembled the bas ic 
data and made them a v a i l a b l e to us. The B r a z i l i a n I n s t i t u t e of 
Geography and S t a t i s t i c s (IBGE) o f fe red us a generous amount of 
computer time in t h e i r f a c i l i t i e s in B r a s i l i a . The t r a n s l a t i o n 
of the report from Eng l i sh to Portuguese was handled with 
except iona l competence by Paulo L e i t e P r a t i n i of the M i n i s t r y of 
Industry and Commerce and Car los Mussi of the ECLAC o f f i c e in 
B r a s i l i a . The study i t s e l f was prepared by Larry N. Mll lmore of 
ECLAC's B r a s i l i a o f f i c e ; he i s g r a t e f u l fo r comments received in 
seminars at IPEA, the U n i v e r s i t y of B r a s i l i a , the XII ENCONTRQ 




Hore than a decade ago CEPAL, in co-operat ion with IPEA, 
sponsored a p ioneer ing study of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between market 
s t r u c t u r e and exports of manufactures in B r a z i l (Fajnzylber 
1971). The study found that in 1968 over ha l f of the i n d u s t r i a l 
exports of B r a z i l were from i n d u s t r i e s with r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l s 
of concent ra t ion , i . e . from i n d u s t r i e s with large numbers of 
small and medium-sized f i r m s . Data fo r a sample of 283 f i rms 
which exported in 1967 suggested that export performance was a 
decreasing f u n c t i o n of f i r m s i z e , and (except fo r foreign-owned 
f i rms) an i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y (Fa jnzy lber , 
appendix 71. 
Since the l a t e 1960s, B r a z i l ' s exports of manufactured goods 
have undergone impress ive growth and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . For t h i s 
reason i t i s now p o s s i b l e to assemble a la rge data base which 
al lows us, with the a id of s t a t i s t i c a l techniques of a n a l y s i s , to 
reach qui te d e f i n i t e conc lus ions concerning the e f f e c t of market 
s t r u c t u r e and economic p o l i c i e s on export performance. The data 
were assembled from the re turns of d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t taxes that 
i n d u s t r i a l corporat ions f i l e d with the B r a z i l i a n government in 
1978 and 1979. Nonetheless, no i n d i v i d u a l company i s i d e n t i f i e d 
in the data base, and p a r t i c u l a r care has been taken to insure 
the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of data fo r i n d i v i d u a l f i r m s . 
The plan of the report i s as f o l l o w s . The f i r s t chapter 
c o n s i s t s of a non-techn ica l summary of the main empi r i ca l 
f i n d i n g s along with a d i scuss ion of t h e i r p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
It i s intended as a c o n c i s e , s e l f - c o n t a i n e d report that i s 
a c c e s s i b l e to the general reader. D e t a i l s are provided in the 
remaining chapters . Chapter II d iscusses var ious hypotheses to 
be tested that are drawn from the l i t e r a t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
trade and i n d u s t r i a l economics. Chapter III provides a 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the data base along with some nonparametric t e s t s 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between f i r e s i z e and expor ts , and between 
f i rm s i z e and export s u b s i d i e s . The l a s t two chapters contain 
the main econometric ana lyses : chapter IV s p e c i f i e s and est imates 
a l o g i t model of the determinants of the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing 
while chapter V u t i l i z e s ordinary l eas t squares techniques to 
f i n d the determinants of i n t e r - f i r m d i f f e r e n c e s in the 
performance of exporters . 
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I. SUHHARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of t h i s study is to determine f i r s t what f a c t o r s 
d i s t i n g u i s h exporters from nonexporters and, secondly, what 
f a c t o r s in f luence the performance of f i rms once they enter export 
markets. To accomplish t h i s task, a vast micro data base has 
been assembled. It contains data for the f i s c a l year 1978 for 
12 435 f i rms , 3 345 of which reg is tered at least some exports . 
Only 21 f irms (eight exporters) are pub l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Nonresident ownership of equity exceeds ten percent in 841 f i rms 
(¿10 expor ters) . These s u b s i d i a r i e s of t ransnat iona l enterpr i ses 
and j o i n t ventures of fore ign with l o c a l c a p i t a l account for 
33.0'/. of the domestic sa les and 38.8X of the t o t a l exports of 
f i rms in our sample. An add i t iona l 245 f irms (148 exporters) 
have l i c e n s e agreements with overseas f i rms which allow them 
access to fore ign technology and trademarks. 
1. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Firm s i z e i s without doubt the most important factor 
a f f e c t i n g both the p r o b a b i l i t y that a f i rm w i l l export and i t s 
subsequent export performance. To export even the smal lest 
volume of output requi res incurrence of the costs involved in 
dea l ing with government bureaucrac ies , obta in ing market 
informat ion, and s e t t i n g up overseas sa les o rgan iza t ions . 
Because of the existence of these f ixed costs of export ing, 
larger f i rms are more l i k e l y to export than are small f i rms . 
However, among f irms that do export, those with a small domestic 
market e x h i b i t the la rgest r a t i o of exports to s a l e s , for they 
have the most to gain from scale economies (cost reduct ions) 
through exports . 
Both observed r e l a t i o n s h i p s - - the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of f i rm 
s i z e on the p r o b a b i l i t y of exporting and the negative e f f e c t of 
s i z e on subsequent export performance — p e r s i s t when the e f f e c t 
of other re levant v a r i a b l e s are accounted f o r . Moreover t h i s i s 
true not f o r i s o l a t e d i n d u s t r i e s , but rather for i n d u s t r i e s 
t h r o u g h o u t B r a z i l ' s manufacturing sec tor . On average, each one 
percent increase in the t o t a l sales of a f i rm i s associated with 
a 0,8 to 0 . 9 percent increase in the odds of export ing. Among 
exporters , each increase of one percent in domestic sa les 
r e s u l t s , on average, in a decrease of 0.8 to 0.9 percent in the 
r a t i o of exports to domestic sa les . 
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These f ind ings regarding f irm i i z e imply that increased 
concentrat ion of domestic sa les in large enterpr i ses has a 
negat ive e f f e c t on exports f i r s t because small f i rms may f a i l to 
reach the c r i t i c a l s i z e required for exports and secondly because 
larger f irms export a smaller proport ion of t h e i r output. These 
i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s are quite strong and are o f f s e t only p a r t i a l l y 
by p o s i t i v e d i r e c t e f f e c t s of concentrat ion on export 
performance! other th ings equal , very small exporters and very 
large e n t e r p r i s e s export more i f they are located in concentrated 
i n d u s t r i e s than i f they are in r e l a t i v e l y unconcentrated 
i n d u s t r i e s . Nonetheless, for the vast major i ty of f irms - - over 
70'/. of the f i rms in our sample — increased concentrat ion has no 
p o s i t i v e e f f e c t whatsoever on exports , whereas i t does have a 
s u b s t a n t i a l , though i n d i r e c t , negative e f f e c t through changes in 
the s i z e d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i rms in an i n d u s t r y . 
Exporters use more phys ica l plant and equipment per employee 
and a more s k i l l e d labor force than nonexporters. The 
s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s of t h i s report shows c l e a r l y , however, that 
t h i s i s the product of two separate r e l a t i o n s h i p s : i ) large 
f irms are s k i l l - and c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e compared to small f i r m s , 
and i i> exporters happen a lso to be r e l a t i v e l y large compared to 
nonexporters. C o n t r o l l i n g for d i f f e r e n c e s in f i rm s i z e and other 
v a r i a b l e s , increases in c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y and average s k i l l 
l e v e l s decrease the p r o b a b i l i t y that a f i rm w i l l export. This 
r e s u l t i s cons is tent with the p red i c t ions of the conventional 
theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade for a country l i k e B r a z i l which i s 
well endowed with u n s k i l l e d labor , but lacks abundant c a p i t a l and 
s k i l l e d labor . 
Among f irms that export , phys ica l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y (but not 
human s k i l l s ) has a p o s i t i v e impact on export performance once 
account i s taken of v a r i a t i o n s in domestic sa les and other 
re levant v a r i a b l e s . In other words, the greater the requirements 
of phys ica l p lant and equipment per unit of output, the g r e a t e r , 
on average, i s the volume of exports. This f i n d i n g i s opposite 
that which might be pred icted by standard trade theory, but i t i s 
cons i s tent with cons iderat ions of economies of sca le in 
product ion. Investment in plant and equipment tends to be 
i n d i v i s i b l e or "lumpy," so a f irm using c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e 
techniques of production requ i res a large market to reduce 
average costs to a minimum. For two f i rms with equal domestic 
sa les but d i f f e r i n g techniques of product ion, the one with a 
large investment in c a p i t a l has a need to spread c a p i t a l costs 
over a larger volume of exports than does the f i rm that u t i l i z e s 
more labor and fewer or less soph is t i ca ted machines. 
Adver t i s ing expenditures show a very strong and p o s i t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with both the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing and export 
performance. Markets in which a d v e r t i s i n g i s important are 
"monopol ist ica l1 y compet i t i ve , " i . e . the products sold are not 
standardized and f i rms compete with a d v e r t i s i n g and a 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n of brand names. When l o c a l producers are protected 
from import compet i t ion, high pr ices and high p r o f i t s encourage 
new entrants to set up production f a c i l i t i e s , so such markets 
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tend a lso to have large number« of p lants of suboptimal s i z e . 
Firms operat ing in protected , but monopol ist i c a l l y competit ive 
markets thus have a strong incent ive to export at p r i ces below 
those p r e v a i l i n g in the loca l market in order to obtain economies 
of sca le and a reduct ion in costs per unit of output. 
State ownership appears to have a negative e f f e c t on the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing and a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on export/sales 
r a t i o s once t h i s r a t i o i s greater than zero. It i s d i f f i c u l t to 
ascr ibe much importance to t h i s r e s u l t , however, s ince few f irms 
in the sample are publ ic e n t e r p r i s e s . 
In c o n t r a s t , l i c e n s e agreements have a s i g n i f i c a n t and 
p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on both the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing and the 
performance of exporters . It i s sometimes thought that owners of 
technology and trademarks impose severe r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
l i c e n s e e s , hindering exports of such f i rms . For the firrcs in our 
data base, however, the existence of l i c e n s e agreements with 
overseas f i rms imp l ies , on average, an increase of up to 100X in 
the odds that a f irm w i l l export , and an increase of 100 to 1507. 
in subsequent exports . Licensed technology and brand names thus 
appear to be a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r , rather than an obstac le to, 
export success in B r a z i l . 
D irect fore ign investment is also assoc iated with a larger 
number of exporters and a larger volume of exports even a f ter 
c o n t r o l l i n g for the e f f e c t of other re levant v a r i a b l e s such as 
i n d u s t r y , s i ze and c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y . The odds that a subs id iary 
of a t ransnat iona l enterpr i se or a jo in t venture of fore ign and 
loca l c a p i t a l w i l l export i s 140 to 270'/. greater than a 
comparable pr ivate f i rm without access to fo re ign technology and 
trademarks through ownership l inks or l i c e n s e s . This r e s u l t 
r e f l e c t s the fact that the cost of export ing is lower for 
t ransnat iona l f i rms , which have a good knowledge of fore ign 
market cond i t ions and often have the necessary sa les 
o rgan izat ions already in place in overseas markets. Among 
exporters , however, fore ign ownership i s assoc iated with an 
increased export volume of 80 to 130'/., which i s s i m i l a r to the 
e f f e c t of fo re ign l i c e n s e s . 
T a r i f f s and other import b a r r i e r s increase the c r u z e i r o 
p r i c e of import s u b s t i t u t e s r e l a t i v e to exports , encouraging 
f irms to produce for l oca l rather than export markets. For each 
percentage point increase in the r a t i o of domestic to import 
p r i c e s , the volume of exports f a l l s by an estimated three-
quarters of a percentage po int . For some f i rms , t h i s ant i -export 
bias i s o f f s e t by export subs id ies that increase the amount of 
c r u z e i r o s received for each do l la r of export revenue. In 
a d d i t i o n , export performance i s improved when exporters have 
access to a supply of inputs at in te rnat iona l p r i c e s through the 
drawback prov i s ion for duty- f ree imports. 
Export subs id ies are widely used in B r a z i l to st imulate 
exports of manufactures, but the ana lys i s of t h i s report shows 
c l e a r l y that the system of subs id ies d i s c r i m i n a t e s against small 
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exporters . In genera l , the smaller the exporter , the smaller the 
rate of subsidy. This i s true for aggregate manufacturing and 
for i n d i v i d u a l i n d u s t r i e s throughout the manufacturing s e c t o r . 
Most s u r p r i s i n g l y , a t o t a l of 523 exporters - - 15.6X of the 
sample - - received no f i s c a l subsidy at a l l in 197B. 
Unsubsidized exporters are found in a wide v a r i e t y of i n d u s t r i e s , 
and tend to be much smal ler than subs id ized exporters . This 
suggests that the cost of bureaucrat ic t r a n s a c t i o n s may well 
exceed the benef i t of any subsidy to which a small exporter i s 
ent i t i e d . 
2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Many p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s fo l low d i r e c t l y from the empi r i ca l 
f i n d i n g s summarized above. Others requ i re some e l a b o r a t i o n . 
Those discussed in t h i s sect ion are intended to be i l l u s t r a t i v e 
but not comprehensive. 
An important f i n d i n g of the present study i s the 
conf i rmat ion of a very strong and independent r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between f irm s i z e and the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing in B r a z i l . 
Other th ings equal , the smal ler the f i r m , the less l i k e l y i t i s 
to export a port ion of i t s output. Given f i x e d costs of enter ing 
export markets, such a r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i n e v i t a b l e . Nonetheless, 
the s t r e n g t h of the impact of s i z e on the p r o b a b i l i t y of 
export ing i s s t rongly in f luenced by government p o l i c y . The 
estimated e f f e c t of f i rm s i z e on the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing i s 
not a purely techn ica l parameter, but rather a number that 
r e f l e c t s the e f f e c t s of government p o l i c i e s ; i t can be a l t e r e d 
by changes in those p o l i c i e s . Small f i rms tend to operate with a 
l e s s s k i l l e d labor force and with less c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e methods 
of production than do large f i rms , so the fact that the impact of 
c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y on the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing i s negat ive 
means that p o l i c i e s to promote the entry of small f i rms i n t o 
export markets can be p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e . 
The system of export subs id ies in e f f e c t in B r a z i l , or at 
least that in e f f e c t in 1978, d i s c r i m i n a t e s against the small 
exporter , and t h i s no doubt discourages small f i rms from 
export ing in the f i r s t ins tance . More important ly , however, the 
bureaucracy in general operates so as to increase markedly the 
f i x e d costs of export ing . To quote a recent World Bank repor t : 
The general a t t i t u d e of the admin i s t ra t ion ( p a r t i c u l a r -
ly of CACEX [the Foreign Trade Department of the Banco 
do B r a s i l l ) toward export ing e n t e r p r i s e s seems often to 
have been one of s u s p i c i o n , instead of ass i s tance and 
promotion. The volume of export documentation required 
i5 enormous, and CACEX operates a d e t a i l e d export 
contro l system. This requ i res for both the export ing 
e n t e r p r i s e s and CACEX large and c o s t l y bureaucrac ies , 
which may be an important reason for the concentrat ion 
of exports in a comparatively l i m i t e d number of large 
enterpr i ses with experienced export a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . 
(World Bank 1983, p. 31.) 
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The B r a z i l i a n government appears to be f u l l y aware of the fact 
that bureaucrat ic c o n t r o l s i n h i b i t the exports of small f i rms . 
Even the d i r e c t o r of CACEX, Mr Car los Viacava, has p u b l i c l y 
c r i t i c i z e d the "excessive c e n t r a l i z a t i o n " of government which 
"hinders e f f o r t s of small and medium-sized f i rms to expand t h e i r 
exports." ( J o r n a l d e B r a s i l i a , 17 February, 1984, p. 1.) To 
date, however, l i t t l e has been done to change t h i s s i t u a t i o n . 
The formation of t rad ing companies or export c o n s o r t i a i s a 
p o t e n t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e way to d i s t r i b u t e the f ixed costs of 
export ing among a number of f i rms. Such organ izat ions are 
p a r t i c u l a r y useful for small f irms when f ixed costs inc lude the 
cost of dea l ing with a c e n t r a l i z e d bureaucracy, but ne i ther type 
of o rgan izat ion i s common in B r a z i l . In a supposed e f f o r t to 
encourage exports by small f i rms , the Central Bank in A p r i l 1984 
passed Resolut ion No. 906 which reduces the minimum c a p i t a l 
required for the formation of export c o n s o r t i a composed s o l e l y of 
small f i rms from 114 000 QRTN (indexed government bonds), or 
approximately US $ 912 000, to 11 000 QRTN, or approximately US 
$ 88 000. Unfor tunate ly , however, t h i s measure w i l l have no 
impact whatsoever on new entrants into export earkets , or even 
new entrants into export c o n s o r t i a , for a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s in a 
consortium formed under Resolut ion 906 must p rev ious ly be members 
of an es tab l i shed consortium which has been in existence e i ther 
for two years with a minimum of two m i l l i o n d o l l a r s in exports or 
for three years with a minimum of one mi l ion d o l l a r s in exports . 
A second empir ica l f i n d i n g which i s of great importance from 
the point of view of p o t e n t i a l changes in economic p o l i c y i s the 
f a c t that there i s a very strong i n v e r t * r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
f i rm s i z e and export performance that i s independent of other 
economic v a r i a b l e s . This f ind ing has two fundamental p o l i c y 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . F i r s t , any program to encourage the entry of small 
and medium-sized f i rms into export markets w i l l have the added 
benef i t of increas ing the average export/sa les r a t i o s of 
B r a z i l i a n exporters . Secondly, p o l i c i e s which decrease 
i n d u s t r i a l concentrat ion in domestic markets w i l l r e s u l t in 
improved export performance because the average s i z e of f i rms , as 
measured by domestic s a l e s , w i l l decrease. This p o s i t i v e impact 
of decreased concentrat ion on exports i s o f f s e t only p a r t i a l l y by 
a negative e f f e c t for very large and very small f i rms . 
The s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s of t h i s study demonstrates c l e a r l y 
that commercial p o l i c y has a s i g n i f i c a n t and d i r e c t impact on 
export performance in B r a z i l . Import p r o t e c t i o n al lows domestic 
p r i c e s and costs to exceed thoBe of fo re ign producers and makes 
export markets appear unat t rac t i ve to B r a z i l i a n producers. Th is 
b ias against exports can be o f f s e t by export s u b s i d i e s , drawback 
for import dut ies on imported inputB, and by rea l devaluat ion of 
the c r u z e i r o . Export subs id ies as administered in B r a z i l appear 
to d i s c r i m i n a t e against the small f i r m , and duty drawback i s most 
e f f e c t i v e as an export st imulus for f i rms with l i t t l e i n d u s t r i a l 
value-added and a high dependence on imported inputs . Real 
deva luat ion , in c o n t r a s t , st imulates exports from a l l f i rms 
I r r e s p e c t i v e of s i z e or dependence on imports. The exchange rate 
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i f thut p o t e n t i a l l y a very e f f e c t i v e instrument of export 
promotion in B r a z i l . It has the added advantage of not provoking 
the imposit ion of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g dut ies in importing c o u n t r i e s . 
In an i n f l a t i o n a r y economy such as that of B r a z i l , rea l 
devaluat ion reguires increases in the c r u z e i r o p r i c e of d o l l a r s 
to equal or exceed increases in the general p r i c e l e v e l . 
Access to fo re ign technology and trademarks i s c l e a r l y 
b e n e f i c i a l to the performance of exporters in B r a z i l ' s 
manufacturing sec tor . The f ind ings of t h i s paper suggest, 
however, that i t makes no d i f f e r e n c e on average whether t h i s 
access i s provided by l i c e n s i n g agreements or by the sa le of 
equity to t ransnat iona l e n t e r p r i s e s . S u b s i d i a r i e s of 
t ransnat iona l e n t e r p r i s e s and jo in t ventures of fore ign and l o c a l 
c a p i t a l do, however, face markedly lower f ixed costs of 
export ing; for t h i s reason, they are more l i k e l y to export in the 
f i r s t instance than are comparable f irms that lack these d i r e c t 
l i n k s to fore ign markets. 
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II. THIORKTICAl CQNIIDIRATIQNI 
This chapter d iscusses the main p r e d i c t i o n s of the theory of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and i n d u s t r i a l economics concerning both 
i n t e r - f i r m and i n t e r - i n d u s t r y d i f f e r e n c e s in the p r o b a b i l i t y of 
export ing and in export performance. Where re levant , the 
empir ica l f i nd ings of e a r l i e r studies are a l so mentioned. For 
ease of expos i t ion , in t h i s chapter and throughout the repor t , 
export performance r e f e r s s o l e l y to the export/sa les r a t i o s of 
exporters , i . e . to f i rms who have already entered export markets. 
It H i l l be shown that the determinants of export performance are 
somewhat d i f f e r e n t from the determinants of the p r o b a b i l i t y of 
export ing in the f i r s t instance. 
1. SCALE ECONOMIES 
Given that there are f ixed costs of enter ing export markets, 
i t fo l lows that the larger the f i rm, the greater the p r o b a b i l i t y 
of export ing , for these f ixed costs can be spread over a larger 
volume of s a l e s . Fixed costs inc lude the costs of deal ing with 
government bureaucracies in the export ing and importing country, 
of obta in ing market information and of s e t t i n g up a sa les 
o rgan izat ion abroad. Moreover, importers of ten have no i n t e r e s t 
in small or i r r e g u l a r shipments, so a minimum s i ze may be 
necessary i f any exports are to be suppl ied at a l l . (See Tyler 
1976, pp. 254-260 and Rapp 1976.) 
Once a f i rm incurs the f ixed cost of enter ing fore ign 
markets, one can expect a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between export 
performance and the s i ze of f i rm, where s i z e i s measured in terms 
of domestic s a l e s . If export ing i s motivated by a des i re to 
achieve economies of s c a l e , then f irms with large domestic sa les 
are l i k e l y to export a smaller proport ion of the i r output, for 
they can obtain the b e n e f i t s of l a r g e - s c a l e product ion without 
i n c u r r i n g the extra costs associated with export ing (S le jser et 
a l . 1980). For the same reason, f i rms with a large number of 
establ ishments should export more than would a s i n g l e - p l a n t f i rm 
with a s i m i l a r volume of domestic s a l e s . In a d d i t i o n , the 
ex is tence of f ixed costs of export ing g ives r i s e to sca le 
economies in export a c t i v i t i e s . A minimum volume of exports i s 
often necessary to reduce unit costs to a reasonable l e v e l . This 
minimum looms larger in a small f i rm, producing a negative 
c o r r e l a t i o n between f i rm s i z e and e x p o r t - s a l e s r a t i o s . 
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Auquier (1980, pp. 205-207) notes c o r r e c t l y that there i s an 
a l t e r n a t i v e explanation -for an inverse r e l a t i o n s h i p between f i r e 
Bize and export performance: Such c o r r e l a t i o n could r e s u l t f roa 
product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and demand f a c t o r s as well as sca le 
economies per se. If small f i r»» produce v a r i e t i e s ( s p e c i a l t y 
goods) that do not have mass appeal, or i f small f i rms in an 
industry face more e l a s t i c domestic demand curves than t h e i r 
larger r i v a l s , then i t fo l lows that among f i rms that export , the 
proport ion of output exported w i l l be larger for the small f i r e s . 
In an empir ica l test employing data for i n d i v i d u a l f i rms the only 
way to d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s explanation from the sca le economies 
hypothesis i s that the l a t t e r p r e d i c t s a p o s i t i v e p a r t i a l 
c o r r e l a t i o n between the nuaber of p lants and export performance 
whereas the former would not p r e d i c t , holding f i rm s i z e constant , 
any c o r r e l a t i o n whatsoever between plant s i z e and exports . 
Nevertheless , the two hypotheses are not mutually exc lus ive and 
i t i B poss ib le for both simultaneously to account for greater 
export performance on the part of small f i rms . 
Evidence for a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between f irm s i z e and 
export/sales r a t i o s has been found for Belgium (Glejser et a l . 
1980), France (Auquier 1980), the United Kingdom (Utton 1982), 
Japan (Rapp 1976) and B r a z i l (Fajnzylber 1971, appendix 7, S i l b e r 
1978). Hirsch and Adar (1974) report a p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n 
between f i rm s i z e and export performance for a sample of f i rms 
from Denmark, Holland and I s r a e l , but the study has two de fec ts : 
i ) s i z e was defined as t o t a l sales rather than domestic s a l e s , 
and i i ) i t i s not c lear whether f irms with no exports were 
excluded from the sample. In a l l of these s t u d i e s , with the 
exception of G le jser et a l . , there has been i n s u f f i c i e n t contro l 
for v a r i a t i o n s in other relevant v a r i a b l e s such as type of 
product, c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , export subs id ies and type of 
ownership. 
2. CAPITAL INTENSITY 
Standard (Heckscher-Ohlin) trade theory p r e d i c t s a n e g a t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , whether human, or 
p h y s i c a l , and exports in a c a p i t a l - p o o r , l a b o r - r i c h country l i k e 
B r a z i l . There does ex i s t considerable aggregate evidence for 
B r a z i l in support of t h i s hypothesis . Despite the d i s t o r t i o n s of 
subs id ized c r e d i t , import protect ion and export s u b s i d i e s , 
B r a z i l ' s imports embody, on average, more s k i l l s and phys ica l 
c a p i t a l than do B r a z i l ' s exports . This f i n d i n g , which i s based 
on d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t requirements in product ion , i s true for 
both t o t a l trade and for trade in manufactures (Tyler 1976, ch. 
6, Carvalho and Haddad 1981, Rocca and Mendonca 1972, Hidalgo 
1983). Ty ler (1970) found, on the bas is of d i r e c t requirements 
only , that exports of manufactures in 1965 were more c a p i t a l -
i n t e n s i v e than manufacturing production in general ; but Carvalho 
and Haddad (1981, p. 53) show that the labor i n t e n s i t y of 
i n d u s t r i a l exports increased markedly in the 1967-1974 per iod , so 
T y l e r ' s conc lus ions may not be app l i cab le to l a t e r years. 
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Conventional trade theory may be useful in p r e d i c t i n g 
whether or not a f i rm w i l l export in the f i r s t Instance. Once 
the export dec i s ion has been nade, however, trade theory may be 
of l i t t l e help in exp la in ing the p r o p o r t i o n of output that i s 
exported by a p a r t i c u l a r f i rm. An a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis 
r e l a t i n g c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y to export performance can be der ived 
from i n d u s t r i a l economics. If sca le economies are a d e c i s i v e 
factor in the a l l o c a t i o n of output between fore ign and domestic 
markets, one would expect t h i s fac tor to be more important, 
SL§t§!lL5 ELiCÜlUüt the more c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e the tecniques of 
production employed by the f i rm. Investment in phys ica l p lant 
and equipment tends to be i n d i v i s i b l e or "lumpy," hence a f i rm 
operat ing with c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e techniques w i l l tend to requ i re 
a larger market to reduce average costs to a minimum. In other 
words, holding the s i z e of the domestic market constant , phys ica l 
c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y should have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on export 
performance. S k i l l e d labor tends to be quite d i v i s i b l e compared 
to phys ica l equipment, so no p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t i s pred icted for 
human c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y . 
3. ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
For a d v e r t i s i n g , l i k e c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , there are two 
p l a u s i b l e hypotheses. The Dreze (I960) hypothesis p r e d i c t s a 
negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between a d v e r t i s i n g and exports because 
count r ies l i k e B r a z i l which are minor p a r t i c i p a n t s in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade are not "taste-makers ," hence are expected to 
s p e c i a l i z e in standardized manufactures which compete p r i m a r i l y 
on the bas is of p r i c e . On the other hand, a d v e r t i s i n g i n t e n s i t y 
i s assoc iated with monopol ist ic compet i t ion, and monopol ist ic 
competit ion can be b e n e f i c i a l for exports when the domestic 
market i s protected from import competit ion. 
Consider a protected industry which i s m o n o p o l i s t i c a l l y 
compet i t ive in the sense that there are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d products 
but freedom of entry i n t o , as well as e x i t from, the indust ry . 
In i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets f i rms are l i k e l y to be "pr i ce- takerB" 
which face extremely e l a s t i c demand. In the domestic market 
consumers regard any p a r t i c u l a r f i rm s product as a very 
imperfect s u b s t i t u t e for competing goods produced by other f i r m s , 
so demand i s less than p e r f e c t l y e l a s t i c . Since excess p r o f i t s 
a t t r a c t ent ry , in long-run equ i l ib r ium each f i rm in such an 
industry w i l l produce, in the absence of exports , at a point 
where i t s average cost curve i s tangent to the downward s lop ing 
demand curve that i t faces . This r e s u l t s in the well-known 
"excess capac i ty theorem" of monopol ist ic competit ion in which 
average costs exceed those which would be experienced i f output 
were expanded. The greater the a d v e r t i s i n g expenditures, the more 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d the product , which in turn impl ies a less e l a s t i c 
domestic demand and greater "excess c a p a c i t y . " This excess 
capac i ty can be p r o f i t a b l y u t i l i z e d for export markets so long as 
the marginal revenue from export sa les exceeds the marginal cost 
of product ion. 
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4. FOREISN LICENSES 
Licensees of fo re ign technology and trademarks might, due to 
r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by overseas f i rms , be expected to show a 
lower propensity to export than would be the case in the absence 
of l i c e n s e agreements.' On the other hand, access to f o r e i g n 
technology and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y known brand names might give a 
f i rm a competit ive edge in fore ign markets. The e f f e c t which 
dominates can be determined only by empir ica l a n a l y s i s , not by 
economic theory. 
S. FOREISN OWNERSHIP 
Foreign-owned f i r m s , because of t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
connect ions , are expected, c e t e r i s par ibus , to be more l i k e l y to 
export and to have a better export performance than l o c a l l y owned 
f i rms . Transnat ional f i rms have a greater knowledge of f o r e i g n 
market cond i t ions than do purely l o c a l f i r m s , and have 
organ izat ions already in place in overseas markets. 
6. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 
There e x i s t s a large body of t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e , 
supported by weak empir i ca l evidence, that postu la tes a p o s i t i v e 
c o r r e l a t i o n between market power and export performance. (See 
White 1974, Das 1982, Pagoulatos and Sorensen 1976 and Marvel 
1980.) This reasoning, which i s based l a r g e l y on the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of p r o f i t a b l e p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n (dumping) seems re levant for 
protected markets l i k e those of B r a z i l . If so, one can expect , 
e§Ci.bus, a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n between concentrat ion and 
exports for f i rms with la rge domestic market shares. Auquier 
(1980, p.211) has proposed the a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis that 
"concentrat ion , by promoting more c o l l u s i v e behavior on the home 
market, should induce more small f i rms to export (because they 
f ind t h e i r compet i t ive opt ions on domestic sa les c o n s t r a i n e d ) . " 
I f , at the same time, large f irms take advantage of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , higher concentrat ion should 
r e s u l t in a greater export volume for both dominant f i rms and the 
"competit ive f r i n g e " of small f i r a s . The two hypotheses may thus 
be complementary rather than competing explanat ions of the e f f e c t 
of market s t ruc ture on exports . 
Two studies have pred ic ted an i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n between 
concentrat ion and export performance. Fa jnzy lber (1971, p. 101) 
hypothesized that a negative e f f e c t could r e s u l t in B r a z i l from 
"the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of domestic sales for f i rms which operate in 
h ighly concentrated i n d u s t r i e s . One can assume that the greater 
the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of domestic sa les , the less the incent ive for 
f i rms to enter the compet i t ive i n t e r n a t i o n a l market." Fa jnzy lber 
seems to have had a " s a t i s f i c i n g " view of monopoly power in mind, 
but the data a v a i l a b l e to him (tables 20 and 24) were not 
cons i s tent with the hypothes is . G le jser et a l . (1980, pp. 508-
509) pred ic ted a negative e f f e c t for concentrat ion in i n d u s t r i e s 
producing standardized commodities on the grounds that to export 
from from such i n d u s t r i e s "would invo lve i n c r e a s i n g the demand 
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e l a s t i c i t y and becoming pr i ce- taker« by weakening the 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c interdependence and f a c i l i t y of c o l l u s i o n . " Their 
empir ica l evidence for Belgium supports the hypothes is , but i t 
does not seem to be a p p l i c a b l e to the protected markets of 
B r a z i l . 
7. C O M M E R C I A L POLICY 
In markets with competing imparts, export performance i s a 
funct ion of domestic p r i c e s r e l a t i v e to p r i c e s for export s a l e s . 
Risk f a c t o r s may impede a producer from export ing a l l of h i s 
output, even though i t might be p r o f i t a b l e to do so at a given 
point in time. So long as a producer i s not completely 
s p e c i a l i z e d in the domestic or export markets, as i s the case for 
a l l exporters in our sample, then increases in the domestic p r i c e 
r e l a t i v e to the export p r i c e w i l l cause producers to reduce 
exports in order to s e l l in the more p r o f i t a b l e domestic market. 
Over t ime, changes in both the exchange rate and commercial 
p o l i c y (export subs id ies and import t a r i f f s ) are p o t e n t i a l l y 
important determinants of p r i ces for exports and domestic s a l e s , 
hence of export supply. At a point in t ime, the exchange rate i s 
f i x e d , so i n t e r - i n d u s t r y or i n t e r - f i r m d i f f e r e n c e s in export 
performance w i l l depend soley on corresponding d i f f e r e n c e s in 
commercial p o l i c y . 
Import r e s t r i c t i o n s in many B r a z i l i a n i n d u s t r i e s have 
created markets in which domestic production does not compete 
with imports. As a r e s u l t , a large number of i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
t radable goods have been transformed into what Tyler (1983b) has 
c a l l e d "pseudo nontradables ," but which might more accurate ly be 
descr ibed as "pseudo nonimportables." Domestic p r i ces for these 
goods are determined soley by B r a z i l i a n demand and supply, or by 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c c o l l u s i o n , or by the cost condi t ions of 
monopol is t ica l1y competit ive f i rms. Unless the markets are 
internally competit ive one would not n e c e s s a r i l y expect a 
negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between export performance and the r a t i o of 
domestic to export p r i c e s . In concentrated i n d u s t r i e s , high 
pr i ces may ind icate high p r o f i t s rather than high cos ts . In 
m o n o p o l i s t i c a l l y competit ive i n d u s t r i e s , f i rms with decreasing 
average costs may be able to export incremental production at 
p r i ces well below those p r e v a i l i n g in the protected domestic 
market. 
A large number of t ime-ser ies analyses of the export supply 
of manufactures are now a v a i l a b l e for B r a z i l . A l l ignore changes 
in t a r i f f p o l i c y , and most add changes in export subs id ies to the 
rea l exchange rate v a r i a b l e . A l l researchers , without except ion, 
have found found exports to be very responsive to changes in the 
r e a l , subsidy i n c l u s i v e , exchange r a t e . Braga and Markwald 
(1983, p. 723), a f te r surveying s ixteen of these s t u d i e s , 
conclude that "there e x i s t s a consensus among economists today 
that unity i s a reasonable value for the p r i c e - e l a s t i c i t y of 
the export supply of manufactures." 
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£ £ £ i g r i , one «light expect aggregate export supply to be 
equal ly responsive to changes in the exchange rate and to changes 
in the rate of export subsidy. Both instruments a f f e c t in a 
s i m i l a r manner the amount of loca l currency received by the 
exporter for each d o l l a r of export s a l e s . They d i f f e r in that 
the exchange rate a f f e c t s a l l exporters equal ly in the absence of 
d i f f e r e n t i a l export taxes or mult ip le exchange r a t e s , Hhereas 
export subs id ies are most often product or f i r m - s p e c i f i c . P into 
(1983) separated rea l exchange rate changes from changes in 
export s u b s i d i e s ; using 1954-1974 annual data, he found v i r t u a l l y 
no d i f f e r e n c e between the two e l a s t i c i t i e s . Ty ler (1976), with 
quarter ly data for 1963-1972, somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y found the 
subsidy e l a s t i c i t y to be nearly twice as great as the exchange 
rate e l a s t i c i t y . He a t t r i b u t e d t h i s to greater producer 
conf idence in government support of exports when t h i s support i s 
manifested with s u b s i d i e s , and predicted an eventual convergence 
over time of the two e l a s t i c i t i e s . 
Nith the exception of the present r e p o r t , there have been no 
studies of the export response to commercial p o l i c y at the leve l 
of the f i rm, and only one study at the industry l e v e l . Ty ler 
(1983a) in a pooled c r o s s - s e c t i o n and t i m e - s e r i e s regress ion 
model found the i n t e r - i n d u s t r y v a r i a t i o n in export growth to be 
r e l a t e d negat ive ly to changes in nominal t a r i f f s and p o s i t i v e l y 
to changes in export s u b s i d i e s . Only the former v a r i a b l e was 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , perhaps as a r e s u l t of aggregation and 
the large i n t e r - f i r m v a r i a t i o n in rates of subsidy within each 
i n d u s t r y . (See chapter III of t h i s r e p o r t . ) 
In the regress ion a n a l y s i s of chapter V, a measure of the 
degree of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n (value added/output) of each f i rm 
i s included as an explanatory var iab le for export performance. 
This i s intended to act as a proxy for the importance of the 
"drawback" prov i s ion for duty- f ree importat ion of inputs used in 
the production of exports . Information on use of the drawback 
system i s not a v a i l a b l e for i n d i v i d u a l f i rms , but in 1978, the 
year of our sample, over 40X of manufactured exports contained at 
least some inputs imported with the drawback scheme. The d o l l a r 
value of these duty- f ree imports amounted to 277. of the value of 
the corresponding exports . (See Musalem 1983.) The drawback 
p r i v i l e g e i s undoubtedly valuable to f i rms that make use of i t 
for, desp i te the l i m i t e d a v a i l a b i l i t y of data, Musalem was able 
to f ind evidence of a high e l a s t i c i t y of s u b s t i t i o n between 
imported inputs and domest ica l ly produced inputs . The 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of inputs at i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e s should be most 
useful to the export ing f i rm which purchases a s u b s t a n t i a l 
por t ion of i t s inputs from other f irms in the economy, i . e . to 
the f i rm with a low r a t i o of value-added to output. For t h i s 
reason a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p is expected, c e t e r i s par ibus , 
between v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n and export performance. 
Exporters with varying degrees of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n can 
a lso be a f f e c t e d d i f f e r e n t i a l l y by i n d i r e c t taxes, but B r a z i l i a n 
taxes appear to be neutra l in th i s respect . Producers in B r a z i l 
pay a tax on i n d u s t r i a l products known as IPI. Although the IPI 
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rate v a r i e s f ro* product to product, i t i s e f f e c t i v e l y a va lue-
added tax. Firm» r ece ive c r e d i t s for IPI that the government has 
c o l l e c t e d on inputs purchased from other f i rms in the economy. 
If a product i s sold in the domestic econommy, the f irm pays the 
IPI rate for that good, l ess the IPI tax c r e d i t s for purchased 
intermediate goods. As i s well known, t h i s system i s neutral 
with respect to tax burden of f irms with d i f f e r i n g degrees of 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . If a product i s exported, the f i rm i s 
exempted from the IPI but r e t a i n s the IPI tax c r e d i t s on any 
purchased inputs . The tax system is thus neutra l as well with 
respect to exporters which d i f f e r in t h e i r degree of v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n . An exporter which purchases no inputs from the rest 
of the economy <100?. v e r t i c a l l y integrated) pays no IPI at a l l 
whereas an exporter which depends on outs ide s u p p l i e r s receive• a 
tax c r e d i t for IPI paid on purchased inputs . These border tax 
adjustments are not export s u b s i d i e s , but rather a method of 
excluding the f u l l value of exports from i n d i r e c t taxat ion . 
Ty ler (1976, pp. 204-209) agrees that re tent ion of IPI tax 
c r e d i t s by the exporter does not c o n s t i t u t e an export subsidy 
"for s o c i e t y as a whole," but argues that i t does c o n s t i t u t e a 
subsidy for the exporter , a subsidy which i s paid by the 
s u p p l i e r s of intermediate inputs: 
6reater IPI tax benef i t s w i l l be accrued by products 
with more stages of production and lower degrees of 
i n d u s t r i a l v e r t i c a l i z a t i o n . Thus, a producer adding 
very l i t t l e i n d u s t r i a l value added can stand to benef i t 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y from the previous IPI tax c r e d i t 
mechanism when he exports . In fact i t i s t h i s kind of 
f i rm that stands to gain the most. A la rge , more 
v e r t i c a l l y integrated f irm that exports does not enjoy 
commensurate f i s c a l benef i t s v ia the tax c r e d i t 
mechanism for IPI paid on previous stages of 
product ion, (p. 209) 
This i s an i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y , but there seems to be a 
l o g i c a l error in the argument. The "producer adding very l i t t l e 
value added" rece ives a rebate for the IPI tax that was included 
in the p r i c e of purchased inputs . The "more v e r t i c a l l y 
integrated f irm" rece ives less rebate because no tax was paid on 
inputs produced within the f i rm. Nonetheless, i f the exporters 
themselves behave at i f IPI tax c r e d i t s were s u b s i d i e s , t h i s 
would be another reason to expect a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n and export performance. 
6. PLANT LOCATION 
Plant locat ion can a lso have an independent e f f e c t on export 
performance, p a r t i c u l a r l y in such a d iverse country as B r a z i l , 
and i t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to test t h i s hypothes is . Unfortuna-
t e l y , the necessary data for such a test were not a v a i l a b l e . The 
data a v a i l a b l e for the present study do conta in information on 
the l o c a t i o n of the head o f f i c e of each f i rm, but t h i s need bear 
no r e l a t i o n to the l o c a t i o n of a f i r m ' s product ion f a c i l i t i e s . 
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III. DKICKIPTIVC AND NQNPARAHCTKIC ITATIITIM 
1. THE DATA BASE 
A vast micro data base has been assembled to t e s t the 
hypotheses d i scussed in the preceeding chapter . The f u l l set of 
data c o n s i s t s of 15 041 f i r m s , of which 3 562 r e g i s t e r e d exports 
in the f i s c a l year 1978. To f a c i l i t a t e the s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s , 
107 f i r m s which recorded v i r t u a l l y no domestic s a l e s were de le ted 
f r o * the sample, as were 2 282 f i r e s (101 expor ters ) which showed 
negat ive value-added or f a i l e d to repor t the number of eap loyeec . 
S ixteen i n d u s t r i e s producing "non-tradableB" such as rock , b r i c k s 
and mineral water were a l s o d e l e t e d , reduc ing the sample s i z e to 
a t o t a l of 12 435, of which 3 345 export to f o r e i g n markets. 
The main data source c o n s i s t s of c o r p o r a t e inco«e tax 
r e t u r n s f i l e d in 1979. These r e f e r to the f i s c a l year 1978, 
which v a r i e s by f i r * and need not c o i n c i d e with the ca lendar 
year . To improve i n t e r - f i r m c o m p a r a b i l i t y of th* i n f o r m a t i o n , the 
data f o r f i rms with a f i s c a l year ending be fore December 1978 
were adjusted upwards accord ing to v a r i a t i o n s in the i n d u s t r i a l 
wholesale p r i c e index. S ince income tax r e t u r n * do not c o n t a i n 
employment i n f o r n a t i o n , these data were taken f r o * th* avarag* 
l e v e l s of employment reported on the i n d u s t r i a l product tax (IPI) 
forms in the ca lendar year 1978. I n d i v i d u a l f i r m s are n o t , of 
course , i d e n t i f i e d , and to insure c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y f o u r - d i g i t 
i n d u s t r i e s with fewer than s ix f i rms were not inc luded in the 
data base. 
Each f i r m has been a l l o c a t e d to the i n d u s t r y which accounts 
for the l a r g e s t p r o p o r t i o n of i t s t o t a l s a l e s . There i s no way 
of knowing the extent to which a f i rm produces products o u t s i d e 
i t s main i n d u s t r y , or the extent to which the i n d u s t r y 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by t o t a l s a l e s t r u l y r e f l e c t s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
s a l e s in export markets. 
As shown in t a b l e 1, the vast major i ty of the f i rms in our 
sample are under n a t i o n a l p r i v a t e ownership. Fore ign ownership 
i s a c h a r a t e r i s t i c of 841 f i r m s , where ownership i s de f ined 
qu i te broad ly as more than ten percent of t o t a l e q u i t y . An 
a d d i t i o n a l 245 f i r * s have l i c e n s i n g agreeaents with overseas 
f i r m s . Only 21 f i rms in the sample are p u b l i c l y owned or "mixed" 
e n t e r p r i s e s , a consequence of the d e l e t i o n of h i g h l y concentrated 
i n d u s t r i e s from the data base. 
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As can be seen in tab le 2, foreign-owned f i r»» account for 
33'/. of the domestic sa les and nearly 39X of the exports of f i rms 
in our sample. The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t ransnat iona l f i r e s i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y high in the machinery, e l e c t r i c a l equipment, 
t ransport equipment, rubber, pharmaceutical and cosmetics 
subsectors . In c o n t r a s t , there i s l i t t l e fore ign d i r e c t 
investment in the wood, f u r n i t u r e , c l o t h i n g , footwear or p r i n t i n g 
subsectors . In a l l but seven of the 21 subsectors , t ransnat iona l 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in exports exceeds p a r t i c i p a t i o n in domestic s a l e s . 
Transnat iona ls tend to account for a la rger share of value-added 
than of employment in each subsector . This i s understandable 
because foreign-owned f i rms tend to be larger than t h e i r l o c a l l y 
owned counterpar ts , and large f irms are known to use quite 
c a p i t a l - and s k i l l - i n t e n s i v e techniques of product ion compared to 
small f i r m s . There i s a lso some tendency for the t r a n s n a t i o n a l s 
share of export subs id ies to exceed t h e i r share of exports , but 
t h i s may a lso be a r e s u l t of the i r larger s i z e . 
Table 1 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Sample by Subsector 
Number of Firms 
Foreign Foreign Pub l i c 
Subsector J o t a l Export L i cense _0wner_ _F i r 
TOTAL 12 439 3 349 243 841 21 
Non-metal l i c minerals 391 102 10 26 
Basic i r o n and s tee l 256 108 12 21 4 
Basic non-ferrous 166 39 2 16 
Metal products 1 002 260 14 64 
Machinery 1 047 475 53 169 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment 523 232 20 96 
Transport equipment 371 184 22 50 1 
Wood 528 122 4 6 
Furni ture 481 84 6 5 
Pulp and paper 806 85 2 23 
Rubber products 365 54 2 11 
Leather 594 129 2 6 
Chemicals 581 197 19 92 2 
Pharmaceut ica l , cosmetics 739 86 9 67 2 
P l a s t i c s 418 84 9 19 
T e x t i l e s 859 377 26 56 1 
C loth ing 639 104 3 8 
Footwear 272 136 1 3 
Food and tobacco 1 715 332 13 53 4 
P r i n t i n g 300 17 11 7 6 
Other manufactures 382 138 5 43 1 
Source: 1978 data base. 
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Tabi* 2 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Foreign-Owned F i r n s in T o t a l Employment, 
Value-Added, Domestic S a l e s , Expor ts , and Export S u b s i d i e s 
(percentage) 
i x B ° r t _ S u b s i d i e s 
Income 
Employ- Va lue- Domestic Export Export Tax 
ment added Sa les Sa les C r e d i t Exemption 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 26.1 35.9 33.0 38. 8 47. 9 33. 9 
N o n - m e t a l l i c minera l s 22.4 29.2 28.4 32. 3 41. 1 40. 4 
Bas ic i r o n and s t e e l 26.4 37. 1 34.9 18. 7 21. 3 17. 8 
B a t i c n o n - f e r r o u s 18.2 24. 1 22.4 38. 2 51. 1 23. 7 
Metal products 19.1 30.8 25.4 43. 7 34. 8 37. 6 
Machinery 34.8 47. 1 43.5 59. 5 52. 1 44. 8 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment 54.7 66.5 62.4 80. 0 81. 4 58. 6 
Transport equipment 53.7 60.0 69.0 67. 2 75. 2 48. 2 
Mood 5.9 5 .3 3.3 14. 8 18. 1 9. 0 
F u m i tu re 4 .9 6 .3 5 .3 3. 1 3. 4 4. 5 
Pulp and paper 14.6 21.4 19. 1 22. 7 23. 2 32. 2 
Rubber products 45. 1 67.8 70.7 83. 0 84. 4 88. 3 
Leather and goods 9.6 13.9 11.9 21. 1 17. 2 4. 9 
Chemicals 32.0 25.1 20.3 9. 2 24. 3 18. 4 
Pharm., cosmet ics 46.9 59.0 54.3 57. 9 48. 9 57. 8 
P l a s t i c s 11.9 17.8 17.9 20. 0 25. 9 12. 2 
Text i1es 19.5 27.2 27.4 36. 6 36. 2 45. 3 
C l o t h i n g 3.1 5.6 5.1 6. 9 10. 2 0. 8 
Footwear 2.9 2 .7 4.0 0. 9 1. 7 0. 0 
Food and tobacco 12.6 20.6 20.4 30. 1 32. ,5 28. 2 
P r i n t i n g 4 .7 5.6 4 .9 0. 1 0. 9 1. 7 
Other manufactures 27. 1 39.9 34.0 24. 7 36. ,5 47. 1 
Source: 1978 data base. 
Note: A foreign-owned f i r m i s def ined as one in which non-
r e s i d e n t s c o n t r o l more than ten percent of the e q u i t y . 
2. FIRN SIZE AND EXPORTS 
Table 5 snows the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 3345 e x p o r t e r s by s i z e 
and by s u o s e c t o r . Near ly ha l f of the e x p o r t e r s i n the sample 
reported adjusted t o t a l s a l e s in excess of 100 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s 
( f i v e and a h a l f mii1 ion d o l l a r s ) in 1978. The t y p i c a l exporter 
in the manufactur ing s e c t o r i s thus a l a r g e f i r m , l a r g e at l e a s t 
by B r a z i l i a n s t a n d a ' c s . 
21 
Table 4 reports the percentage of f i r e s in the t o t a l saaple 
represented by expor ters , again by s i z e c l a s s and by subsector . 
The percentage of f i rms which export increases s t e a d i l y f roa l e s s 
than one percent in the s a a l l e s t s i z e c l a s s to nore than s i x t y 
percent for f i r e s with t o t a l sa les of «ore than 100 a i l l i o n 
c r u z e i r o s . This tendency i s present in each of the 21 
Table 3 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of Exporters by S ize and Subsector 
(number of f i rms) 
S ize C lass 
I II III IV V VI VII V i l i 
TOTAL 9 19 40 63 244 969 778 1631 
Non-metal l ic minerals 0 0 1 1 8 16 19 57 
Basic i ron and s tee l 0 0 1 0 3 16 18 70 
Bas ic non-ferrous metals 0 0 0 0 2 2 11 24 
Metal products 1 1 5 3 14 37 79 120 
Machinery 1 1 4 11 41 105 118 194 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment 0 1 1 1 13 35 60 121 
Transport equipment 0 1 1 1 13 30 30 108 
Mood 0 2 2 2 12 28 34 42 
Furn i tu re 2 0 2 1 2 21 31 25 
Pulp and paper 1 0 0 1 9 11 16 47 
Rubber products 0 0 1 3 6 11 10 23 
Leather and leather goods 1 1 6 9 14 31 35 32 
Chemicals 1 3 2 2 10 21 46 112 
Pharmaceut ical , cosmetics 0 1 3 3 7 11 13 48 
P l a s t i c s 0 0 3 3 8 11 19 40 
T e x t i l e s 0 0 1 à 11 49 92 218 
C lo th ing 0 4 1 4 12 27 25 31 
Footwear 0 0 1 5 17 49 34 30 
Food, beverages, tobacco 2 0 3 4 21 24 53 225 
P r i n t i n g 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 13 
Other manufactures 0 0 2 3 19 30 33 51 
Source; 1978 data base. 
Note: The s i z e c lasses are defined as f o l l o w s : 
1 Less than 2 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
II 2 - 4 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
III 4 -• 8 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
IV 8 - 12 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
V 12 - 25 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
VI 25 - 50 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
VII 50 - 100 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
VIII More than 100 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in sa les 
During 1978 the average exchange rate was 18 c r u z e i r o s per U.S. 
d o l l a r . 
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subsectors . It would appear, then, that increased s i ze increases 
the p r o b a b i l i t y that a f i rm w i l l export . S ize in i t s e l f i s , 
however, no guarantee that a f i rm w i l l export , and f i rms of qui te 
modest s i z e do export to fore ign markets. Mith in each i n d u s t r y , 
the t o t a l sa les of the smallest exporter i s but a small 
percentage — usual ly l ess than one percent — of the sa les of 
Table 4 
Percentage of Firms Which Export by Size and Subsector 
S ize Class 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
TOTAL 0.6 2.1 4.2 7.4 14.9 23.9 39.8 61, ,9 
Non-metal l ic minerals 0 0 4.0 14.3 19.0 23.2 31.7 48. ,7 
Basic i ron and stee l 0 0 16.7 0 15.0 32.0 32.7 67, ,3 
Basic non-ferrous 0 0 0 0 6.9 6.7 36.7 54. ,5 
Netal products 0.9 3.4 7.7 4.0 11.0 17.8 40.7 61, ,9 
Machinery 2.0 4.0 6.2 15.3 28.3 41.5 57.6 84, ,0 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment 0 6.3 5.9 5.0 21.0 28.9 55.6 74, ,2 
Transport equipment 0 20.0 7.7 8.3 38.2 38.0 42.9 76, ,6 
Wood 0 4.8 4.0 3.9 14.0 28.6 52.3 71, ,2 
Furni ture 2.7 0 5.9 2.8 2.5 21.0 35.2 61, ,0 
Pulp and paper 0.7 0 0 1.4 6.9 12.0 25.8 49, ,5 
Rubber products 0 0 2.9 6.8 13.0 30.6 29.4 74. ,2 
Leather , leather goods 0.5 1.3 6.9 21.4 20.6 56.4 92. 1 94, , 1 
Chemicals 12.5 23.1 10.5 8.3 15.4 16.9 40.0 52, ,6 
Pharm., cosmetics 0 1.0 2.7 5.3 6.5 17.2 27. 1 53, ,3 
P l a s t i c s 0 0 11.1 9.7 10.5 11.6 23.5 54, 8 
T e x t i l e s 0 0 5.0 13.3 12.4 26.8 48.4 74, ,9 
C loth ing 0 8.0 2.0 6.2 10.6 20.9 27.8 47, , 7 
Footwear 0 0 8.3 25.0 36.2 64.5 69.4 81, , 1 
Food, tobacco 0.8 0 2.2 4.3 12.9 12.5 20.5 44, ,3 
P r i n t i n g 0 0 0 0 4.7 0 4.3 35, , 1 
Other manufactures 0 0 10.0 12.5 31.1 39.5 48.5 75, ,0 
Source: 1978 data base. 
Note: The s i z e c lasses are defined as f o l l o w s : 
I Less than 2 m i l l i o n c ruze i ros in s a l e s . 
II 2 - 4 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
I l l 4 - 8 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
IV 8 - 1 2 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
V 1 2 - 2 5 m i l l i o n c ruze i ros in s a l e s . 
VI 25 - 50 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s in s a l e s . 
VII 50 - 100 m i l l i o n c ruze i ros in s a l e s . 
VIII More than 100 m i l l i o n c ruze i ros in s a l e s . 
During 1978 the average exchange rate was 18 c r u z e i r o s per U.S. 
d o l l a r . 
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the l a r g e s t non-exporter . Factors other than s i z e obvious ly 
a f f e c t the dec i s ion to enter export markets, and these f a c t o r s 
are analysed in chapter IV. 
Two measures of cent ra l tendency — the median and the mean 
— are reported in tab le 5 for the export/sa les r a t i o s of 
exporters in each manufacturing subsector . For the sample as a 
whole, the median r a t i o i s only four percent whereas the mean 
r a t i o i s f i f t e e n percent . This suggests a h igh ly skewed 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , with a large number of exporters r e g i s t e r i n g very 
low e x p o r t - s a l e s r a t i o s . A logar i thmic t ransformat ion of the 
data i s thus appropr iate for a n a l y t i c a l techniques , such as 
ord inary least squares regress ion , that assume a normal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Table 6 reports three c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s for exporters 
in the e n t i r e manufacturing sector and in each subsector . Rank 
c o r r e l a t i o n has been used because i t does not requ i re any 
assumption regarding the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the under ly ing data. 
The f i r s t c o r r e l a t i o n reported , that between exports and domestic 
Table S 
Export/Sales Ratios (percentages) 
Number 
of f irms median 
Standard 
mean d e v i a t i o n 
TOTAL 3343 3.97 15.25 24.16 
Non-metal l ic minerals 
Basic i r o n and s tee l 
Basic non-ferrous metals 
Metal products 
Machinery 




Pulp and paper 
Rubber products 
Leather and leather goods 
Chemicals 
Pharmaceutical and cosmetics 
P l a s t i c s 
T e x t i l e s 
C loth ing 
Footwear 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
P r i n t i n g 
Other manufactures 
102 1.79 12.33 
108 7.49 17.16 
39 2.18 12.67 
260 1.97 6.43 
475 4.77 10.64 
232 2.50 7.56 
184 2.92 10.09 
122 20.15 26.87 
84 1.31 5.44 
85 0.96 7.44 
54 1.56 5.87 
129 15.27 23.63 
197 2.86 18.30 
86 1.70 3.82 
84 0.97 2.69 
377 5.25 14.83 
104 2.06 11.44 
136 48.24 45.21 
332 14.55 30.15 
17 0.58 1.72 
138 4.54 15.98 
25.07 
21.30 



















Source: 1978 data base. 
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s a l e s , tends to be p o s i t i v e , which shows that f i rms which rank 
high in export r e c e i p t s tend also to rank high in sa les to the 
B r a z i l i a n market. But most c o e f f i c i e n t s are well below u n i t y , 
which suggests that the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s far from p e r f e c t . The 
second c o e f f i c i e n t reports the c o r r e l a t i o n between export/sa les 
r a t i o s and t o t a l s a l e s . This s t a t i s t i c tends to be small and not 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero. When the c o r r e l a t i o n i s 
measured between domestic sa les and the export r a t i o , there i s a 
negative r e l a t i o n s h i p in 19 subsectors , and the negative 
c o e f f i c i e n t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in ten subsectors . 
Large f i rms in terms of domestic sa les thus tend to export a 
smaller proport ion of t h e i r t o t a l output; but the t ransport 
equipment subsector represents a s i g n i f i c a n t exception to t h i s 
general pattern . 
Table 6 
Spearman Rank C o r r e l a t i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s for Exporters: 
Exports and Domestic Sales 
Exports and X/S and X/S and 
i92®lt l£_f i l§® t o t a l _ s a l e s dgmestic_sales 
TOTAL .295*« -.022 -.232#t 
Non-metal l ic minerals .311*« - .111 - . 189 
Basic i ron and stee l .462** .009 - . 191* 
Basic non-ferrous metals .267 - .031 -.161 
Metal products .484** .035 -.061 
Machinery .501** .118* - .018 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment .522** .048 - .016 
Transport equipment .623** .281** . 171* 
Wood . 123 - .070 -.440** 
Furni ture .251* - . 177 - .233* 
Pulp and paper .511** - .076 - . 143 
Rubber products .508** .010 -.081 
Leather , leather goods .364** . 138 - .186* 
Chemicals .014 - .350** - .524** 
Pharmaceut ical , cosmetics .601** - . 127 - . 157 
P l a s t i c s .601** - .097 - . 131 
T e x t i l e s .272** .065 - . 174** 
C loth ing .215* - .031 - .219* 
Footwear - .167 - .007 -.671«* 
Food, beverages, tobacco .152** - .048 -.461** 
P r i n t i n g .618** .071 .071 
Other manufactures .271** .008 - .200* 
Source: 1978 data base. 
* C o e f f i c i e n t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l 
in a two-ta i led t e s t . 
** C o e f f i c i e n t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l 
in a two-ta i led t e s t . 
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In sum, the d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s reported here provide 
cons iderable support for the hypothesized importance of sca le 
economies: Because of the high f ixed cost of export ing, larger 
f i rms are more l i k e l y to export than are small f i rms . However, 
among the f i rms that do export , f irms with small domestic market 
sa les are l i k e l y to have a higher r a t i o of exports to s a l e s , for 
they have the most to gain from scale economies (cost reduct ions) 
through exports . Nevertheless , the subsector leve l i s rather 
aggregate, and we have not yet controled for v a r i a t i o n s in 
v a r i a b l e s other than s i z e which a f f e c t the p r o b a b i l i t y of 
export ing and subsequent expert performance. 
3. FIRM SIZE AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
Such c lear evidence of a negative a s s o c i a t i o n between export 
r a t i o s and domestic sa les i s somewhat s u r p r i s i n g , for the system 
of export subs id ies in e f f e c t in 1978 d i s c r i m i n a t e d against the 
small f i rm. As reported in tab le 7, there i s a h igh ly 
s i g n i f i c a n t and p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between export volume and 
the the ra te of subsidy through both the export c r e d i t (SI) and 
the income tax exemption <S2). O v e r a l l , the smaller the 
exporter , the smaller the export subsidy as a percentage of 
exports . This i s genera l ly true within each of the 21 subsectors 
as we l l , the only notable exceptions being basic non-ferrous 
metals and f u r n i t u r e . When the data are disaggregated to 139 
i n d u s t r i e s , s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s 
between export volume and the sum of SI plus S2 are evident in 33 
i n d u s t r i e s . (See appendix B.) This i s more than f i v e times the 
number that would be expected by chance at the leve l of 
confidence employed. Moreover, not one of the s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s c a r r i e s a negative s ign . 
Our data base does not contain any informat ion on subs id ized 
c r e d i t r e c e i v e d in conjunct ion with exports , but t h i s f i n a n c i a l 
i n c e n t i v e , though important, i s not l i k e l y to have o f f s e t the 
bias against the small f i rm. On the cont rary , i t i s quite l i k e l y 
that large f i rms obtain a d i spropor t ionate amount of subs id ized 
credi t . 
Most i n t e r e s t i n g l y , 760 exporters in the sample received no 
export c r e d i t in 1978, and 1 229 received no income tax reduct ion 
from t h e i r export a c t i v i t i e s . A t o t a l of 523 exporters - - 15.6"/. 
of the sample — received no f i s c a l incent ive at a l l . With the 
exception of the chemical subsector , unsubsidized exporters tend 
to be much smal ler , on average, than subs id ized exporters . (See 
tab le 8.) Moreover, unsubsidized exporters can be found 
throughout the manufacturing sector : in 106 of the 139 
i n d u s t r i e s , at least one f i rm exported without the benef i t of 
f i s c a l s u b s i d i e s . 
It should be emphasized that the large v a r i a t i o n in rates of 
export subsidy within manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s may well r e f l e c t 
an equal ly large v a r i a t i o n in the types of products that are 
exported. Each f i rm has been a l l o c a t e d to the industry which 
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accounts for the la rgest proport ion of i t s t o t a l s a l e s . The 
exporta of a f i r a aay be quite d i s t i n c t f r o a i t s overa l l s a l e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in the case of l a rge , a u l t i - p l a n t f i r a s . 
Table 7 
Spearman Rank C o r r e l a t i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s for Exporters i Export 
Volume and Rate of F i s c a l Subaidy 
Rank_Correl at i.on_betHeen ExBort*_*Qd 
Total Export Income Tax 
SubsidyJSl C r e d i U S l i ExemetionJS2 
TOTAL . 2 0 2 « .195*» .176** 
Non-metal l ic minerals .320»* .249* .294** 
Basic i ron and s tee l .302»* .229* .248** 
Basic non-ferrous metals - .132 - .176 .071 
Metal products .314** .312** .214** 
Machinery .228** .239** .110* 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment .232** .207** . 149* 
Transport equipment .338** .323** .223** 
Hood . 178* .050 .304** 
F u r n i t u r e .125 .143 .050 
Pulp and paper .332** .421** - .012 
Rubber products .309* .243 .397** 
Leather and leather goods .343** .361** .221** 
Chemicals . 163* . 149* .191** 
Pharmaceutical and cosmetics .263* .236* .302** 
P l a s t i c s .352** .301** .332** 
Texti1es . 186** .149** .177** 
C loth ing .272** .227* .419** 
Footwear .538** .377** .314** 
Food, beverages, tobacco . 117* .085 .229** 
P r i n t i n g .481* .573* .114 
Other manufactures .208* . 162 .233** 
Source: 1978 data base. 
* C o e f f i c i e n t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l 
in a two- ta i led t e s t . 
** C o e f f i c i e n t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l 
in a two- ta i led t e s t . 
Note: Subsidy rate (S, SI and S2) i s def ined as the r a t i o of 
subs id ies to s u b s i d y - i n c l u s i v e export revenue. 
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Table 10 
Average S i z e of A l l E x p o r t e r s and E x p o r t e r s Hi th no S u b s i d i e s 







TOTAL NOSUB TOTAL NOSUB TOTAL NOSUB 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 3343 523 51.0 26.7 383.6 433.5 
N o n - m e t a l l i c m inera l s 102 24 16.0 5 .5 273.6 62.6 
Bas ic i r o n and s t e e l 108 7 89.4 2 .6 678.4 59. 1 
Bas i c n o n - f e r r o u s 39 5 43.6 35. 1 475.3 259.4 
Metal products 260 42 12.6 14.5 207.4 130.5 
Machinery 475 54 27.3 5. 1 213.8 71.5 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment 232 24 38.9 2.4 418.7 216.0 
T ranspor t equipment 184 22 154. 1 2 .7 901.0 95.6 
Mood 122 15 30.9 10. 1 132.6 66.4 
Furn i t u r e 84 17 5.4 0 .7 102.2 50.6 
Pulp and paper 65 20 27.3 2.0 331.5 230.7 
Rubber products 54 16 27.5 1.3 525.8 65.4 
Leather and goods 129 14 22.2 1.1 83.5 32.3 
Chemicals 197 39 55.5 125. 7 1087.4 3735.9 
Pharm., cosmet ics 86 25 12.5 3.8 507.4 175.5 
P I a s t i c s 64 13 4.8 0 .5 228.4 52.5 
T e x t i l e s 377 32 34.3 4.9 255.4 95.2 
CIoth i ng 104 18 8 .5 1.3 114.3 97. 1 
Footwear 136 17 36.0 0.2 81.7 61.1 
Food and tobacco 332 98 175. 1 72.9 614.0 415.8 
P r i n t i n g 17 4 8 .9 0 .3 427. 1 54.5 
Other manufactures 138 17 26.8 3. 1 174.0 79.4 
Source: 1976 data base. 
S u b s i d i z a t i o n of exports v i a income tax exemptions i s 
r e l a t e d to the r a t e of p r o f i t , hence i n d i r e c t l y to c a p i t a l 
i n t e n s i t y . It i s thus understandable that t h i s subs idy 
d i s c r i m i n a t e s a g a i n s t smal l f i r m s , which tend to use l a b o r -
i n t e n s i v e techn iques of p r o d u c t i o n . It i s not c l e a r why the 
export c r e d i t ( c r e d i t o premio) should a l s o d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t 
small e x p o r t e r s . S ince the export c r e d i t in e f f e c t in 1978 
v a r i e d wide ly by p r o d u c t , r a t e s must have been lower for those 
products exported predominant ly by small f i r m s . In a d d i t i o n , 
b u r e a u c r a t i c o b s t a c l e s may have made i t u n a t t r a c t i v e for a small 
expor ter to incur the cost of c o l l e c t i n g a subs idy to which i t 
was e n t i t l e d . 
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IV. LOB IT ANALYSIS OF THE M O I A I I L I T Y OF EXPORTINO 
1. THE L06IT MODEL 
In t h i s chapter a s ing le-equat ion model i s used to measure 
the e f f e c t of economic v a r i a b l e s on the p r o b a b i l i t y that a f i rm 
M i l l be an exporter . The equation to be estimated i s 
where P. = l/( l+e Z i ) ; 1 
Z. = b . +b, InS. +b„lnK. +b,ADV. +b.STATE. +b.LIC. +b.F0R. 
l 0 1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l 6 l 
and the disturbance u. i s an independently d i s t r i b u t e d random 
v a r i a b l e with zero mean. 
Yi i s a dichotomous var iab le which takes the value of 1 i f 
f i rm i exports and 0 i f i t does not. This type of binary choice 
model i s r e f e r r e d to in the l i t e r a t u r e as l o g i t a n a l y s i s . (See 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1976, eh. 8 or Cox 1970.) The model 
r e s t r i c t s the estimated p r o b a b i l i t i e s (the P i ' s ) to the z e r o - t o -
one i n t e r v a l and assumes that a change in an independent v a r i a b l e 
w i l l have i t s greatest impact on the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing 
when P would otherwise be equal to 1/2. At very low or very high 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s , large changes in independent v a r i a b l e s r e s u l t in 
only small changes in the estimated p r o b a b i l i t y . 
Est imation of the l o g i t model presents two re la ted problems. 
F i r s t , i t i s not appropr iate to use ordinary least squares to 
estimate any equation with a dichotomous dependent v a r i a b l e , for 
the error term i s h e t e r o s c e d a s t i s t i c , i . e . the var iance of u. i s 
not the same for a l l observat ions . Since the Yi can assume only 
two d i f f e r e n t values, 0 or 1, observat ions for which the Pi are 
c lose to 0 or 1 w i l l have small var iances whereas those c lose to 
1/2 w i l l have larger var iances . It i s poss ib le to show that 
P i ( l - P i ) i s a cons is tent estimate of the var iance of the error 
term, so weighted least squares can be used to produce 
asymptot i ca l ly e f f i c i e n t and unbiased est imates of the parameters 
of the model. (Kmenta 1971, pp. 425-27 and 461-62.) Secondly, 
the model i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y non l inear , so i t i s necessary to 
i t e r a t i v e l y reweight the least squares r e s u l t s , where the weights 
are the r e c i p r o c a l s of the var iances c a l c u l a t e d from the previous 
i t e r a t i o n . In p r a c t i c e t h i s means that somewhat more computer 
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time i s required than would otherwise be the case. (SAS 
I n s t i t u t e 1982, pp. 36-37.) 
The l o g i t equation can also be expressed in the fo l lowing 
way: 
ln(P ./(1-P . )>=b. +b , 1nS . +b„lnK. +b,ADV. +b.STATE. +b_LIC. +b,F0R. 
i i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i S i 6 i 
where the dependent v a r i a b l e i s the logarithm of the odds that a 
f i rm w i l l export . This equation cannot, of course , be es t iaa ted 
d i r e c t l y , for the logarithms of zero and i n f i n i t y are undefined. 
Therefore the f i r s t equation is the one that was a c t u a l l y 
est imated. 
The independent v a r i a b l e InS r e f e r s to the s i z e of the f i r a 
as measured by the natural logarithm of the c r u z e i r o value of 
adjusted s a l e s . The c o e f f i c i e n t of InS i s expected to be 
p o s i t i v e , for larger f i rms are nore l i k e l y to export than are 
small f i rms given high f i xed costs of export ing . 
C a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y (K) i s def ined as c r u z e i r o value-added per 
employee. Value-added per employee i s h igh ly c o r r e l a t e d with the 
c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y of d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s (Lary 1968) and 
presumably d i f f e r e n t f i rms as wel l . In a d d i t i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e 
to d i v i d e t h i s measure of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y in to human c a p i t a l 
i n t e n s i t y (HK) and phys ica l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y (PHK). The former 
i s measured as the average annual wage whereas the l a t t e r i s 
def ined as non-wage value-added per employee. These two 
v a r i a b l e s could not be c a l c u l a t e d for 21 f i r m s , inc lud ing two 
exporters , which f a i l e d to report the i r 1978 wage b i l l . Measured 
non-wage value-added was negative for 183 f i r m s , so t h e i r 
phys ica l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y (PHK) was set equal to one c r u z e i r o . 
Value-added was estimated as tota l sa les revenue plus change in 
i n v e n t o r i e s less purchases of raw m a t e r i a l s , a d v e r t i s i n g , 
e l e c t r i c i t y , fue l and goods to be r e s o l d . The value-added of 
f i rms whose f i s c a l year d i f f e r e d from the calendar year was 
adjusted by the wholesale p r i ce index in order to make the 
s t a t i s t i c s more comparable between f i r n s . 
In accordance with the Heckscher-Ohlin- theorem, a negative 
c o e f f i c i e n t i s thus expected for c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , whether human 
or p h y s i c a l . Nonetheless i t should be emphasized that our 
measure of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y takes no account of i n d i r e c t labor 
requirements. It i s e n t i r e l y conceivable that a f i rm may be use 
c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e methods of product ion, yet u t i l i z e large 
amounts of u n s k i l l e d labor in the for« of inputs purchased from 
other f i rms in the economy. 
The a d v e r t i s i n g v a r i a b l e (ADV) i s def ined as the r a t i o of 
a d v e r t i s i n g expenditures to domestic s a l e s . Dreze (1960) would 
pred ic t a negative c o e f f i c i e n t for t h i s v a r i a b l e because 
countr ies which have l i t t l e weight in world trade are expected in 
export markets to s p e c i a l i z e in standardized goods which coapete 
on the b a s i s of p r i c e rather than a d v e r t i s i n g . As explained in 
chapter I I , monopol ist ic competit ion in a protected domestic 
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market can conceivably reduce the importance of the "Dreze 
hypothesis" or even produce a p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t . 
STATE i s a dummy v a r i a b l e which takes the value of uni ty i f 
the government holds equity in the f i r m , and the vaue of zero 
otherwise. Eight of the 21 publ ic enterp ises in the sample are 
exporters . No p a r t i c u l a r sign i s expected a p r i o r i for the 
c o e f f i c i e n t of t h i s v a r i a b l e . 
LIC i s a dummy v a r i a b l e which i s equal to one i f a 
f i rm in which res idents own ninety percent or more of the equity 
has a l i c e n s i n g agreement with an overseas f i rm, and zero 
otherwise. Nore than hal f of these 245 f i rms reg i s te red exports 
in 1978. The c o e f f i c i e n t of t h i s v a r i a b l e can be negat ive , i f 
overseas f irms prevent l i censees from competing in export 
markets, or p o s i t i v e , i f access to f o r e i g n technology and 
trademarks gives l i censees a competit ive edge in exports . 
FOR takes a value of one i f non-resident owners hold more 
than ten percent of the equity of a f i rm, and zero i f fore ign 
ownership i s ten percent or l e s s . This v a r i a b l e i s thus broadly 
def ined to inc lude j o i n t ventures of nat iona l and fore ign f i rms 
as well as f o r e i g n - c o n t r o l l e d f i rms . Nearly three-quarters of 
the 841 f i rms in which fo re igners held more than ten percent of 
the equity recorded exports in 1978. A p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t i t 
expected for t h i i v a r i a b l e . 
The same l o g i t model wat estimated for each manufacturing 
tubsector , with only two changet. F i r s t , the STATE dummy wat 
deleted due to an i m u f f i c i e n t number of pub l i c enterpr i ses in 
the sample. Secondly, the dummy v a r i a b l e s LIC and FOR were 
combined into a v a r i a b l e l a b e l l e d LICFOR which takes the value of 
un i ty i f a f i rm has fore ign l i c e n s i n g agreements or fo re ign 
d i r e c t investment amounting to more than ten percent of i t s 
e q u i t y , and zero otherwite . 
2. EMPIRICAL RE8ULT8 
Table 9 reports the mean and standard dev iat ion of the 
explanatory v a r i a b l e s for the sample at a whole at well at for 
the subsets of exporters and nonexporters. Exporters are c l e a r l y " 
larger than nonexporters, u t i l i z e more s k i l l - and c a p i t a l -
in tens ive techniques of production and e x h i b i t a higher r a t i o of 
a d v e r t i t i n g to domettic t a l e t . From the disaggregate data 
reported in appendix tab le C - l , i t can be teen that t h i t i t 
genera l ly true in each tubtector at we l l . The only exceptions 
are rubber p roduct ! , where exportert have low a d v e r t i t i n g r a t i o s , 
and footwear, where exportert output i t t l i g h t l y less c a p i t a l -
in tens ive than that of nonexportert . Nonthelett , i t would not be 
cor rect to conclude that each of these v a r i a b l e s n e c e s s a r i l y has 
a p o s i t i v e impact on the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing , for there are 
s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n ! between the explanatory 
v a r i a b l e i t h e a t e l v e i . (See tab le 10.) F i r e s that export aay be 
r e l a t i v e l y c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e not by v i r t u e of the fact that they 
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«el l part of the i r output to fore ign markets, but rather because 
they are la rge . To determine the independent e f f e c t of c a p i t a l 
i n t e n s i t y on export performance, holding constant other re levant 
v a r i a b l e s such as s i z e , a m u l t i v a r i a t e approach i s needed. 
P r e c i s e l y such an approach i s provided by the l o g i t regress ion 
model. 
Tables 11 and 12 report parameters for 27 equations which 
were estimated by i t e r a t i v e l y reweighted l e a s t squares, the 
weights being the r e c i p r o c a l s of P i ( l - P i ) . In equations 01 and 
04 the in tercept was held constant over a l l f i r m s , whereas in the 
other four equations of tab le 11 i t was allowed to vary by 
subsector . 
a) Firm_Size 
The c o e f f i c i e n t of the logarithm of s a l e s (lnS) i s p o s i t i v e 
as expected and h igh ly s i g n i f i c a n t . Its magnitude ranges from 
0.8 to 0.9 in regress ions employing the f u l l sample of f i r m s , 
which i n d i c a t e s that a ten percent increase in the s i ze of a 
f i rm, as measured by t o t a l s a l e s , i s assoc iated with an eight to 
nine percent increase in the odds of export ing (P/( l -P)>. In the 
subsector regress ions reported in tab le 12 the c o e f f i c i e n t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t in every case at the .01 l e v e l and i t s magnitude 
ranges from a low of 0.47 (chemicals) to a high of 1.67 
(footwear). 
Mean and Standard Deviat ion of Var iab les in Logit Regression 
Table 9 
V a r i a b l e Desc r ip t ion 
Standard 
Mean Deviat ion 



























InPHK ln(non-wage value-added/employee) 11.560 1.736 
nonexporters 11.448 1.883 
exporters 11.864 1.201 
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Table 10 
Simple C o r r e l a t i o n between V a r i a b l e s in L o g i t Regress ion 
InS InK ADV InHK InPHK 
ln8 1.000 0.463 0.066 0. 497 0.340 
InK 0.463 1.000 0.051 0. 696 0.734 
ADV 0.066 0.051 1.000 0. 081 -0 .006 
InHK 0.497 0.696 0.081 1. 000 0.309 
InPHK 0.340 0.734 -0 .006 0. 309 1.000 
Note: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s except that for the c o r r e l a t i o n between 
ADV and InPHK (-0.006) are s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at 
the .01 l e v e l . 
b' C a g i t a l _ I n t e n s i t y 
The v a r i a b l e fo r t o t a l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y (K) i s h i g h l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t and has the negat ive c o e f f i c i e n t suggested by 
standard t rade t h e o r y , but the e l a s t i c i t y i n c r e a s e s markedly in 
a b s o l u t e s i z e from - 0 . 3 5 to -0 .91 when subsector dummies are 
i n c l u d e d in the r e g r e s s i o n . Th is appears to be due to 
o b s e r v a t i o n s in the footwear subsector which are o u t l i e r s with 
respect to t h i s v a r i a b l e and others as w e l l . In r e g r e s s i o n 
equat ion 03, which exc ludes the 272 footwear f i rms but i n c l u d e s 
20 dummy v a r i a b l e s , the est imated e l a s t i c i t y of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y 
i s only - 0 . 3 4 . In 19 of the 21 subsector r e g r e s s i o n s , the 
c o e f f i c i e n t of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y i s n e g a t i v e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y so at 
the .05 l e v e l in a t w o - t a i l e d tes t in n ine e q u a t i o n s . Pulp and 
paper i s the only subsector to show a s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e 
c o e f f i c i e n t fo r c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y . 
When human c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y (HK) and p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l 
i n t e n s i t y (PHK) enter the equat ion , both have the expected 
negat ive c o e f f i c i e n t s , but the abso lute va lue of the c o e f f i c i e n t 
of InHK i s much l a r g e r than that of InPHK. This suggests t h a t ^ 
v a r i a t i o n s in s k i l l i n t e n s i t y , as measured by average wages, have 
a much greater impact on the p r o b a b i l i t y of expor t ing than do 
v a r i a t i o n s in p h y s i c a l p lant and equipment. It should be noted, 
however, that our proxy for p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y i s non-
wage value-added per employee and t h i s may cause a downward b ias 
in the est imate of the a b s o l u t e s i z e of the c o e f f i c i e n t of PHK. 
Output per worker i s known to be h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d with c a p i t a l -
labor r a t i o s , but i t i s a l so a f f e c t e d by t o t a l f a c t o r 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . The small s i z e of the " p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y " 
may thus r e f l e c t the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of s u p e r i o r management on 
both exports and p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
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c) Advert is ing_Intens i ty 
The advert is ing var iab le (ADV) c a r r i e s a s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t in a l l of the equations reported in table 
11. This implies that B r a z i l i a n f i r e s producing h ighly 
advert ised, hence highly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , goods are aore l i k e l y to 
export than are f irms producing standardized commodities. Such a 
f ind ing i s opposite that predicted by the Dreze hypothesis, but 
i t i5 consistent with the existence of "excess capacity" due to 
monopol ist ic competition in the protected B r a z i l i a n market. 
To test whether the p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t for ADV might be a 
product of er rors in the data, 141 observations were deleted in 
which the advertis ing/domestic sales r a t i o was very high (87. or 
h igher) . Regression equations 01 and 02 were then re-estimated 
with the r e s t r i c t e d sample. The c o e f f i c i e n t for adver t i s ing 
a c t u a l l y increased from 5.246 to 14.043 in equation 01 and f roa 
7.299 to 22.960 in equation 02 with l i t t l e e f f e c t on the s i ze or 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of other parameters of the model. The r e s u l t s 
reported in table 11 may thus underestimate the magnitude, though 
not the s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , of the impact of advert i s ing on 
the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing. 
In the subsector regressions l i s t e d in table 12, ADV has a 
p o s i t i v e coe f f i cent in 19 equations and a s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e 
c o e f f i c i e n t in nine equations. In view of the fact that our 
expectation of a p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t i s based on the excess 
capacity theorem of the theory of monopolistic competit ion, i t 
may seem strange that the highest c o e f f i c i e n t s (97.2 and 85.8) 
occur in basic iron and stee l and in basic non-ferrous metals, 
subsectors with very low advert is ing r a t i o s . In in terpret ing 
these subsector r e s u l t s i t i s important to r e c a l l that the data 
re fer to f i rms , not p lants or establ ishments, and each f irm has 
been a l located to the industry which accounts for the largest 
proport ion of i t s to ta l sa les . A r e l a t i v e l y high advert is ing 
r a t i o for a f i rm in the i ron and steel subsector , for example, 
may well be i n d i c a t i v e of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , with considerable 
production and exports from plants operating in monopol i s t i ca l ly 
competit ive i n d u s t r i e s . 
Equal ly noteworthy i s the fact that the c o e f f i c i e n t of ADV 
in the pharmaceutical and cosmetics subsector — everyone's 
example of monopolistic competition — i s quite low (2.1) and not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from zero. Three poss ib le explanations 
of t h i s r e s u l t come to mind. F i r s t , adver t i s ing r a t i o s in t h i s 
subsector are quite high, so the ADV var iab le may be a poor 
ind icator of i n t e r - f i r m var ia t ions in "excess capacity" within 
the subBector. Secondly, industr ies in t h i s subsector have 
r e l a t i v e l y high p r i c e s , and presumably high cos ts , compared to 
fore ign producers. (See appendix table D- l of th i s repor t . ) 
Unless sa les expansion can reduce average costs to a level below 
export pr i ces plus subs id ies , there i s no incent ive to export 
regardless of the existence of "excess c a p a c i t y . " F i n a l l y , 
in te rnat iona l brand names are very important for pharmaceutical 
products, soap and cosmetics, so export markets are l i k e l y to be 
as monopo l i s t i ca l l y competit ive as the domestic market. In t h i s 
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Table 10 
Logit Analys is of the Probab i l i t y of Exporting 




























































































« f i r a s 12 435 12 435 12 163 12 414 12 414 12 142 
Note: The nunbers in parentheses are the asymptotic standard 
errors of the estimated c o e f f i c i e n t s . A s ing le aster isk 
(*) ind icates that a c o e f f i c i e n t i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t from zero at the .05 leve l of confidence and a 
double aster isk (**) indicates s i g n i f i c a n c e at the .01 
l e v e l . 
a/ Excludes footwear. 
Ii/ The constant tern in t h i s regression was allowed to vary by 
subsector. The estimated c o e f f i c i e n t s of the 21 du*ay teras 
are reported in appendix table C-2. 
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Table 10 
L o g i t A n a l y s i s by Subsector of the P r o b a b i l i t y of Expor t ing 
Subsector 
07 N o n - n e t a l 1 i c 
m i n e r a l s 
08 Bas i c i r o n and 
s t e e l 
09 Bas i c n o n f e r . 
metals 
10 Metal p roducts 
11 Machinery 





15 F u r n i t u r e 




20 Pharmaceut. , 
cosmeti cs 
21 P l a s t i c s 
22 T e x t i l e s 
23 C l o t h i n g 
24 Footwear 
25 Food, tobacco 
26 P r i n t i n g 
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( 0 . 2 1 8 ) 
0.697* 































Note; The s t a t i s t i c s in parentheses are the asymptot ic s tandard 
e r r o r s of the c o e f f i c i e n t s . (*) i n d i c a t e s s i g n i f i c a n c e at the .05 
l e v e l of c o n f i d e n c e and (**) at the .01 l e v e l . 
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case the assumption of h igh ly e l a s t i c demand for exports would 
not be warranted and there would be less incent ive to enter 
export markets. 
d > State_Ownersh^B l_Fore^gn_gwnershi E_and_Li cerises 
The c o e f f i c i e n t of the dummy v a r i a b l e STATE i s negat ive , 
which i n d i c a t e s , other th ings equal, that a publ ic enterpr i se i s 
less l i k e l y to export than i s a f i rm under p r i v a t e ownership. 
Nonetheless, the c o e f f i c i e n t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the 
0.05 leve l only when the constant term i s constra ined to be the 
same for a l l subsectors . 
In cont ras t , the c o e f f i c i e n t s of LIC and FOR are 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e , and the l a t t e r i s near ly twice as large 
as the former. The l i c e n s i n g dummy, for some unknown reason, 
loses s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e when the footwear subsector i s 
deleted from the sample. It appears then that one can conclude 
with a high degree of conf idence that fo re ign d i r e c t investment 
in a f i rm increases the odds that the f i rm w i l l be an exporter , 
but such a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t from fore ign l i c e n s i n g agreements i s 
l ess c e r t a i n . In the subsector regress ions reported in tab le 
12, the LICFOR dummy shows a p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t in a l l but two 
subsectors — leather and footwear — and in these two subsectors 
there i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y low incidence of fore ign l i censes and 
fore ign ownership. In only seven subsectors , however, i s a 
p o s i t i v e LICFOR c o e f f i c i e n t s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 leve l of 
conf idence. 
Some experimentation was done that was not successfu l and 
for t h i s reason i s not reported here. The Herf indahl index of 
concentrat ion was entered into the l o g i t regress ion under the 
assumption that small f i rms are induced to export from h igh ly 
concentrated i n d u s t r i e s . In no case was the c o e f f i c i e n t 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero, in contrast to the r e s u l t 
predicted by Auquier (1980, p. 211). An attempt was a lso made 
to enter i n t e r a c t i o n terms of subsector dummies with InS, i . e . to 
allow the s i z e c o e f f i c i e n t to vary by subsector . This 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n proved to be very cos t ly in terms of computer t ime, 
so the attempt was abandoned when convergence f a i l e d to occur 
within a reasonable number of i t e r a t i o n s . 
e ' 11 ^ us tr a t i_on _of _t he_Use _qf _t he_Logit _Par ameter s 
The estimated parameters of the l o g i t equations can e a s i l y 
be used to c a l c u l a t e p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Assume, for example, that 
one wishes to pred ic t the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing for a f i rm 
with 1978 sa les of 100 m i l l i o n c ruze i ros (InS - 18.421), va lue-
added per employee of 180 thousand c r u z e i r o s (InK = 12.101), and 
no a d v e r t i s i n g , s tate ownership, fo re ign l i c e n s e s or fore ign 
owners. From equation 01, the natural logarithm of the odds of 
export ing i s -12.559 + 0.896(18.421) - 0.350(12.101) or -0.289. 
Taking anti1ogarithms and so lv ing for P . , the p r o b a b i l i t y that 
such a f i rm w i l l export i s found to be .43. If the same f i rm i s 
under fore ign ownership, the ca l cu la ted logarithm of the odds 
increases by 0.941 to 0.652 and the p r o b a b i l i l t y of export ing 
increases to .66. 
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It i s a lso p o s s i b l e to see how the p r o b a b i l i t y of export ing 
for each category of f i r e changes as the s i z e of f i r a i n c r e a s e s , 
hold ing a l l other v a r i a b l e s constant. Table 13 reports such an 
exerc ise u t i l i z i n g equation 01 of tab le 11. If equation 02 had 
been used for these c a l c u l a t i o n s , the e f f e c t of s i ze Mould have 
been somewhat smaller and i f equation 03 had been used i t would 
have been l a r g e r . Table 14 reports a s i m i l a r exerc i se for 
changes in c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y and a d v e r t i s i n g , holding s i z e and 
the three dummy terms constant . It should be noted that the 10 
to 14 c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y range corresponds to a range of 22 
thousand to 1.2 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s (approximately 1 200 to ¿6 800 
d o l l a r s ) in value-added per employee. 
Table 13 
I l l u s t r a t i o n of the Re lat ionsh ip between S i z e , Ownership 
and the P r o b a b i l i t y that a Firm w i l l Export 
Total Sales P r o b a b i l i t Y . o t . E x q o r t i n g 
( m i l l i o n 
„c ruze i ros} 
Publ ic 
E n t e r g r i s e 
Pr ivate 
Enterpr i se 




4 .01 .04 .07 . 10 
8 .02 .09 .12 .17 
12 .03 .10 .17 .23 
25 .05 . 18 .28 .36 
50 .09 .29 .42 .51 
100 . 16 .43 .58 .66 
200 .26 .59 .72 .78 
400 .40 .73 .83 .87 
Source: Ca lcu lated from equation 01 of tab le 11 with v a r i a b l e s 
InK and ADV set equal to t h e i r means (12.154 and 
0.007 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . 
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Table 10 
I l l u s t r a t i o n of the R e l a t i o n s h i p between C a p i t a l I n t e n s i t y , 
A d v e r t i s i n g and the P r o b a b i l i t y that a F irm w i l l Export 
Ad ver t i s i n g Cagi t a l In tens i t y b / 
I n t e n s i t y . ! / 10 U 12 13 14 
0 .61 .52 .44 .35 .28 
.01 .62 .54 .45 .37 .29 
.02 .63 .55 .46 .38 .30 
.04 .66 .58 .49 .40 .32 
.10 .73 .65 .57 .48 .39 
Source: C a l c u l a t e d from equat ion 01 of t a b l e 11 with f i r m 
s i z e set equal to 100 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s and the dummy 
v a r i a b l e s STATE, LIC and FOR set equal to z e r o . 
a/ Rat io of a d v e r t i s i n g expend i tures to domestic s a l e s . 
b/ The n a t u r a l l o g a r i t h m of c r u z e i r o s of va lue-added per employee. 
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V. REBRE8SION ANALYSIS OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
Chapter IV analyzed -factors which a f f e c t a f i r m ' s d e c i s i o n 
to enter export markets. In t h i s chapter a t tent ion i s focused on 
a second quest ion: Once the export dec i s ion has been made, what 
determines the a l l o c a t i o n of output between fore ign and domestic 
markets? Data for 3 345 exporters are used to test the 
hypotheses discussed in chapter II. 
1. THE ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION MODEL 
The basic model chosen for a simultaneous tes t of these 
hypotheses draws heav i ly on Gle jser et a l . (1980): 
In (X. ./DS. .) = b .D . + b, D .In (DS. .) + b . , a l n ( E S T . .) + b . . . l n ( K . .) l j u j j k j u 279 u 280 i j 
+ b 2 8 1 f i D V i j + W j + b 2 8 3 S 1 D i j + b 2 8 4 S 1 i j 
+ b 2 8 5 S 2 D i j + b 2 8 6 S 2 i J + b 287 V J + b 288 H j 
+ b ^ S T A T E . . • b ^ L I C . . • b 2 9 1 F0R. . • u . . 
i = 1, 2, . . . , n nj > 2 
j = 1, 2, . . . , 139 
k = 140, 141, . . . , 27.8 
V ° b279> 0 b280 = ?' b 281- ? b 282 < 0 
b283> 0 b284 >0 b285> 0 b286> 0 
b287< 0 b288> 0 b 289 = ? b290= ? b291> 0 
where 
the s u b s c r i p t s i and j r e f e r to the i t h f i rm and the j th 
indust ry , r e s p e c t i v e l y ; 
ln(X. ./DS. . ) , the dependent v a r i a b l e , i s the natural logarithm of 
1 J 1 J t h e r a t i o of exports to domestic s a l e s , so can take 
any p o s i t i v e or negative value. The c r u z e i r o value of 
both exports and sa les for those f i rms whose f i s c a l 
year d i f f e r e d from the calendar year was adjusted by 
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the wholesale p r i c e index for manufactures 10 as to 
make the i n t e r - f i r m s t a t i s t i c s more comparable. Export 
subs id ies are included as a part of the export and 
t o t a l sa les revenue. 
D. i s a dummy v a r i a b l e corresponding to one of the 139 
i n d u s t r i e s to which a f irm belongs; 
D. ln iDS. .) i s the natural logarithm of sa les (in c ruze i ros) 
1 l J m u l t i p l i e d by the industry dummy so that b j , the s i z e 
e l a s t i c i t y , takes a d i f f e r e n t value in each indust ry . 
In another s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h i s model, t h i s v a r i a b l e 
i s replaced by l n ( D S i j ) , const ra in ing the s i z e 
e l a s t i c i t y to be the same for a l l i n d u s t r i e s . 
EST, , i s the number of establ ishments owned by a p a r t i c u l a r 
f i rm; 
K, . i s the value-added (in adjusted c ruze i ros) per employee, 
l J a commonly used proxy for c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y . In 
another vers ion of the model, t h i s v a r i a b l e i s 
replaced by HKij and PHKij , which i s wages per 
employee and non-wage value-added per employee, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . These two v a r i a b l e s are proxies for 
human and phys ica l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t i e s . (See Lary 
1968.) They could not be measured for two f irms which 
f a i l e d to report t h e i r 1978 wage b i l l . Measured non-
wage value-added was negative for 17 of the remaining 
3 343 f i rms , so the i r phys ica l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y was 
set equal to one c ruze i ro so that i t s logarithm could 
be def ined. Value-added was estimated as t o t a l sa les 
revenue plus value of changes in stock less purchases 
of raw m a t e r i a l s , a d v e r t i s i n g , e l e c t r i c i t y , fue l and 
goods to be r e s o l d . 
ADV. . i s a f i r m ' s expenditures on a d v e r t i s i n g expressed as a 
1 J proport ion of domestic s a l e s ; 
T. i s the i m p l i c i t t a r i f f of an i n d u s t r y , measured as the 
J excess p r i ce of domestic over import p r i c e s ; 
SID. . i s a dummy v a r i a b l e which takes the value of one i f an 
l J exporter rece ives an export tax c r e d i t ( c réd i to 
premio) and the value of zero otherwise; 
51. . i s the export tax c r e d i t of a f i rm expressed as a proport ion 
1 J of t o t a l export revenue, inc lud ing export s u b s i d i e s ; 
S2D. . i s a dummy v a r i a b l e which takes the value of one i f a f i rm 
1 J pays reduced corporate income tax by v i r t u e of i t s 
export a c t i v i t y , and the value of zero otherwise; 
52. . i s the export c r e d i t equivalent of the reduct ion in taxable 
1 J income expressed as a proport ion of the f i r m ' s t o t a l 
export revenue. Export c r e d i t s are taxable as income 
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at the standard rate of 30'/., so the export c r e d i t 
equivalent of the reduct ion in taxable income due to 
export a c t i v i t y i s 0.3/0.7 (>0.43) times the reduct ion 
in taxable income. 
V. . i s the r a t i o of value-added to t o t a l output, intended as a 
measure of the degree of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n of the 
f i rm; 
H i s the Herf indahl index of concentrat ion of domestic sa les in 
a p a r t i c u l a r indust ry , def ined as the sum of the 
squares of market shares of the i n d i v i d u a l f i rms; 
STATE i s a dummy v a r i a b l e which takes the value of unity i f the 
government holds equity in the f i r m , and the value of 
zero otherwise; 
LIC. j i s a dummy v a r i a b l e equal to unity i f a n a t i o n a l l y owned 
f i rm has a l i c e n s i n g agreement with an overseas f i rm, 
and equal to zero otherwise; 
FDfT . takes the value of one i f non-resident owners hold more 
than ten percent of the equity of the f i rm and zero i f 
fore ign ownership amounts to ten percent or less of 
the equity; 
an independent error term with zero mean and constant 
var iance . Since the var iance of the dependent 
v a r i a b l e i s a decreasing funct ion of the s i ze of the 
f i rm, the assumption of constant var iance 
(homoscedasticity) was not expected to be r e a l i s t i c . 
Most s u r p r i s i n g l y , a n a l y s i s of the r e s i d u a l s of 
several regress ion equations revealed no evidence of 
h e t e r o s c e d a s t i c i t y , so no c o r r e c t i o n of the ordinary 




2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 15 l i s t s the mean and standard dev iat ion of the 
explanatory v a r i a b l e s which enter the regress ion equat ions, and 
tab le 16 reports the simple c o r r e l a t i o n matrix for these 
v a r i a b l e s . The main regress ion r e s u l t s are shown in table 17, 
which contains estimated c o e f f i c i e n t s for six s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of 
the basic model. Equation 01 has a constant term, but excludes 
the industry dummies (Dj) , which do enter equation 02. The 139 
industry dummies are a lso entered along with dummy-domestic sa les 
i n t e r a c t i o n terms in equation 03. The estimated c o e f f i c i e n t s for 
the industry dummies and i n t e r a c t i o n terms can be found in 
appendix D. Equations 04 through 06 are i d e n t i c a l to the f i r s t 
three equations except that human and phys ica l c a p i t a l replace 
the c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y v a r i a b l e . 
In genera l , the regress ion r e s u l t s are most s a t i s f a c t o r y 
from the point of view of goodness of f i t . In equation 01 a l l of 
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the estimated c o e f f i c i e n t s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero 
at the .01 leve l of confidence in a two- ta i led t e s t , and in 
equation 04 a l l but one c o e f f i c i e n t i s s i g n i f i c a n t at t h i s l eve l 
of conf idence. The industry terns add cons iderably to the 
explanatory power of the equation, for the c o e f f i c i e n t of 
determination (R ) increases from .33 to .79 with the add i t ion of 
industry dummies, and again to .81 when the c o e f f i c i e n t of 
domestic sa les i s allowed to vary by indust ry . The f u l l model 
thus "expla ins" more than 807. of the v a r i a t i o n of the dependent 
var i able . 
Rather than d iscuss each s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the model in turn , 
i t seems pre ferab le to present the r e s u l t s by v a r i a b l e , as they 
r e l a t e to the hypotheses discussed in chapter II . 
Table IS 
Mean and Standard Deviat ion of Var iab les in Regression 
y iC ì§b le_and_Descr ipt ion 
Standard 
Mean Deviat ion 
1 n(X. ,/DS. .) 
1J 1J 
I n t r a t i o of exports/domestic sa les) -3.087 (2.539) 
InDS. . 
1J 
lntdomestic sa les) 18.234 (1.593) 
InEST. . 
1J 
ln(number of establ ishments) 0.512 (0.683) 
InK. . 
1J 
In(value-added per employee) 12.305 (0.720) 
InHK. . 
1J 
ln(wage b i l l per employee) 11.207 (0.635) 
InPHK.. 
1 : 
In(non-wage value-added/employee) 11.864 (1.201) 
ADV. . 
1J 
advert is ing/domest ic sa les 0.010 (0.033) 
T i 
i m p l i c i t t a r i f f 0. 180 (0.325) 
SI. . 
1J 
export c red i t/expor ts 0. 131 (0. 126) 
S 2 U 
p r o f i t tax subsidy equi vai ent/ex ports 0.022 (0.029) 
V. . 
1J 
value-added/output 0.355 (0.161) 
H. ' Herf indahl index of concentrat ion 0. 069 (0.091) 
STATE-owned enterpr i ses 
L icens ing agreements with fore ign f irms 
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• > iÇ§ i§ .Eçonga ies 
When the c o e f f i c i e n t of the domestic sa les v a r i a b l e i s 
constra ined to be i d e n t i c a l for a l l 139 i n d u s t r i e s , i t s sign i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y negative as hypothesized. (See equations 01, 02, 
04 and 05 of tab le 17.) The c o e f f i c i e n t of the establ ishment 
v a r i a b l e i s a lso h ighly s i g n i f i c a n t and has the p o s i t i v e s ign 
pred ic ted by the sca le economies hypothesis . Most i n t e r e s t i n g l y , 
the absolute s i z e of the c o e f f i c i e n t of InEST i s considerably , 
smal ler than that of InDS. This suggests that a doubling of the 
number of p lants per f i rm has less impact on export r a t i o s than 
does a 50"/. reduct ion in domestic s a l e s . In shor t , there i s 
strong evidence of the importance of economies of sca le at the 
plant l e v e l , but the r e s u l t s also lend some support to the 
cons iderat ions of product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and demand f a c t o r s 
s t ressed by Auquier (1980). 
Table 16 
C o r r e l a t i o n Matrix 
InDS InK InHK InPHK ADV T SI 82 V H 
In(X/DS) - .363 - .004 - .145 .001 .123 - .059 .025 .108 - .104 .032 
InDS 1.000 .305 .366 .230 -.128 - .047 .033 .039 - .092 .132 
InK .305 1.000 .757 .753 .017 .075 - .063 .145 - .002 .113 
InHK .366 .757 1.000 .398 .043 .128 - .043 - .049 .060 .063 
InPHK .230 .753 .398 1.000 - .030 .031 - .035 .176 .034 .060 
ADV - .128 .017 .043 - .030 1.000 .067 - .011 - .002 .016 .077 
T - .047 .075 .128 .031 .067 1.000 .007 .052 .211 .018 
SI .033 - .063 - .043 - .035 -.011 .007 1.000 .082 .115 - .011 
82 .039 .145 - .049 .176 - .002 .052 .082 1.000 .274 .024 
V - .092 - .002 .060 .034 .016 .211 .115 .274 1.000 - .085 
H .132 .113 .063 .060 .077 .018 -.011 .024 - .085 1.000 
Note: C o e f f i c i e n t s with an absolute value of .034 or greater 
are s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 leve l and 
c o e f f i c i e n t s with an absolute value of .044 or greater 
are s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l . 
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Equation 03 i s a r igorous test of the sca le economies 
hypothes is , for in t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n both the in te rcept and the 
domestic sa les c o e f f i c i e n t are allowed to vary by indust ry . As 
can be seen in appendix D, the sa les e l a s t i c i t i e s are negative in 
121 of the 139 i n d u s t r i e s , s i g n i f i c a n t l y so at the .01 leve l in 
50 i n d u s t r i e s . In c o n t r a s t , none of the p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s 
are s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero at the .05 leve l of 
conf idence. Estimated e l a s t i c i t i e s of l ess than -1 i n d i c a t e that 
inc reas ing domestic sa les i s associated not only with a d e c l i n e 
in the expor t - sa les r a t i o , but also with an absolute dec l ine in 
export volume. It i s thus noteworthy that 40 of the 139 sa les 
e l a s t i c i t i e s in equation 03 are less than - 1 , e ight s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
so at the .05 leve l of conf idence. The s p e c i f i c a t i o n of equation 
06 produces almost i d e n t i c a l r e s u l t s . 
b> C a p i t a l . I n t e n s i t y 
The c o e f f i c i e n t of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y i s h igh ly s i g n i f i c a n t , 
and i t s p o s i t i v e sign i s opposite that which would be pred icted 
for B r a z i l by standard trade theory. Moreover, i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e 
i s a t t r i b u t a b l e s o l e l y to v a r i a t i o n s in phys ica l c a p i t a l 
i n t e n s i t y , for the c o e f f i c i e n t of the human c a p i t a l v a r i a b l e i s 
small and not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero in equations 04 
through 06. This f i n d i n g i s cons is tent with the hypothesis that 
the in f luence of economies of sca le overwhelms the r o l e of fac tor 
proport ions emphasized in the convent ional theory of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rade. A f i rm with a large investment in plant and 
equipment requ i res a larger volume of exports to reduce average 
costs to a minimum than does a f i rm with the same volume of 
domestic sa les but less c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e product ion techniques. 
The p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y on export 
performance appears to be quite strong, but one caveat should be 
noted. Because of the lack of r e l i a b l e data on the c a p i t a l stock 
of each f i r m , our proxy for physica l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y i s non-
wage value-added per employee. Although t h i s proxy v a r i a b l e i s 
known to be h ighly c o r r e l a t e d with phys ica l p lant and equipment 
per employee, i t i s not an i n f a l l i b l e guide to c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , 
for i t i s a f fec ted by t o t a l factor p r o d u c t i v i t y as well as 
c a p i t a l - 1 a b o r r a t i o s . Part of the observed "phys ica l c a p i t a l 
e f f e c t " might thus r e f l e c t the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of super ior 
management on both exports and p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the simple c o r r e l a t i o n 
between c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y and export r a t i o s i s quite d i f f e r e n t 
from the p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n i m p l i c i t in the regress ion 
equat ions. As can be seen in the f i r s t l i n e of tab le 16, the 
simple c o r r e l a t i o n between the logarithm of X/OS and that of K or 
PHK i s very low and not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero. In 
c o n t r a s t , the c o r r e l a t i o n between the logar ithm of the wage ra te 
(InHK) and the logarithm of the export r a t i o i s negative and 
h ighly s i g n i f i c a n t . The mul t ip le regress ion r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e 
that t h i s negative c o r r e l a t i o n , though s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , 
i s spurious and that s k i l l l e v e l s as measured by the average wage 
have no independent e f f e c t on export r a t i o s . Wage rates are 
o o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d with domestic s a l e s ; f i rms with a high 
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volume of domestic sa les export p ropor t ionate ly l e s s not because 
t h e i r wages are high but rather because they can achieve 
economies of sca le in the domestic market with less need to enter 
competit ive i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets. S i m i l a r l y , the c o r r e l a t i o n 
between domestic sa les and physica l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y obscures 
the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t that the l a t t e r has on export r a t i o s . 
c ' Advert is^ng_Intensity —i 
The c o e f f i c i e n t of adver t i s ing i s h ighly s i g n i f i c a n t and, 
l i k e the c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y v a r i a b l e , i t s s ign i s opposite that 
which would be predicted by trade t h e o r i s t s (Dreze 1960). Firms 
producing h ighly adver t i sed , hence h ighly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d products 
export a larger proport ion of the i r output than do f i rms / 
producing standardized manufactures. This f i n d i n g i s cons is tent 
with the hypothesis that f i rms in monopol ist ic competit ion w i l l 
seek export markets because of the existence of "excess capac i ty" 
in the sense that long-run marginal costs of production are well 
below long-run average costs . 
The adver t i s ing v a r i a b l e i s def ined as the r a t i o of 
a d v e r t i s i n g expenditures to domestic s a l e s . Since the domestic 
sa les term a lso enters the denominator of the dependent v a r i a b l e , 
the p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s that the c o e f f i c i e n t for ADV i s biased 
upwards as a r e s u l t of e r rors in the measurement of domestic 
s a l e s . To test t h i s hypothesis , f i f t y observat ions were deleted 
in which the advert is ing/domest ic sales r a t i o was very high (8'/. 
or more). Regression equations 01 through 03 were then re-
estimated with the r e s t r i c t e d sample of f i rms . In equation 01 
the c o e f f i c i e n t of ADV f e l l to - 0 . 7 , and was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t from zero, while other c o e f f i c i e n t s were a f fec ted very 
l i t t l e . In equations 02 and 03, however, the c o e f f i c i e n t 
Increased from 5.4 to 10.6 and from 8.7 to 12.2 r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
r e t a i n i n g i t s high leve l of s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . For the 
f u l l regress ion model, the reported r e s u l t s for the a d v e r t i s i n g 
v a r i a b l e are thus quite robust . 
c " l !PEli£ii_I§niii-E!!9iS£iiSD 
In equations o l and 0 4 , the c o e f f i c i e n t of the t a r i f f 
v a r i a b l e i s negative as expected and i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 
leve l of conf idence. For each percentage point increase in the 
r a t i o of domestic to import p r i c e s , the volume of exports f a l l s 
by three-quarters of a percentage po int . It appears that high 
domestic p r i ces by and large do r e f l e c t high production costs or 
serve as an incent ive to supply the domestic market at the 
expense of exports . P r o t e c t i o n i s t commercial p o l i c i e s are thus a 
ser ious impediment to the export of manufactures in B r a z i l . 
The v a r i a b l e Tj can also be in terpreted as the c r o s s -
sec t iona l equivalent of a real exchange ra te . Over time, an 
aggregate index of the rea l value of the c r u z e i r o i s simply the 
r a t i o of domestic p r i ces to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e s , d iv ided by the 
nominal exchange rats (cruze i ros per unit of fo re ign currency) . 
At a point in time, t he nominal exchange rate i s the same for a l l 
f i rms , but i n d u s t r i s ? d i f f e r in the r a t i o of domestic to 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e s . The higher t h i s r a t i o , the greater the 
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" o v e r v a l u a t i o n " of the c r u z e i r o in that i n d u s t r y , and the l e s s 
c o m p e t i t i v e w i l l f i r e s be in export markets. Most i n t e r e s t i n g l y , 
our est imated e l a s t i c i t y of 0.75 i s only s l i g h t l y lower than 
long-run supply e l a s t i c i t i e s c a l c u l a t e d with time s e r i e s data . 
(See Braga and Markwald 1983.) 
Although the s i z e of the c o e f f i c i e n t of Tj i s q u i t e 
p l a u s i b l e , two caveats should be noted regard ing the u n d e r l y i n g 
data . F i r s t , the t a r i f f data are ra ther aggregate , fo r only 77 
separate t a r i f f r a t e s were a v a i l a b l e f o r the 139 i n d u s t r i e s 
covered in t h i s s tudy . (See appendix t a b l e D - l . ) Second ly , 
c a l c u l a t i o n s of the i m p l i c i t t a r i f f are based on d i r e c t p r i c e 
comparisons made in l a t e 1980 and e a r l y 1981, two to three years 
a f t e r the r e l e v a n t time per iod fo r the remainder of the 
exp lanatory v a r i a b l e s . Data fo r l e g a l t a r i f f s are a v a i l a b l e , but 
these were not used because T y l e r (1983b) has shown that there i s 
widespread t a r i f f redundancy in B r a z i l , and v i r t u a l l y no 
c o r r e l a t i o n whatsoever between l e g a l and i m p l i c i t t a r i f f s . 
Due to severe m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y , i t was not p o s s i b l e to 
es t imate the r e g r e s s i o n equat ions which i n c l u d e the i m p l i c i t 
t a r i f f v a r i a b l e a long with the 139 i n d u s t r y dummy terms. 
T h e r e f o r e , in those equat ions the c o e f f i c i e n t of Tj i s 
c o n s t r a i n e d to take the va lue obtained in r e g r e s s i o n s which 
exc lude the i n d u s t r y dummies. 
e> i i L E 2 C t _ S u b s i d i es 
The B r a z i l i a n government uses both f i s c a l and f i n a n c i a l 
i n c e n t i v e s as export s u b s i d i e s to o f f s e t , at l e a s t in p a r t , the 
a n t i - e x p o r t b i a s of the system of p r o t e c t i o n . At the l e v e l of 
the f i r m , i t has been p o s s i b l e to obta in i n f o r m a t i o n for only two 
types of f i s c a l i n c e n t i v e s : SI , the export tax c r e d i t ( c r e d i t o 
premio) and 52, the export c r e d i t e q u i v a l e n t of the r e d u c t i o n in 
co rpora te income tax a t t r i b u t a b l e to e x p o r t s . SI i s by f a r the 
most important of the two s u b s i d i e s , averaging 13.IX fo r the 
f i r m s in our sample compared to only 2.27. fo r S2. The s imple 
c o r r e l a t i o n between SI and S2 i s s i g n i f i c a n t , but a r e l a t i v e l y 
low .082. 51 i s n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d with both human and p h y s i -
ca l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , whereas S2, which i s based on p r o f i t s , 
hence i n d i r e c t l y on c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , shows a high p o s i t i v e 
c o r r e l a t i o n with p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y . (See t a b l e 16.) 
F i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e s are omitted e n t i r e l y from the 
r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s . No data are a v a i l a b l e by f i r m , but Musalem 
(1981) has est imated that the subsidy element of export f i n a n c i n g 
amounted to 10.5% of t o t a l exports of manufactures in 1978. It 
i s a l s o imposs ib le to o b t a i n data by f i r m on the use of the 
drawback p r o v i s i o n fo r imported i n p u t s , but the v e r t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n v a r i a b l e ( V i j ) i s intended to act as a proxy fo r t h i s 
f i s c a l i n c e n t i v e . 
Both SI and S2 enter the r e g r e s s i o n equat ion in two d i s t i n c t 
ways. A dummy v a r i a b l e f i r s t captures the effect of the presence 
of any p o s i t i v e subs idy on export r a t i o s . The subs idy r a t e 
i t s e l f i s then entered s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as a measure of the impact 
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of i n c r e a s e d s u b s i d i e s on export performance a t t h e a a r g i n . 
T h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n p r o v i d e s an unconst ra ined e s t i a a t e of the 
marginal e f f e c t of changes in the r a t e of subs idy on export 
performance. 
Ord inary Least 
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Table 17 (continued) 
V a r i a b l e 
Ol 02 
. i ? e g r e s s i o n _ Ç g e f f i ç i e n t s 
03 04 OS 06 
S T A T E . . 2.495** 2.157** 1.360 
l J (0.748) (0.718) (0.742) 
2.756** 2.351** 1.540* 
(0.752) (0.721) (0.745) 
LIC^ 0.803** 0.865** 0.732** 0.891** 0.903** 0.766** 
(0.181) (0.167) (0.167) (0.182) (0.167) ( 0 .168 ) 









( 0 . 1 0 0 ) 
.813 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the standard e r r o r s of the 
c o e f f i c i e n t s . (*) i n d i c a t e s s i g n i f i c a n c e at the .05 l e v e l 
and (**) at the .01 l e v e l . 
a/ C o e f f i c i e n t v a r i e s by i n d u s t r y . See appendix t a b l e s D-2, D-3 
and D-4. 
b/ An a p r i o r i r e s t r i c t i o n fo r the c o e f f i c i e n t of t h i s v a r i a b l e 
was necessary because of m u l t i c o l 1 i n e a r i t y . 
The c o e f f i c i e n t of S2 i s s i g n i f i c a n t in a l l equat ions and 
has the expected p o s i t i v e s i g n . In the f u l l model (equat ion 03 
or 06) , i t s s i z e i m p l i e s that a one percentage po in t i n c r e a s e in 
the r a t e of s u b s i d i z a t i o n through income tax r e d u c t i o n s produces 
a three percent i n c r e a s e in export volume. Th is e l a s t i c i t y i s 
much h igher than that of the i m p l i c i t t a r i f f v a r i a b l e , but i t 
should be noted that i t i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y h igher in a 
s t a t i s t i c a l sense. 
The c o e f f i c i e n t of 51, in c o n t r a s t , i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
n e g a t i v e . The net e f f e c t of the export tax c r e d i t (SID + SI) i s 
p o s i t i v e , but the marginal e f f e c t on expor ts of i n c r e a s e s in the 
subs idy appears to be n e g a t i v e . Higher r a t e s of subs idy are thus 
a s s o c i a t e d with reduced export volume. T h i s unexpected f i n d i n g 
i s the product of a d e f e c t in the u n d e r l y i n g data : SI i n c l u d e s 
not only s u b s i d i e s fo r exports of the c u r r e n t y e a r , but a l s o an 
unknown amount of accumulated s u b s i d i e s fo r expor ts of p r e v i o u s 
y e a r s . 
Export s u b s i d i e s in the form of tax c r e d i t s were o r i g i n a l l y 
g iven by s t a t e governments as well as the f e d e r a l government. 
Because of budgetary problems, many s t a t e s found themselves 
unable to honor t h e i r committments to e x p o r t e r s , so in 1977 the 
5 0 
federa l government allowed f i rms to u t i l i z e ha l f of t h e i r 
accumulated state c r e d i t s in payment of federa l IPI taxes. In 
1978 t h i s percentage was increased to 1007. and in 1979 the 
federa l government took f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for a l l f i s c a l 
i ncent ives to exports . Export tax c r e d i t s are taxable as income 
in the year that they are a c t u a l l y used. Since the income tax 
data for a l l f i rms in our sample cover f i s c a l years ending in 
1978, the use of accumulated tax c r e d i t s introduces a ser ious 
d i s t o r t i o n in the SI v a r i a b l e . Export revenue i s def ined as 
i n c l u s i v e of s u b s i d i e s , so a f irm which u t i l i z e d accumulated 
export c r e d i t s in 1978 without a c t u a l l y export ing in that year 
appears to have a subsidy rate of 100%. Firms with a small 
volume of exports r e l a t i v e to accumulated export c r e d i t s can a lso 
show quite high apparent rates of subsidy. In genera l , for a l l 
f i rms u t i l i z i n g accumulated export c r e d i t s , the SI v a r i a b l e i s 
biased upwards, which biases downwards the estimate of the 
c o e f f i c i e n t of SI. 
In an attempt to improve the estimate of the e f f e c t of the 
export c r e d i t on export supply , 44 f i rms for which SI was 40X or 
higher were deleted from the sample. The r e s u l t s are shown in 
equations 07 through 09 of tab le 18. With the removal of these, 
o u t l i e r s , the c o e f f i c i e n t of SI becomes p o s i t i v e and i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 leve l in the f u l l model. Since the 
c o e f f i c i e n t i s s t i l l biased downwards because of the i n c l u s i o n of 
an unknown amount of accumulated export c r e d i t s , one can s a f e l y 
conclude that export subs id ies given in the form of tax c r e d i t s 
are at least as e f f i c a c i o u s as subs id ies given in the form of 
income tax reduct ions . 
These er rors in the measurement of export subs id ies a lso 
a f f e c t the measurement of exports , hence export r a t i o s . For t h i s 
reason the regress ion equations were re-est imated u t i l i z i n g data 
only for the 760 f irms which received no subs id ies whatsoever in 
the form of export c r e d i t s . As shown in chapter II , i t i s the 
smal lest exporters which tend to rece ive no export c r e d i t s , so 
t h i s i s hardly a random sample of f i rms; nonetheless , equation 10 
in tab le 18 compares qu i te favorably with equation 01 or 07. 
With the add i t ion of industry dummies, a d d i t i o n a l observat ions 
were deleted because many i n d u s t r i e s contain only one or two 
f irms with no export c r e d i t s . 
In the f u l l model with 699 f i rms (equation 12), the 
c o e f f i c i e n t of determination i s quite high ( .904), but only the 
a d v e r t i s i n g v a r i a b l e i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero. This 
i s due to severe m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y among the explanatory 
v a r i a b l e s . Neither the c o e f f i c i e n t of S2D nor that of S2, for 
example, are s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i c a n t , but in a j o i n t test the two 
v a r i a b l e s are s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l of conf idence 
<F=5.38). For t h i s type of regress ion model an extremely large 
number of observat ions seem to be required in order to obta in 
p rec i se est imates of the parameters. G l e j s e r et a l . had a sample 
of only 970 f i rms to estimate a s i m i l a r model; the "small" s i z e 
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Table 18 (notes) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the standard e r r o r s of the 
c o e f f i c i e n t s . (*) i n d i c a t e s s i g n i f i c a n c e at the .05 l e v e l 
and (•*) at the .01 l e v e l . 
a/ C o e f f i c i e n t v a r i e s by i n d u s t r y . See appendix t a b l e s D-5, 0-6 
and D-7. 
b/ An a p r i o r i r e s t r i c t i o n fo r the c o e f f i c i e n t of t h i s v a r i a b l e 
was necessary because of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y . 
V e r t i . c a l _ I n t e g r a t i o n 
The value-added/output v a r i a b l e has the expected negat ive 
s ign and i s h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t in a l l s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the 
r e g r e s s i o n model. The more v e r t i c a l l y i n t e g r a t e d the f i r m , the 
l e s s the volume of e x p o r t s . Th is f i n d i n g i s c o n s i s t e n t with the 
hypothes i s that the drawback p r i v i l e g e of d u t y - f r e e i m p o r t a t i o n 
of i n p u t s i s most v a l u a b l e for an exporter that r e l i e s h e a v i l y on 
o u t s i d e s u p p l i e r s for component par ts and raw m a t e r i a l s . In the 
f u l l model (equation 03 or 06), each a d d i t i o n a l percentage po in t 
of p r o d u c t i o n that i s i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h i n the f i r m i s a s s o c i a t e d 
with a one percent f a l l in expor ts . 
F irms which produce f i n a l consumer goods tend to a d v e r t i s e 
more, and to be l e s s i n t e g r a t e d v e r t i c a l l y than f i rms which 
produce c a p i t a l or i n t e r m e d i a t e goods. S ince the c o e f f i c i e n t fo r 
a d v e r t i s i n g i s p o s i t i v e , whereas that fo r v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s 
n e g a t i v e , i t appears that B r a z i l i a n producers demonstrate a 
s t rong c o m p e t i t i v e advantage in consumer goods. 
g) I n d u s t r i a l _ C o n c e n t r a t ion 
The c o e f f i c i e n t of the Her f indah l (H) index has the expected 
p o s i t i v e s i g n , but i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t only when 
i n d u s t r y dummies are excluded from the r e g r e s s i o n equat ion . As 
was the case with the t a r i f f v a r i a b l e , t h i s may well be the 
r e s u l t of c o l l i n e a r i t y , with the dummy terms p i c k i n g up some of 
the e f f e c t of market c o n c e n t r a t i o n . The c o e f f i c i e n t of 1.167 in 
equat ion 01 i m p l i e s t h a t , ho ld ing other v a r i a b l e s c o n s t a n t , 
expor ts i n c r e a s e by n e a r l y 1.2 percent fo r each i n c r e a s e of .01 
p o i n t s i n the H index . Does a c o e f f i c i e n t of t h i s magnitude 
i n d i c a t e that c o n c e n t r a t i o n i s b e n e f i c i a l fo r export performance? 
The answer i s not n e c e s s a r i l y , for other t h i n g s are not c o n s t a n t , 
and there i s a l s o a very strong inverse r e l a t i o n s h i p between f i r m 
s i z e and export performance. 
Suppose, fo r example, there to be an i n d u s t r y that c o n t a i n s 
ten i d e n t i c a l s i n g l e - p l a n t f i r m s , so that the H index i s equal to 
10(1/10) , or 0 .10 . Now l e t the number of f i r m s be reduced to 
n i n e , with no change in the s i z e of the domestic market or^ the 
e q u a l i t y of market s h a r e s . The H index i n c r e a s e s to 9(1/9) , or 
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approximately 0.11, so we would expect an increase of 1.2% in 
exports . But the domestic sa les of at least one f i r a must 
inc rease , and t h i s w i l l have a negative e f f e c t on exports of the 
indust ry . If the domestic sa les of the f i rm which leaves the 
industry are d i s t r i b u t e d equal ly aaong the remaining nine f i rms , 
the domestic sa les of each w i l l increase by approximately 11% and 
exports on t h i s account w i l l f a l l by more than nine percent , much 
more than the increase a t t r i b u t a b l e to increased concentrat ion . 
One might well argue that the concentrat ion v a r i a b l e i s not 
proper ly s p e c i f i e d in the equations of tab le 17. Most of the 
l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s top ic impl ies that a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
expected between industry concentrat ion and export performance 
only in the case of large f i rms with cons iderab le monopoly power 
in the domestic market. In a d d i t i o n , Auquier (1980) has 
hypothesized that the competitive f r i n g e should a lso export more, 
the more concentrated the market, because t h e i r domestic opt ions 
are preempted by larger r i v a l s . 
These two hypotheses can be tested j o i n t l y by adding two 
i n t e r a c t i o n terms to the regress ion model: DS25ijHj and 
DSSOOijHj. The f i r s t var iab le i s equal to the value of the H 
index for the j th industry only i f the i t h f i rm of that industry 
reported domestic sa les of 25 m i l l i o n cruzeiros or l e s s ; 
otherwise the v a r i a b l e i s equal to zero. This sa les c r i t e r i a 
app l ies to 576 f irms in our sample. The second i n t e r a c t i o n term 
takes the value of the H index of the industry corresponding to a 
p a r t i c u l a r f i rm only i f the f i rm recorded domestic sa les in 
excess of 500 m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s , which was the case of only 379 
f i rms in our sample. These two v a r i a b l e s thus measure the 
dev iat ion of small and large f irms from the c o e f f i c i e n t of H 
estimated with data from the entire sample of 3 345 firms. 
Adding the i n t e r a c t i o n terms to equation 01 produces the 
fo l lowing r e s u l t : 
In (X/DS. .) = 8.344** - 0.912** IntDS. .) + 0.509** In (EST. .) 
l J (0.800) (0.032) 1 J (0.060) 1 3 
+ 0.399** 1n(K. .) + 3.931** ADV. . - 0.752** T. + 2.063** SID. . 
(0.055) 1 J (1.113) 1 J (0.115) J (0.113) 1 J 
- 2.772** SI. . + 0.483** S2D. . + 3.948* S2.\ - 3.081** V. . 
(0.347) l J (0.096) 1 J (1.589) 1 J (0.243) 1 J 
- 0.496 H. + 1.927* STATE. . + 0.756** LIC. . + 0.576** FOR. . 
(0.508) J (0.759) 1 J (0.180) 1 J (0.104) 1 3 
+ 3.439** DS25. .H. + 3.694** DS500. .H R2 = .337 
(0.946) l J J (0.826) 1 J J 
It should be noted that the c o e f f i c i e n t of Hj becomes negat ive , 
but i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero, whereas the 
c o e f f i c i e n t for the i n t e r a c t i o n between s i z e and concentrat ion 
exceeds 3.0 and i s h igh ly s i g n i f i c a n t . 
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Introducing the s i z e - c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t e r a c t i o n terms into 
the f u l l regress ion model (equation 03) y i e l d s a s i m i l a r r e s u l t i 
1 n (X/DSi j ) = a.D. + b,D. ln(DS. .) + 0.366** In (EST. .) 
J J k J 1 J (0.059) U 
+ 0.279** In (K. .) + 8.598** ADV. . - 0.752 T. + 1.696** SID. . 
(0.057) l J (1.406) l J J (0.106) 1 J 
- 2.045** SI. . + 0.448** S2D. . + 2.843* S2. . - 1.116** V. . 
(0.332) l J (0.088) l J (1.455) l J (0.271) l J 
- 0.907 H. + 1,371 STATE. . + 0.697** L.IC. . + 0.638** FOR. . 
(1.054) J (0.741) l J (0.167) 1 J (0.099) 1 J 
+ 3.884** DS25. .H. + 3.385** DS500. .H. R2 = .815 
(1.259) 1 J J (1.225) 1 J J 
The industry dummies (a.) and 139 domestic sa les e l a s t i c i t i e s 
were c a l c u l a t e d but J are not shown for reasons of space. 
In sum, the r e s u l t s lend cons iderab le support to the 
p r o p o s i t i o n that concentrat ion induces greater export performance 
on the part of both large f i rms and the compet i t ive f r i n g e , while 
for the vast major i ty of f i rms market concentrat ion in i t s e l f 
bears no r e l a t i o n s h i p to exports . In a d d i t i o n , i t should be 
noted that concentrat ion can have a large e f f e c t on export 
performance through i t s e f f e c t on the s i z e d i s t r i b u t i o n of f i rms 
in an indust ry . This negative e f f e c t , though i n d i r e c t , over-
whelms the d i r e c t e f f e c t s i f increased concentrat ion at the f i rm 
leve l i s assoc iated with increased concentrat ion of production at 
the plant l e v e l as we l l . 
No p a r t i c u l a r sign was hypothesized for the STATE dummy. It 
i s inc luded in the regress ion f i r s t because of i n t e r e s t in the 
behavior of publ ic compared to pr ivate e n t e r p r i s e and secondly 
because pub l i c ownership may well have an independent e f f e c t on 
export performance. As can be seen in tab le 17, the c o e f f i c i e n t 
of t h i s v a r i a b l e i s quite l a rge , and i s most often s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t . Ex gost , i t i s tempting to i n t e r p r e t t h i s as 
evidence that pub l i c e n t e r p r i s e s have more informat ion and a 
wider export hor izon that p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s , or that they are 
able to s e l l abroad at a loss with the f u l l knowledge that t h i s 
w i l l be covered by the s ta te or by increased p r i c e s for domestic 
s a l e s . Nonetheless, s ince only eight exporters in our sample are 
under pub l i c ownership, i t i s very p o s s i b l e that t h i s r e s u l t may 
not be genera l ly a p p l i c a b l e to publ ic e n t e r p r i s e s operat ing in 
B r a z i l ' s manufacturing s e c t o r . 
i ) Foreign_Licenses 
The p o s i t i v e and h igh ly s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t of the 
fo re ign l i c e n s e dummy i s c o n s i s i t e n t with the t h e s i s that in 
B r a z i l l i c e n s e agreements with overseas f i rms are a p r e r e q u i s i t e 
f o r , rather an obstac le to , export success. The estimated 
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c o e f f i c i e n t var ies from 0.7 to 0.9 depending on the 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the other v a r i a b l e s , which impl ies that exports 
of resident-owned f i rms with l i censes are two to two-and-a-half 
times greater than exports of s im i la r f i rms operat ing without 
l i censed technology or trademarks. 
j' E2CSL9Q_Qí!üfCit!i.B 
The ¿10 foreign-owned f irms in our sample have an average 
export r a t i o of only 11.87. compared to 16.07. for the remaining 
f 2 735 f i rms . Nonetheless, the c o e f f i c i e n t of the f o r e i g n 
J ownership dummy i s p o s i t i v e and h ighly s i g n i f i c a n t . Fore ign-
owned f i rms tend to be l a r g e , and large f i rms export a smal ler 
proport ion of t h e i r output. Once the e f f e c t of s i z e and other 
j v a r i a b l e s are accounted f o r , foreign-owned f i rms export , on 
/ average, twice the volume of comparable f i rms which have no 
I access to l i censed technology or trademarks. 
It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the s i z e of the FOR dummy 
d i f f e r s l i t t l e from that of the dummy for l i c e n s e agreements. It 
would thus appear to make no d i f f e r e n c e in terms of export 
performance whether fore ign f irms t r a n s f e r t h e i r technology and 
trademarks through l i c e n s i n g arrangements or through d i r e c t 
investment in B r a z i l i a n companies. 
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A. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 
The complete data base for t h i s report c o n s i s t s of 15,041 
f i rms , which represent nearly 6X of the t o t a l number of a c t i v e 
manufacturing f irms in 1978. Exporting f i rms t o t a l 3,562, or 
roughly two-th i rds of the t o t a l number of exporters in the 
manufacturing sector . Those f irms which r e g i s t e r e d v i r t u a l l y no 
domestic sa les were de leted , reducing the sample by 107 to 14,934 
f i rms . Each f i rm has been a l located to the industry which 
accounts for the largest proport ion of i t s s a l e s . 
It should be emphasized that t h i s i s not a s t r a t i f i e d 
sample, for small f i rms are under-represented. Ind iv idua l f i rms 
are not, of course, i d e n t i f i e d , and to insure c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y 
f o u r - d i g i t i n d u s t r i e s with fewer than six f i rms were not inc luded 
in the data base. For 179 i n d u s t r i e s , data are inc luded for a l l 
f i rms with reported 197S sa les in excess of two m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s 
or exports greater than one m i l l i o n c r u z e i r o s , i . e . approximately 
100 and 50 thousand d o l l a r s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Table A- l shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n by industry of the e n t i r e 
sample and the 3,455 exporters . This tab le revea l s the e x t r a o r -
dinary d i v e r s i t y of B r a z i l i a n exports: a l l but nine of the 179 
f o u r - d i g i t i n d u s t r i e s r e g i s t e r e d exports in 1978. 
The data have been used to c a l c u l a t e ind i ces of market 
concentrat ion for each of the 179 i n d u s t r i e s . This repeats the 
e a r l i e r work of Braga and Mascolo (1982) with two important 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s . F i r s t , many f irms have a f i s c a l year which does 
not co inc ide with the calendar year. The c r u z e i r o values of 
sa les for these f irms have been i n f l a t e d by the i n d u s t r i a l whole-
sale p r i c e index in order to make the s t a t i s t i c s more comparable. 
Secondly, exports have been deleted from t o t a l s a l e s in order to 
c a l c u l a t e ind i ces of concentrat ion in the d o a a s t i c market. It 
has not been poss ib le to take competing imports in to account, but 
these are of minor importance in most i n d u s t r i e s . 
Table A-2 reports the Herf indahl ind i ces of concentrat ion 
for domestic s a l e s , exports and t o t a l sa les in each indust ry . 
This index i s def ined as the sum of the squares of market shares, 
so takes a value between one (a s ing le s e l l e r ) and zero. As i s 
to be expected, export sa les tend to be much more concentrated 
than domestic sa les ; in only 13 i n d u s t r i e s i s the index for 
export sa les smaller than that for domestic s a l e s . Host 
s u r p r i s i n g l y , however, in 73 i n d u s t r i e s t o t a l sa les are a c t u a l l y 
lass concentrated than domestic s a l e s . This i s strong evidence 
that the l a r g e s t exporters are not, in genera l , the l a r g e s t 
s e l l e r s in the domestic market. 
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Table A-l 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of F i r n s in the Complete Data Base by Industry 
Code Ny»ber_of _Fir«|s P?S£Cif i i i9D 
Total E x g o r t e r s 
14 934 3 439 TOTAL 
NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
1010 36 8 Stone, marble, g r a n i t e 
1011 23 Crushed rock 
1020 24 Limestone 
1030 86 1 B r i c k 
1040 100 40 Ceramics 
1050 47 5 Cement 
1060 117 11 Cement products 
1070 55 21 81ass 
1080 42 8 Processed n o n - m e t a l l i c minera l 
1099 41 9 Other n o n - m e t a l l i c m i n e r a l s 
BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
1101 30 27 Pig i r o n 
1102 6 3 Pr imary i r o n and s t e e l 
1103 12 9 Pr imary i ron a l l o y s 
1104 45 23 S t e e l p l a t e , i n c l u d i n g a l l o y s 
1105 33 13 Iron and s t e e l p ipe and tubes 
1106 88 23 Forged s t e e l 
1107 27 8 S t e e l Mire 
1109 17 3 P l a t e d s t e e l 
BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
U l i 48 12 Pr imary n o n - f e r r o u s metals 
1112 13 3 Pr imary n o n - f e r r o u s a l l o y s 
1113 18 6 Non- fer rous metal p l a t e s 
1114 7 1 P ipe and tubes of n o n - f e r r o u s 
1115 59 8 F o r g i n g s of n o n - f e r r o u s metals 
1116 6 1 Non- fer rous metal Mire 
1117 7 1 P l a t e d n o n - f e r r o u s metals 
H I B 10 5 So lder and anodes 
1119 7 2 P r e c i o u s metals 
METAL PRODUCTS 
1120 18 8 M e t a l l u r g y of poMders 
1130 81 14 M e t a l l i c s t r u c t u r e s 
1140 112 27 Products made of metal bars 
1150 101 17 Metal stampings 
1160 169 22 Tanks and b o i l e r s 
1170 80 42 C u t l e r y , arms, hand t o o l s , etc 
1180 31 1 Meta l -Mork ing , g a l v a n i z i n g 













































Jota l Exporter» 
MACHINERY 
22 8 N o n - e l e c t r i c a l i n d u s t r i a l motors 
189 78 Heating and plumbing equipment 
154 75 Machine too ls 
118 23 Parts and accessor ies for ind. machinery 
140 66 A g r i c u l t u r a l machinery 
186 93 E levators and other commercial machinery 
6 4 ' O f f i c e machinery, inc lud ing e l e c t r i c a l 
20 9 Domestic appl iances 
10 2 Clocks and Matches 
26 16 Tractors and earth-moving equipment 
21 2 Machinery and equipment repa i r 
219 103 Other machinery and equipment n . e . c . 
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
63 35 E l e c t r i c a l generating equipment 
105 40 E l e c t r i c a l mater ia l 
6 2 L i g h t i n g 
36 20 E l e c t r i c a l material for motor v e h i c l e s 
48 17 E l e c t r i c a l equipment for domestic use 
113 60 E l e c t r i c a l equip for commerce and ind. 
6 2 E l e c t r i c a l equip, for techn ica l uses 
81 26 E l e c t r o n i c equipment 
87 32 Communications equipment 
10 1 E l e c t r i c a l equipment repa i r 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
29 9 Sh ipbu i ld ing 
11 1 Ship repair 
8 7 Railway veh ic les 
17 15 Automobiles 
248 122 Automobile par ts , except rubber, e l e c . 
19 3 Rebui ld ing of automobile engines 
61 19 Automobile bodies, except chass is 
22 10 B i cyc les and motorcycles 
10 1 A i r c r a f t repa i r 
14 4 Other veh ic les 
12 1 Automotive upholstery 
WOOD 
301 68 Lumber 
89 8 Wood s t ruc tures 
65 33 Plywood and p a r t i c l e b o a r d 
103 18 Other wood a r t i c l e s , except f u r n i t u r e 
FURNITURE 
343 57 Wood f u r n i t u r e 
71 16 Metal f u r n i t u r e 
37 5 Mattresses 
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PULP AND PAPER 
34 4 Pulp 
217 44 Paper and cardboard 
335 28 Paper a r t i c l e s 
259 9 Cardboard a r t i c l e s 
9 1 A r t i c l e s of pressed f i b e r s 
RUBBER 
28 Natural rubber 
33 8 T i res and tubes 
294 1 T i re re-treading 
40 7 Rubber hose and sheets 
22 4 Foam rubber, except mattresses 
268 37 Other rubber a r t i c l e s except c loth ing or 
footwear 
LEATHER 
278 93 Leather tanning 
7 3 Leather f i n i s h i n g 
97 11 Luggage 
250 25 Other leather goods except c loth ing or 
footwear 
CHEMICALS 
91 36 Organic and inorganic chemicals n . e . c . 
20 3 Petroleum fue ls and o i l s 
26 10 Basic petrochemicals 
11 3 Grease, other petroleum der ivat ives 
27 8 Synthetic f i b e r s 
8 4 Explosi ves 
63 40 Essent ia l o i l s 
13 5 Concentrated f l avors and aromas 
51 15 Insect i c ides , d i s i n f e c t a n t s , c leansers 
103 28 Paint and varnish 
62 4 F e r t i 1 i zers 
169 44 Other chemical products n . e . c . 
PHARMACEUTICAL 
408 58 Pharmaceutical products 
PERFUMES AND SOAPS 
155 13 Perfumes 
180 13 Soap and detergents 
58 2 Candles 
PLASTICS 
21 6 P l a s t i c sheets 
73 20 P l a s t i c a r t i c l e s for i n d u s t r i a l use 
43 10 P l a s t i c a r t i c l e s for domestic use, 
except luggage, shoes or c loth ing 
14 4 P l a s t i c fu rn i ture 
127 15 P l a s t i c packaging 
Cod® Number _of_F i rmi Descr ipt ion 
i i i * r E x p o r t e r ! 
2360 19 9 P l a s t i c pipe and f i t t i n g s 
2399 127 21 Other p l a s t i c a r t i c l e s n . e . c . 
TEXTILES 
2410 148 34 T e x t i l e f i b e r s 
2420 484 232 Kni ts and woven f a b r i c s 
2430 141 47 Stretch k n i t s , e l a s t i c 
2440 35 14 P l e a t i n g , embroidery, r ibbons 
2450 23 12 Spec ia l t e x t i l e s 
2460 44 10 F in ished c lo th and yarn 
2499 49 30 Other t e x t i l e products n . e . c . 
CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 
2510 568 78 C loth ing 
2520 9 3 Hats 
2530 275 136 Footwear 
2540 55 18 C loth ing accessor ies 
2599 38 6 Other f a b r i c a r t i c l e s n . e . c 
PROCESSED FOOD 
2601 431 15 Coffee and grain process ing p lants 
2602 64 5 Flour m i l l s 
2603 180 1 Coffee roast ing and gr ind ing 
2604 7 7 Instant cof fee and tea 
2605 30 4 Maize products , except o i l s 
2606 16 1 Cassava products 
2609 78 37 Other grain m i l l products 
2610 67 23 Preserved f r u i t s and vegetables 
2620 207 44 Meatpacking p lants 
2621 73 9 Meat products from meatpacking p lants 
2622 25 Sausage and meat products not produced 
in meatpacking p lants 
2629 8 Meat products n . e . c . 
2630 43 24 F ish and f i s h products 
2640 122 9 Dairy products, except ice cream 
2651 171 45 Sugar 
2652 12 4 Refined sugar 
2660 54 23 Chocolates and candies 
2670 129 Bakeries 
2680 101 8 Macaroni, spaghett i and noodles 
2691 72 51 Vegetable o i l s and lard 
2692 11 3 Ice cream 
2693 11 1 Sa l t 
2694 9 Vinegar 
2698 51 3 Prepared animal feeds 
2699 66 21 Other food products , n . e . c . 
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Code Number :_sf.ficss D e s c r i g t i o n 
lilil Expor ter« 
BEVERAGES 
2710 147 6 Nine 
2720 365 15 D i s t i l l e d l i q u o r 
2730 28 3 Beer and malt beverages 
2741 225 7 N o n - a l c o h o l i c beverages 
2742 38 M i n e r a l Mater 
2750 24 1 A l c o h o l d i s t i l l a t i o n 
TOBACCO 
2810 34 8 Tobacco 
2820 8 5 C i g a r e t t e s 
2830 7 2 C i g a r s 
2899 22 9 Other tobacco products 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 
2910 167 19 Newspapers, magazines and books 
2920 187 8 Commercial p r i n t i n g 
2999 85 1 Other p r i n t i n g n . e . c . 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
3000 27 10 T e c h n i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c ins t ruments 
3011 7 1 A r t i f i c i a l l i m b s , whee lcha i r s 
3012 36 17 S u r g i c a l and denta l s u p p l i e s 
3021 8 2 Photographic equipment 
3023 29 9 O p t i c a l ins t ruments 
3031 15 9 Lap idary work 
3032 32 5 Jewelry . 
3033 17 4 Costume jewelry 
3041 6 4 Musica l ins t ruments 
3042 15 4 Phonograph r e c o r d s 
3050 20 5 Brooms and brushes 
3060 20 Moving p i c t u r e s 
3070 21 6 Toys 
3080 11 6 S p o r t i n g and a t h l e t i c goods 
3099 176 56 Other manufactured goods n . e . c . 
Source; : 1978 data base. 
n . e . c . = not e lsewhere c l a s s i f i e d . 
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Table A-2 
C o n c e n t r a t i o n Ind ices f o r B r a z i l i a n I n d u s t r i e s , 1978. 
Industry . H e r f i n d a h l . I n d i c e s . 
!?95®5ÍÍ&_?§L§5 Exports T o t a l _Saïi 
NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
1010 .0653 .3086 .0601 
1011 . 1844 . •. . 1844 
1020 . 1759 • • • . 1759 
1030 . 1661 1.0000 . 1660 
1040 .0254 .0981 .0253 
1050 .0555 .7932 .0550 
1060 . 1082 .2518 . 1065 
1070 .1209 .2158 .1190 
1080 .0648 .2621 .0664 
1099 . 1672 .7821 . 1952 
BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
1101 .0991 .2280 .1176 
1102 .6660 .5132 .6158 
1103 .1143 . 1742 .1107 
1104 . 1479 . 1936 . 1480 
1105 .2157 . 1939 .2050 
1106 .0695 .4390 .0732 
1107 .1842 .4174 .1882 
1109 .2359 .5439 .2365 
BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
1111 . 1283 .2347 .1230 
1112 .2478 .9761 .2338 
1113 .2621 .5198 .2609 
1114 .3155 1.0000 .3154 
1115 .1175 .3951 .1190 
1116 .6378 1.0000 .6382 
1117 .3075 1.0000 .3076 
1118 .2248 .4292 .2400 
1119 .2111 .9485 .2135 
METAL PRODUCTS 
1120 .1136 .2243 .1123 
1130 .0889 .5422 . 1018 
1140 .0465 .2310 .0473 
1150 .0573 . 1623 .0571 
1160 .0788 .1181 .0764 
1170 .0481 .0789 .0465 
1180 .0712 1.0000 .0712 
1199 .0110 .0300 .0110 
Industry Herf indahl_Indices 
29®SSÌì£.§iìSf iJ iEPnil l9$3Ì_Sal 
MACHINERY 
1210 .2492 .3703 .2523 
1220 .0170 . 1420 .0167 
1231 .0303 . 1048 .0313 
1232 .0358 .3711 .0375 
1240 .0900 .-2676 . 1026 
1251 .0269 .0887 .0264 
1253 .4391 .4134 .4336 
1254 . 1729 .2714 . 1679 
1260 .2058 .9870 .2122 
1270 . 1246 .2500 . 1332 
1280 .3225 .7219 .3214 
1299 .0202 .0871 .0222 
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
1310 . 1382 .1118 . 1291 
1320 .0281 .0995 .0279 
1330 .4266 .7787 .4358 
1340 .2450 .5798 .2556 
1351 . 1689 .7010 . 1752 
1352 . 1230 .3312 . 1358 
1353 .2940 .8373 .3023 
1370 .0906 .2870 .0897 
1380 .0870 .2387 .0837 






































































iQSlaSíry b*cf ÍD^ ®Í3l_jDdice§ 
?9§SIÍÍ?_S«l5S ÍüB°üIs l9ÍsÍ_Í«í§! 
PULP AND PAPER 
1710 .5113 .5175 .3521 
1720 .0260 . 1888 .0279 
1730 .0374 .6219 .0373 
1740 .0188 .4354 .0188 
1790 . 1965 1.0000 .1962 
RUBBER 
1810 .1054 • • • . 1054 
1821 .3044 .3945 .3081 
1823 .0101 1.0000 .0100 
1830 .1055 . 1965 .1053 
1840 . 1231 .3613 . 1230 
1899 .0249 .2989 .0246 
LEATHER 
1910 .0224 .0525 .0245 
1911 .3825 .4018 .3729 
1930 .0678 .2176 .0640 
1999 .0397 .1542 .0437 
CHEMICALS 
2000 .0705 . 1592 .0661 
2011 .9469 .9953 .9485 
2012 . 1092 .2026 .1079 
2017 .6404 .6631 .6398 
2020 . 1317 .4340 . 1326 
2031 .2528 .3649 .2557 
2040 .0473 . 1680 .0700 
2050 .3409 .3238 .2837 
2060 .0724 . 1895 .0723 
2070 .0532 .4663 .0528 
2080 .0655 .4015 .0655 
2099 .0555 . 1434 .0535 
PHARMACEUTICAL 
2110 .0359 .0871 .0362 
PERFUMES AND SOAPS 
2210 .0885 .2585 .0885 
2220 .2390 .3740 .2368 
2230 .0626 .9940 .0638 
PLASTICS 
2310 .2077 .3807 .2094 
2320 .0430 .3996 .0430 
2330 .1102 .2539 .1106 
2340 . 1441 .3770 .1447 
2350 .0253 .5242 .0252 
2360 . 1972 .5551 .1992 
2399 .0360 .0920 .0360 
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Induitry; .Hf r f indahl . . Indices 
Export« Total Sa 
TEXTILES 
2410 .0158 .3118 .0172 
2420 .0237 .0205 .0210 
2430 .0401 . 1400 .0422 
2440 .0895 .5318 .0964 
24S0 . 1770 .8174 .2481 
2460 .0804 .2942 .0871 
2499 .1062 .3060 .1134 
CLOTHING 
2510 .0102 .0905 .0101 
2520 .2457 .5128 .2433 
2540 .0416 .2331 .0377 
2599 .0535 .5223 .0546 
FOOTNEftR 
2530 .0138 .0267 .0119 
PROCESSED FOOD 
2601 .0069 .4153 .0082 
2602 .0418 .9179 .0433 
2603 .0185 1.0000 .0183 
2604 .2238 .2097 .2009 
2605 .5129 .3634 .4971 
2606 . 1045 1.0000 . 1042 
2609 .2872 .2112 .2289 
2610 . 1667 . 1788 . 1650 
2620 .0152 . 1066 .0161 
2621 .0678 .2698 .0757 
2622 .0145 • • • .0145 
2629 .2002 • • • .2002 
2630 .0655 . 1607 .0580 
2640 . 1413 . 7779 .1292 
2651 .0115 .0658 .0108 
2652 .2794 .5512 .2536 
2660 .0614 .2886 .0643 
2670 .0761 , t .0761 
2680 .0404 .7484 .0404 
2691 .0644 .0746 .0561 
2692 .8191 .7244 .8033 
2693 . 1662 1.0000 . 1590 
2694 .2039 • • • .2039 
2698 . 1032 .6242 . 1031 
2699 .0453 .3145 .0895 
BEVERAGES 
2710 .0404 .3155 .0404 
2720 .0398 . 1238 .0397 
2730 . 1577 .5133 .1586 
2741 .0498 .4643 .0516 
2742 . 1570 . • * . 1570 
2750 . 1812 1.0000 .2064 
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Industry Herfindahl_Indiç«s___ 
595SSÎÎË-§iif! IïBScIï Î9Îâï.i»i?S 
TOBACCO 
2810 . 1B91 .3094 .2514 
2820 .5837 .8051 .5987 
2630 .6200 .5159 .5917 
2899 . 1475 .2193 .1623 
PRINTING 
2910 .0491 .3148 .0494 
2920 .0218 .9276 .0228 
2999 .0359 1.0000 .0360 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
3000 .1106 .3524 .1106 
3011 .8402 1.0000 .8465 
3012 .0816 .2610 .0857 
3021 .8550 .9766 .8683 
3023 .0689 .4601 .0752 
3031 .3964 .2093 .1686 
3032 . 1521 .3590 .1533 
3033 .1962 .7329 . 1895 
3041 .2614 .4350 .2670 
3042 .2523 .8865 .2670 
3050 .2261 .3942 .2293 
3060 .1715 • • t . 1715 
3070 .3906 .7516 .4042 
3080 .1469 .3334 .1460 
3099 .0226 .4567 .0385 
Source: 1978 data base. 
71 
B. STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
Table B - l 
D e f i n i t i o n of Subsectors 
Subsector l !?dustry_Cgde? 
N o n - m e t a l l i c m inera l s 10 
Bas ic i r o n and s t e e l 110 
Bas ic n o n - f e r r o u s 111 
Metal products 112-119 
Machinery 12 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment 13 
Transpor t equipment 14 
Mood IS 
F u r n i t u r e 16 
Pulp and paper 17 
Rubber products 18 
Leather 19 
Chemicals 20 
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l , soaps, cosmet ics 21-22 
P l a s t i c s 23 
T e x t i l e s 24 
C l o t h i n g 251-252,254-259 
Footwear 253 
Food and tobacco 26-28 
P r i n t i n g 29 
Other manufactures 30 
Tabic B-2 
Spearman Rank C o r r e l a t i o n C o e f f i c i e n t « between Volume of Exports 
and Rate of F i s c a l Subsidy, by Industry 
.Cor re i at i.gn .bet ween Exggrts.and 
Number of Total Export Income Tax 
Industry . . F i r m s S u b s i d e s ) C r e d i t j S l ) ExemßtignJS2> 
TOTAL 3 3 4 3 . 2 0 2 . 1 9 3 . 1 7 4 
NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
1010 8 
1040 40 .481 .358 .330 
1050 5 - -
1 0 6 0 11 
1070 21 .579 .472 .541 
1080 8 
1099 9 
BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
1101 27 




1106 23 .591 .615 
1107 7 - -
1109 3 
BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
1111 12 
1112 3 - -
1113 6 - -
1114-1117 11 





1150 17 .536 .521 .504 
1160 22 
1170 42 .542 .549 .528 
1180,1199 130 .182 - .185 
MACHINERY 
1210 8 .738 
1220 77 .304 - .376 
1231 74 
1232 23 .460 .432 .510 
1240 66 .405 .411 
1251 93 - -
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Rank^Cor r e l at i,qn_between Ex(jgrt§_and 
Number of Tota l Export Income Tax 
Industry _ . £ i r ü s _ _ Subs idy jS) C r e d i t J S l i Exempt ion 's?) 
1253 4 - -
1254,1260 11 .615 .597 .861 
1270 16 
1280,1299 103 .195 .251 
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
1310 35 - .335 -
1320,1330 41 - - -
1340 20 - - -
1351 17 - - -
1352-1353 62 .294 - -
1370 25 .433 - .425 
1380 32 - - -
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
1411 9 - - -
1421 7 - - -
1432 15 - .618 -
1433 122 .452 .326 .445 
1434 3 - - -
1440 19 - - -
1450 9 - - -
WOOD 
1510 65 .406 - .482 





1620 16 - - .634 
1630 5 
1699 6 - .880 
PULP AND PAPER 
1710 4 -
1720 44 .312 .397 





1840 4 - -
1899 35 .349 - .346 
LEATHER 
1910-1911 94 .381 .455 
1930 11 
1999 24 .617 .489 .489 
7 4 
Number of ~~Tot»i 











2070 28 .453 
2080 3 
2099 43 .344 
PHARMACEUTICAL, COSMETICS AND SOAPS 












2410 32 _ 





















































, 8 1 0 
75 
Number of Total Export Income Tax 
ISäyi iCY __FiC§§_. Sybf i d ï i i i ? E § ! Ü t J § i l Exemetign.(S2). 
2610 22 .562 .532 





2660 23 .486 .482 .477 
2680 6 
2691 51 - - .411 
2692 3 - -
2698 3 








PRINTING 2910 8 -
2920,2999 9 - .785 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
3000 10 
3011-3012 18 - .524 
3021,3023 11 
3031 9 - -
3032 5 - -
3033 4 - -
3041 4 -
3042 4 - - 1.000 
3050 5 
3070 6 - -
3080 6 .943 .812 
3099 56 - - .366 
Note: A dash (-) i n d i c a t e s that the c o e f f i c i e n t i s not s i g n i f i -
c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero at the f i v e per cent leve l of 
conf idence in a two-tailed test. 
51 = r a t i o of export c r e d i t ( c red i to premio) to subs idy-
i n c l u s i v e export revenue. 
52 - r a t i o of subsidy equivalent of the income tax 
reduct ion to s u b s i d y - i n c l u s i v e export revenue. 
S = SI + S2. 
Source: 1978 data base. 
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Table C - l 
Mean Values by Subsector of V a r i a b l e s in L o g i t Regress ion 
InS InK ADV InHK InPHK 
TOTAL 16.984 12.154 0.007 10.939 11. 360 
nonexporters 16.418 12.077 0.006 10.868 11. 448 
e x p o r t e r s 18.521 12.365 0.010 11.207 11. 864 
N o n - m e t a l l i c minera l s 17.288 12.070 0.006 10.936 11. 471 
nonexporters 16.812 12.018 0.005 10.875 11. 374 
e x p o r t e r s 18.638 12.216 0.010 11.111 11. 744 
Bas ic i r o n and s t e e l 18.238 12.287 0.004 11.218 11. 440 
nonexporters 17.565 12.185 0.002 I t .170 11. 113 
e x p o r t e r s 19.208 12.426 0.007 11.282 11. 885 
Bas ic n o n - f e r r o u s 17.546 12.331 0.004 11.146 11. 849 
nonexporters 17.067 12.287 0.003 11.065 11. 763 
e x p o r t e r s 19.108 12.562 0.005 11.408 12. 129 
Metal p roducts 17.061 12.170 0.005 11.067 11. 381 
nonexporters 16.575 12.125 0.004 10.997 11. 508 
e x p o r t e r s 18.448 12.297 0.008 11.267 11. 787 
Kachi nery 17.414 12.516 0.009 11.451 11. 840 
nonexporters 16.677 12.474 0.007 11.357 11. 713 
e x p o r t e r s 18.303 12.566 0.011 11.564 11. 992 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment 17.814 12.389 0.009 11.270 11. 782 
nonexporters 17.068 12.356 0.008 11.190 11. 699 
e x p o r t e r s 18.749 12.431 0.011 11.370 11. 886 
Transport equipment 18.036 12.263 0.006 11.261 11. 627 
nonexporters 17. 181 12.187 0.005 11.182 11. 535 
e x p o r t e r s 18.946 12.343 0.007 11.342 11. 721 
Wood 16.439 11.864 0.003 10.390 11. 327 
nonexporters 15.967 11.804 0.002 10.555 11. 232 
e x p o r t e r s 18.008 12.065 0.006 10.708 11. 640 
Furn i tu re 16.305 11.843 0.007 10.741 11. 319 
nonexporters 16. 195 11.794 0.006 10.703 11. 250 
e x p o r t e r s 17.970 12.074 0.011 10.919 11. 644 
Pulp and paper 16.229 11.873 0.003 10.749 11. 220 
nonexporters 15.941 11.807 0.002 10.683 11. 131 
e x p o r t e r s 18.678 12.436 0.005 11.306 11. 971 
Rubber products 13.807 12.016 0.005 10.798 11. 379 
nonexporters 15.381 11.971 0.005 10.727 11. 302 









Pharmaceutical , cosmetics 16.034 
nonexporters 15.678 
exporters 18.741 
P l a s t i c s 17.245 
nonexporters 16.949 
exporters 18.418 
T e x t i l e s 17.829 
nonexporters 17.179 
exporters 18.661 






Food and tobacco 17.103 
nonexporters 16.622 
exporters 19.103 
P r i n t i n g 16.488 
nonexporters 16.336 
exporters 19.013 
Other manufactures 16.911 
nonexporters 16.229 
exporters 18.118 
InK ADV InHK InPHK 
11.683 0, ,004 10, ,478 10. ,478 
11.595 0.002 10. ,402 10. 402 
11.999 0, ,013 10. ,753 10. ,753 
12.931 0. ,007 11. ,310 12. ,474 
12.909 0. > 006 11. ,467 12. 406 
13.033 0, ,008 11, ,593 12, ,607 
12.182 0. ,021 10. ,831 11, ,601 
12.119 0. 019 10. 758 11. 519 
12.660 0. ,033 11. ,552 12, ,223 
12.144 0. ,003 10. 983 11. ,334 
12.079 0. 004 10. 936 11. 445 
12.402 0. 008 11. 179 11. 891 
12.129 0. 003 10. 897 11. 609 
12.077 0. 002 10.843 11. 490 
12.196 0. 004 10. 965 11. 761 
11.893 0. 006 10. 713 11. 312 
11.881 0. 004 10. 684 11. 291 
11.970 0. 011 10. 860 11. 420 
11.394 0. 007 10. 637 10. 994 
11.646 0. 004 10. 626 11. 013 
11.542 0. 010 10. 649 10. 974 
12.173 0. 009 10. 827 11. 334 
12.082 0. 008 10. 751 11. 416 
12.560 0. 014 11. 145 12. 128 
12.183 0. 004 u . 146 11. 617 
12.162 0. 004 11.120 11. 589 
12.580 0. 010 11. 582 12. 069 
12.380 0. 012 11. 084 11. 889 
12.360 0. 009 11. 033 11. 871 
12.414 0. 018 11.175 11.921 
Source: 1978 data base. 
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Table C-2 
Estimated Regression C o e f f i c i e n t s of the Subsector 
Dummy Variables 
Subsector ?taC.t?IL2!l Model 
02 03 05 06 
Non-metallic minerals -4 . 167 -14. 500 -3. 953 -14. 841 
<0. 306) (1. ,472) (0. 304) (1. ,538) 
Basic i ron and steel -3 . 690 -14. 006 -3. 404 -14. 346 
(0. 315) (1. ,465) (0. 314) (1. ,538) 
Basic non-ferrous -4. 227 -14. 462 -4. 019 -14. 840 
(0. 347) (1. ,523) (0. 346) (1. ,593) 
Metal products -3. 843 -14. .062 -3. 577 -14. 406 
(0. 287) (1. ,425) (0. 285) (1. ,499) 
Machinery -2 . 825 -13. 122 -2. 487 -13. ,450 
(0. 287) (1. ,405) (0. 287) (1, ,488) 
E l e c t r i c a l equipment -3. 328 -13. 629 -3. 067 -13. 962 
(0. 296) (1. ,424) (0. 294) (1. ,498) 
Transport equipment -3. 248 -13. 480 -2 . 893 -13. 784 
(0. 302) (1, ,428) (0. 302) (1, ,507) 
Wood -3. 690 -13. ,607 -3. 626 -13. ,983 
(0. 292) (1, ,406) (0. 288) (1, ,464) 
Furni ture -4. 207 -14. 215 -4. 013 -14. ,562 
(0. 299) (1. ,428) (0. 297) (1. ,493) 
Pulp and paper -4. 777 -14. 783 -4. 496 -15. 097 
(0. 299) (1, ,462) <0. 297) (1, .535) 
Rubber products -3. 935 -13. ,883 -3. 722 -14. ,224 
(0. 318) (1, ,456) (0. 316) (1, ,526) 
Leather -3. 229 -12. 814 -3. 092 -13. ,176 
(0. 285) (1. ,363) (0. 282) (1. ,427) 
Chemicals -3. 624 -14. ,400 -3. 597 -14. ,797 
(0. 310) (1, ,490) (0. 304) (1, ,551) 
Pharmaceutical, cosmetics -4. 668 -15. ,117 -4. 529 -15. ,477 
(0. 309) (1, , 50B) (0. 304) (1, ,575) 
P l a s t i c s -4. 294 -14. ,549 -4. 091 -14. ,888 
(0. 306) (1, ,460) (0. 304) (1, .526) 
Text i l es -3. 412 -13. ,586 -3. 280 -13, ,959 
(0. 286) (1, .413) (0. 282) (1, .476) 
Clothing -4. 347 -14. ,406 -4. 153 -14, ,743 
(0. 293) (1, ,426) (0. 290) (1, ,492) 
Footwear -2. 928 -2. 609 
(0. 298) (0. ,297) 
Food and tobacco -4. 480 -14, ,935 -4. 438 -15, .330 
<0. 286) <1 .471) (0. ,281) (1 .531) 
Pr int ing -5. 433 -15, ,535 -5. 101 -15, .867 
(0. 1384) (1 .628) (0. ,383) (1 .699) 
Other manufactures -3. 070 -13, .307 -2. 936 -13, .688 
(0. 303) (1 .426) (0. ,299) (1 .491) 
Note; The s t a t i s t i c s in parentheses are the asymptotic standard 
er rors of the c o e f f i c i e n t s . A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t from zero at the .01 level of confidence. 
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Table D - l 
C o n c e n t r a t i o n I n d i c e s , I m p l i c i t T a r i f f P r o t e c t i o n and 
Industry Dummies ( v a r i a b l e s H, T and D1-D139) 
Indust ry 
Number of 


















I m p l i c i t 
Tariff(X) 
- 1 5 . 5 




- 2 7 . 5 











1 1 0 1 




1 1 0 6 
1107 
1109 









BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
1 1 1 1 

































. 2 1 1 1 
-32.9 
- 8 . 9 
- 8 . 9 
- 9 . 9 



































1 1 6 0 2 2 
1170 42 
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PHARMACEUTICAL, COSMETICS AND SOAPS 
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2210 




















































































































































































































































































Number of Herfindahl Implicit Industi 
Industry Exgorters Index Tariff(X) .Dummy, 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
3000 10 .1106 73.9 D128 
3011 1 .8402 73.9 D129 
3012 17 .0816 73.9 0129 
3021 2 .8550 73.9 D130 
3023 9 .0689 73.9 D130 
3031 9 .3964 73.9 D131 
3032 5 . 1521 73.9 0132 
3033 4 . 1962 73.9 D133 
3041 4 .2614 73.9 D134 
3042 4 .2523 73.9 D135 
3050 5 .2261 73.9 D136 
3070 6 .3906 73.9 D137 
3080 6 .1469 73.9 D138 
3099 56 . 0226 73.9 D139 
Sources 1978 data base and W.G. Tyler, "Política comercial e 
industrial no Brasil: urna analise sob a ótica de 
protecao efetiva para vendas no mercado domestico, 
1980/81," IPEA/INPES, mimeo, July 1981. 
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T a b l e D - 2 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry Dummy Terms 
in Equations 02 and OS 
§guatign_02 §3yation_05 
Variable coefficient standard_errgr cgefficient standard_errgr 
D1 7.219** 1.023 9.055** 1.040 
D2 6.354** 0.835 8. 134** 0.859 
D3 6.629** 1. 174 8.531** 1. 180 
D4 6.424** 0.959 8.231** 0.971 
D5 6.344** 0.894 8.145** 0.920 
06 6.989** 1.032 8.888** 1.054 
D7 5.834** 1.016 7.676** 1.038 
D8 8.486** 0.849 10.329** 0.859 
D9 7.425** 1.507 9.198** 1.536 
D10 8.872** 1.027 10.733** 1.037 
Dll 7. 146** 0.923 8.982** 0.944 
D12 6.922** 0.980 8.776** 1.002 
D13 6.312** 0.873 8.099** 0.905 
D14 5.975** 1. 102 7.842** 1. 120 
D15 6.237** 1.371 8.108** 1.391 
D16 7.673** 0.979 9.541** 0.989 
D17 6.876** 1.357 8,741** 1.370 
018 4.253** 1. 127 6.094** 1. 152 
D19 4.563** 0.986 6.380** 1.015 
D20 6.722** 1.078 8.560** 1.095 
D21 6.452** 1.032 8.272** 1.054 
D22 6.823** 0.948 8.656** 0.966 
D23 6.255** 0.869 8.069** 0.892 
D24 5.813** 0.898 7.579** 0.922 
D25 7.243** 0.886 9.063** 0.910 
D26 7.289** 0.832 9.071** 0.858 
D27 5.808** 0.802 7.619** 0.827 
028 6.575** 1.069 8.415** 1.094 
D29 6.655** 0.822 8.494** 0.849 
D30 7.265** 0.827 9.115** 0.859 
D31 6.354** 0.881 8.145** 0.908 
D32 6.335** 0.821 8.156** 0.845 
D33 6.752** 0.811 8.577** 0.845 
D34 7.628** 1.319 9.549** 1.346 
D35 7.446** 0.981 9.237** 0.995 
D36 7.244** 0.938 9.118** 0.959 
037 6.627** 0.815 8.466** 0.845 
D38 7.171** 0.862 9.018** 0.890 
D39 6.081** 0.845 7.876** 0.869 
D40 6.196** 0.911 7.957** 0. 942 
D41 6.407** 0.922 8.168** 0.943 
D42 6.331** 0.830 8.141** 0.859 
D43 6.894** 0.878 8.741** 0.900 
D44 6.594** 0.862 8.376** 0.886 
D45 9.476** 1.048 11.352** 1.056 
D46 7.824** 1.110 9.643** 1. 133 
D47 9.175** 0.958 11.207** 0.991 
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__Egu§tion Eguation -Q3— 
Variable £9?tíl£ÍSQÍ liíüíiCfL 
048 5. 937** 0. 803 7.750** 0.830 
049 6. 399** 1. 351 8.302** 1.369 
osa 6.385** 0. 896 0.207** 0.923 
OSI 6. 021** 1.012 7.829** 1.029 
052 8. 149** 0. 799 9.951** 0.803 
053 5. 797** 1. 039 7.552** 1.052 
054 7. 628** 0. 839 9.380** 0.633 
055 6. 840** 0.882 8.619** 0.897 
056 5. 875** 0. 806 7.637** 0.824 
057 5. 355** 0. 917 7.158** 0.936 
038 5. 593** 1. 150 7.397** 1.158 
059 6. 655** 1. 087 8.398** 1.100 
060 8. 215** 1. 328 10.072** 1.352 
D61 6. 053** 0. 836 7.865** 0.836 
062 5. 127** 0. 862 6.972** 0.884 
063 5. 642** 1. 002 7.556** 1.011 
064 6. 365** 1. 080 8.221** 1.100 
065 5. 711** 1. 057 7.526** 1.079 
066 4. 187** 1. 220 6.014** 1.232 
067 5. 722** 0. 839 7.541** 0.863 
068 7. 186** 0. 783 8.987** 0.794 
069 6. 649** 0.948 8.337** 0.966 
070 6. 884** 0. 837 8.623** 0.860 
071 6. 693** 0. 868 8.617** 0.883 
072 6. 395** 1. 694 8.426** 1.719 
073 5. 814** 1.043 7.764** 1.058 
074 5. 682** 1. 486 7.611** 1.493 
075 6. 079** 1. 069 7.940** 1.083 
076 8. 530** 1. 249 10.328** 1.263 
077 8. 627** 0. 834 10.540** 0.826 
078 7. 685** 1. 212 9.575** 1.235 
079 5. 384** 0. 944 7.220** 0.957 
080 5. 135** 0. 879 6.973** 0.894 
081 7. 420** 1. 370 9.366** 1.378 
082 6. 119** 0. 853 7.948** 0.874 
083 6. 169** 0. 844 7.973** 0.869 
084 5. 510** 0. 950 7.311** 0.968 
085 6. 219** 0. 934 8.001** 0.945 
086 6. 288** 1. 130 8.129*» 1.153 
087 5. 600** 0. 886 7.472** 0.909 
088 5. 336** 0. 994 7.129** 1.002 
089 5. 519** 1. 220 7.288** 1.238 
090 5. 102** 0, 934 6.922** 0.949 
091 4. 624** 1. 029 6.457** 1.049 
092 5. 695** 0. 883 7.483** 0.898 
093 7. 428** 0. 846 9.256** 0.853 
094 7. 407** 0. 789 9.196** 0.805 
095 6. 755** 0. 818 8.509** 0.837 
096 5. 668** 0. 920 7.417** 0.939 
097 6. 834** 0. 973 8.638** 0.990 
098 7. 823** 0. 978 9.587** 0.993 
099 6. 929** 0. 864 8.624** 0.883 
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Eguat i on_02 Í9ü»tL9ü_Q§ 
V§CL?(íLi coefficient standard_error coefficient standard error 
D100 6.185** 0.796 7.957** 0.816 
0101 8.169** 0.749 9.879** 0.777 
D102 6.811** 0.873 8.571** 0.891 
0103 6.899** 1.084 8.672** 1.095 
D104 8.487** 1.052 10.445** 1.058 
0105 5.494** 1.219 7.303** 1.231 
D106 10.996** 1.060 12.967** 1.070 
D107 7.798** 1.222 9.618** 1.227 
D108 8.876** 0.864 10.654** 0.871 
0109 6.972** 0.873 8.720** 0.885 
0110 8.168** 0.857 10.001** 0.871 
Dill 9.173** 1.004 10.910** 1.014 
D112 8.470** 0.875 10.219** 0.891 
D113 7.604** 1.019 9.343** 1.032 
0114 9.948** 0.895 11.914** 0.908 
0115 6.720** 0.867 8.503** 0.885 
0116 4.498** 1.090 6.278** 1.106 
D117 9.540** 0.852 11.416** 0.845 
0118 5.500** 1.551 7.209** 1.573 
D119 3.845** 1.346 5.722»* 1.365 
D120 8.506** 0.883 10.335** 0.890 
D121 5.235** 1.089 7.063*» 1.081 
D122 5.291** 0.929 7.146»» 0.935 
0123 5.990** 1.365 7.811** 1.381 
0124 6.400** 1.090 8.222»» 1.105 
D125 8.046** 1.082 10.087** 1.110 
D126 5.630** 1.051 7.470»» 1.077 
D127 5.157** 1.010 6.978»» 1.029 
D128 6.415** 0.979 8.160** 1.005 
D129 6.842** 0.910 8.705»» 0.937 
D130 6.562*« 0.980 8.325*» 0.999 
D131 8.362** 1.083 10.285»» 1.078 
D132 6.795** 1. 181 8.623** 1.194 
0133 6.280** 1.234 8.057** 1.261 
0134 7.522** 1.253 9.286** 1.272 
D135 6.713** 1.295 8.639** 1.308 
0136 6.961** 1.160 8.688** 1.177 
D137 6.397** 1. 159 8.129** 1.177 
0138 7.181** 1.088 8.905** 1.106 
D139 7.116** 0.814 8.885** 0.833 
Note: A H coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 
level. 
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T a b i « D-3 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry Dummy Terms 
in Equations 03 and 06 
Eguation_03 Eguation_06 
Variable coefficient §Ì3D!!ard_errgr coefficient 5Ì3Q23CELSCC9C 
01 37.079** 10.072 39.318** 10.072 
02 10.415* 5.036 11.690* 5.050 
03 32.244 58.746 30.304 58.798 
04 22.040** 3.996 23.709** 3.996 
05 3.533 4.930 5.379 4.936 
06 15.366 8. 169 17.374* 8.185 
07 3.827 6.071 5.431 6.077 
08 -0.436 6.945 0.367 6.955 
09 -3.423 8.676 -1.886 8.692 
DIO -0.865 7.173 0.649 7.177 
D11 -10.361 5.514 -8.620 5.534 
D12 -10.734 8.464 -8.964 8.474 
D13 -6.365 5.456 -4.683 5.467 
DI 4 -17.317 14.022 -15.010 14.033 
D15 17.453 17.914 19.253 17.929 
D16 13.578 7.305 15.183* 7.323 
D17 28.793** 7.113 30.785** 7.127 
D18 24.531* 11.653 25.834* 11.674 
D19 1.115 9.461 3.119 9.477 
020 4.592 14.039 5.877 14.050 
021 17.547 13.509 18.666 13.519 
D22 -4.657 5.043 -3.640 5.054 
023 3.372 5.516 5.133 5.523 
D24 5.916 6.299 7.061 6.308 
D25 15.700** 4.651 17.571** 4.651 
D26 0.928 4.296 2.884 4.320 
027 3.327 2.701 4.901 2.724 
D28 4.540 11.381 6.046 11.404 
D29 9.962* 3.971 12.019** 3.975 
D30 2.226 3.896 4.802 3.923 
D31 -1.528 7.638 -0.431 7.648 
D32 -4.313 3. ¡86 -2.836 3.199 
D33 1.263 2.711 2.898 2.735 
D34 3.508 10.852 4. 171 10.864 
D35 -2.297 6.227 -0.394 6.223 
D36 -5.211 6.054 -3.223 6.067 
D37 3.208 2.904 4.976 2.918 
D38 -1.518 4.556 0.144 4.564 
D39 2.429 5.816 4. 181 5.839 
D40 3.934 4.996 5.441 5.001 
D41 -5.249 5.566 -3.964 5.582 
D42 1.077 3. 197 3.112 3.215 
D43 10.807** 4. 170 14.533** 4.295 
D44 -6.409 4.270 -4.759 4.289 
D45 9.715 6.387 11.378 6.394 
D46 -12.616 9.261 -10.790 9.273 
D47 -5.428 3.811 -2.679 3.850 
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Eguat i on_03 §9tí?ÍL9[!_Q£ 
VêCLîtl? Ç9SÎÎLÇL?iît standard_errgr coefficient »tandard_error 
D48 -2.591 2.368 -0.875 2.367 
D49 -39.677 76.748 -38.696 76.847 
D50 10.662 6.549 12.412 6.554 
DSI -12.476 7.775 -10.763 7.786 
D52 6.059* 3.053 8.618** 3.068 
D53 -21.941 25.162 -20.806 25.186 
D54 15.406»* 4.197 16.577** 4.196 
D55 9.642 9.515 11.557 9.519 
D56 12.069** 3.273 13.542** 3.281 
D57 10.987 10.962 12.383 10.964 
D58 2.884 14.630 4.851 14.635 
059 -18.281 14.589 -16.502 14.603 
D60 28.144 15.121 29.465 15.144 
Dil 9.692** 3.634 11.079*« 3.641 
062 2.442 3.248 4.326 3.244 
D63 5.478 12.121 9.234 12.098 
D64 -3.878 7.054 -2.385 7.067 
065 13.914 12.985 15.487 13.004 
D66 18.779 16.978 19.872 16.998 
067 7.008 4.743 8.635 4.745 
D68 7.765* 3.040 10.146»« 3.052 
069 -5.940 5.261 -5.008 5.265 
D70 1.786 4.215 3.251 4.225 
D71 17.690** 2.925 19.705** 2.922 
D72 -10.551 8.134 -8.456 8.177 
073 35.255** 12.075 35.960** 12.087 
074 12.809 8.823 13.605 8.845 
D75 6.023 5.952 7.904 5.980 
D76 11.008 19.254 12.002 19.270 
077 10.135** 2.594 11.842** 2.619 
D78 23.461* 10.674 25.036* 10.677 
D79 2.331 5.479 3.931 5.477 
080 0.679 5.974 2.406 5.979 
081 8.064 4.431 9.897* 4.448 
D82 13.145** 4.027 14.660** 4.040 
083 -3.230 3. 179 -1.837 3.186 
084 8.605 4.706 10.262* 4.725 
085 6.474 3.850 7.811* 3.848 
086 8.266 11.744 9.861 11.758 
D87 -1.572 5.968 2.549 6.028 
D88 -1.260 7.071 0.520 7.068 
089 -4.758 19.964 -3.462 19.985 
090 5.959 9.670 7.623 9.669 
D91 -12.255 8.299 -10.268 8.310 
D92 0.637 5.942 2.631 5.951 
D93 19.326** 4.042 20.881** 4.032 
D94 6.587** 1.955 8.460** 1.950 
095 9.123* 4.077 10.852** 4.086 
D96 -12.675 11.268 -10.764 11.285 
D97 -5.339 8.368 -2.998 8.364 
D98 4. 18.1 9.834 5.816 9.846 
099 -2.687 5.028 -1.088 5.036 
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Eguat i^ on _03 Eguatiqn_06 
Variabile coefficient 5tan<iard_errqr coefficient standardj 
DI 00 3.370 2.873 5.486 2.880 
D101 15.461** 1.566 17.134** 1.599 
D102 21.695** 5.051 23.558** 5.051 
D103 -9.477 16.199 -7.154 16.215 
D104 9.516 10.292 11.743 10.303 
D1 OS -2.582 11.912 -1.405 11.925 
D106 6.000 15.344 6.975 15.381 
D107 9.124 8.517 10.136 8.526 
D108 13.184** 2.325 14.771** 2.327 
D109 13.083** 4.211 14.619** 4.214 
DUO 17.832** 4.605 19.608** 4.609 
Din 5.511 6.867 7.014 6.877 
DI 12 11.785* 5.593 13.678* 5.593 
DI 13 18.862** 4.544 20.419** 4.559 
DI 14 22.203** 4.942 24.713** 4.953 
DI 15 1.304 6.412 2.857 6.414 
DI 16 0. 124 14.525 1. 193 14.538 
DI 17 7.412 4.224 8.913* 4.218 
Di 18 29.406* 12.542 30.889* 12.553 
DI 19 47.343 51.036 52.861 51.088 
D120 13.907* 5.522 15.270** 5.531 
D121 9.402 10.420 10.858 10.430 
D122 18.305** 4.425 19.993** 4.434 
D123 -7.587 69.520 -6.339 69.585 
D124 5.953 7.750 7.062 7.762 
D125 8.130* 3.867 9.355* 3.853 
D126 -14.884 10.542 -13.587 10.550 
D127 5.519 9.803 7.063 9.808 
D128 -5.701 9.518 -3.766 9.529 
D129 -11.997 7.960 -10.309 7.966 
D130 -8.036 8.350 -6.946 8.373 
D131 11.023 6.667 13.801* 6.659 
D132 -32.176* 13.476 -30.522* 13.495 
D133 34.627 19.311 37.668 19.344 
D134 -3.587 30.805 -1.132 30.835 
D135 -21.708 24.836 -19.922 24.868 
D136 2.675 12.464 4.069 12.472 
D137 -9.519 9.911 -7.899 9.920 
D138 13.004 43.748 15.960 43.793 
D139 12.380** 2.291 14.283** 2.299 
Note: <*) indicates significance at the .05 level of confidence 
and (**) at the .01 level. 
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T t b l i D - 4 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry-Domestic Sales 
Interaction Terms in Equations 03 and 06 
Variable Eguati on_03 Eguat ign_06 
ktandar 
error 
. . standard ... . . standard coefficient coefficient 
NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
lnDS*Dl -2.548** 0.586 -2.565** 0.587 
1nDS*D2 -1.019** 0.269 -0.986** 0.269 
lnDS*D3 -2.111 3.014 -1.908 3.016 
lnDS*D4 -1.657** 0.216 -1.643** 0.216 
lnDS*D5 -0.649* 0.260 -0.644* 0.261 
lnDS*D6 -1.270** 0.457 -1.270** 0.457 
lnDS*D7 -0.686* 0.337 -0.665* 0.338 
BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
lnDS*D8 -0.293 0.3BS -0.228 0.389 
lnDS*D9 -0.223 0.436 -0.202 0.436 
InDS'DIO -0.282 0.378 -0.257 0.378 
lnDStDll 0.061 0.268 0.072 0.268 
ln0S*D12 0.132 0.442 0.143 0.443 
lnDS*D13 -0.105 0.296 -0.093 0.297 
lnDS«D14 0.365 0.697 0.350 0.698 
lnDS*D15 -1.374 0.926 -1.364 0.927 
BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
lnDS*D16 -1.094** 0.371 -1.074** 0.371 
lnDS*D17 -2.028** 0.394 -2.029** 0.394 
lnDS*D18 -1.839** 0.601 -1.804** 0.601 
lnDS*D19 -0.607 0.518 -0.610 0.518 
lnDS*D20 -0.675 0.752 -0.638 0.753 
METAL PRODUCTS 
lnDS*D21 -1.411 0.744 -1.365 0. 745 
ln0S*D22 -0.183 0.270 -0.132 0. 270 
lnDS*D23 -0.644* 0.291 -0.635* 0. 292 
lnDS*D24 -0.807* 0,344 -0.766* 0. 344 
lnDS*D25 -1.267** 0.253 -1.263** 0. 254 
lnDS*D26 -0.454* 0.231 -0.457* 0. 231 
lnDS*D27 -0.664** 0.145 -0.644** 0. 145 
MACHINERY 
lnDS*D28 -0. 687 0.605 -0.662 0.606 
lnDS*D29 -0. ,978** 0.214 -0.983** 0.214 
lnDS*D30 -0. 517* 0.215 -0.551* 0.216 
lnDS*D31 -0. ,360 0.424 -0.315 0.425 
lnDS*D32 -0. ,211 0.173 -0.186 0.173 
lnDS*D33 -0, .492** 0. 147 -0.475** 0. 147 
1nDS*D34 -0. ,580 0.546 -0.508 0.547 
lnDS*D35 -0, ,298 0.315 -0.297 0.316 
lnDS*D36 -0, ,159 0.305 -0.158 0.306 








coefficient standai _errgr. 
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
1nDS*D38 -0. 330 0.242 -0.313 0.242 
lnDS*D39 -0. ,604* 0.305 -0.595 0.305 
In0S*D40 -0. 673* 0.268 -0.652* 0.268 
lnDS*D41 -0. 207 0.281 -0.176 0.282 
lnDS*D42 -0. 507** 0. 172 -0.512** 0. 172 
1nDS*D43 -1. 004** 0.218 -1.097** 0.222 
lnDS*D44 -0. 103 0.226 -0.089 0.226 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
1nDS*D45 -0. 809* 0.328 -0.791* 0.328 
1nDS*D46 0. 258 0.474 0.265 0.475 
1nDS*047 -0. 087 0. 181 -0.115 0.181 
1nDS*D48 -0. 339** 0. 123 -0.327** 0.124 
lnDS*D49 1. 747 4.248 1.805 4.253 
1nDS*D50 -1. 023** 0.344 -1.013** 0.344 
1nDS*D51 0. 217 0.425 0.229 0.426 
WOOD 
lnDS*D52 -0. 675** 0.174 -0.713** 0.175 
1nDS*D53 0. 751 1.405 0.793 1.406 
lnDS*D54 -1.222** 0.228 -1. 183** 0.229 
lnDS*D55 -0. 956 0.539 -0.957 0.539 
FURNITURE 
lnDS*D56 -1. 150** 0.182 -1.127** 0.182 
lnDS*D57 -1. 109 0.599 -1.080 0.601 
lnDS*D58 -0. 646 0.796 -0.648 0.796 
lnDS*D59 0. 574 0.803 0.579 0.804 
PULP AND PAPER 
lnDS*D60 -1. 807* 0.768 -1.772* 0.769 
1nDS*D61 -0. 990** 0.190 -0.961** 0.191 
1nDS*D62 -0. 650** 0.174 -0.646** 0.174 
lnDS*D63 -0. 790 0.688 -0.889 0.688 
RUBBER PRODUCTS 
lnDS*D64 -0. 285 0.346 -0.260 0.347 
lnDS*D65 -1. 265 0.733 -1.245 0.734 
lnOS*D66 -1. 674 1.016 -1.624 1.017 
1nDS*D67 -0. 871** 0.262 -0.854** 0.262 
1 nDS*D68 -0. 829** 0.172 -0.856** 0.172 
lnDS*D69 -0. 073 0.302 -0.022 0.303 
lnDS*D70 -0. 496* 0.249 -0.474 0.249 
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Variable Eguat t_on_03 .Eguation.06 




1nDS*D71 -1.404** 0.157 -1.402** 0.157 
lnDS*D72 0.011 0.373 0.017 0.374 
lnDS*D73 -2.236** 0.592 -2.169** 0.593 
1nDS*074 -1.163* 0.475 -1.094* 0.474 
1n0S*075 -0.793** 0.294 -0.787** 0.295 
1nDS*D76 -0.921 1.015 -0.871 1.017 
lnDS*D77 -0.884** 0.148 -0.866** 0.148 
1nDS*D78 -1.666** 0.593 -1.641** 0.594 
1nDS*D79 -0.633* 0.294 -0.616* 0.295 
1nDS*DSO -0.562 0.310 -0.550 0.310 
InDS*D81 -0.845** 0.230 -0.832** 0.230 
1nDS*D82 -1.174** 0.215 -1.150** 0.216 
PHARMACEUTICAL, COSMETICS AND SOAPS 
lnDS*D83 -0.305 0.166 -Q.277 0.166 
1nDS*D84 -0.975** 0.254 -0.961** 0.254 
lnDS*D85 -0.810** 0.210 -0.779** 0.210 
PLASTICS 
1nDS*D86 -0.893 0.588 -0.873 0.588 
lnDS*D87 -0.405 0.326 -0.522 0.329 
lnDS*D88 -0.437 0.386 -0.430 0.387 
1nDS*D89 -0.234 1.096 -0.201 1.097 
1nDS*D90 -0.843 0.518 -0.828 0.519 
1nDS*D91 0.104 0.439 0. 103 0.440 
1 nDS*D92 -0.520 0.327 -0.525 0.327 
TEXTILES 
lnDS*D93 -1.465** 0.224 -1.444** 0.225 
1nDS*D94 -0.753** 0. 100 -0.751** 0. 100 
1 nDS*D95 -0.931** 0.223 -0.923** 0.223 
1 nDS*D96 0.215 0.620 0.213 0.620 
1nDS#D97 -0.131 0.453 -0.153 0.453 
1nDS*D98 -0.599 0.531 -0.586 0.531 
1nDS*D99 -0.288 0.264 -0.276 0.264 
CLOTHING 
lnDS*D100 -0.644** 0. 157 -0.657** 0.157 
lnDS*D102 -1.689** 0.298 -1.689** 0.298 
lnDS*D103 0.141 0.929 0. 116 0.930 
FOOTWEAR 
lnDS*D101 -1.238** 0.087 -1.229** 0.087 
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Variable Eguati on_03 
.... . standard coefficient error 
Eguatign_06 
standard coefficient error 
FOOD 
lnDS*D104 -0. 856 0.569 -0. , 865 0.570 
lnDS*D105 -0. i 381 0.612 -0.342 0.613 
lnDS*D106 -0. 513 0.880 -0. 449 0.880 
lnDS*D107 -0. 859 0.457 -0. ,808 0.457 
1nDS*D108 -1. 046** 0. 131 -1. ,028** 0.131 
lnDS*Dl09 -1. 1138** 0.232 -1, ,119** 0.232 
In0S*D110 -1. 292** 0.232 -1. 283** 0.232 
lrt05*Dl11 -0. 613 0.340 -0. ,595 0.340 
1nDS*Dl 12 -0. 986** 0.311 -0. 988** 0.312 
lnDS*Dl13 -1. 382** 0.231 -1, ,366** 0.232 
lnDS*D114 -1. 452** 0.258 -1. 475** 0.258 
lnOS*Dl15 -0. 509 0.344 -0. ,490 0.345 
lnDS*Dl16 -0. 574 0.766 -0. 530 0.767 
lnDS*D117 -0. 684** 0.220 -0. ,659** 0.220 
1nDS*Dl18 -2. 018** 0.640 -1. 998** 0.641 
lnDS*Dl19 -2. 957 2.540 -3, , 131 2.542 
lnDS*D120 -1. 102** 0.313 -1. 069** 0.313 
BEVERAGES 
ln0S*D121 -1.032 0.584 -1.005 0.584 
lnDS*D122 -1.552** 0.251 -1.536** 0.251 
lnDS*D123 -0.170 3.206 -0.136 3.209 
lnDS*D124 -0.776 0.439 -0.729 0.439 
TOBACCO 
lnDS*D125 -0.806** 0.205 -0.756** 0.207 
PRINTING 
1nDS*D126 0.254 0.538 0.289 0.539 
1nDS*D127 -0.819 0.527 -0.798 0.528 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
lnDS*D128 -0.128 0.524 -0.131 0.525 
lnDS*D129 0.257 0.445 0.273 0.445 
lnDS*D130 0.009 0.463 0.054 0.463 
lnDS*D131 -0.963* 0.427 -1.013* 0.427 
lnDS*D132 1.298 0.724 1.314 0.725 
1nDS*D133 -2.432* 1.111 -2.498* 1.112 
lnDS*D134 -0.194 1.678 -0.225 1.679 
lnDS*D135 0.613 1.231 0.626 1.232 
lnDS*D136 -0.559 0.691 -0.534 0.691 
1nDS*Dl37 0.050 0.526 0.063 0.526 
lnOS*D138 -1.126 2.457 -1.188 2.459 
1nDS*D139 -1.098** 0.124 -1.099** 0. 124 
Note: (*) indicates significance at the .05 level of confidence 
and (**) at the .01 level. 
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T a b l e D-2 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry Dummy Terms 
in Equations 08 and 11 
Eguation_08 §Sy§ii9D_ll 
yiCii^le coefficient standard_error coefficient standard_error 
D1 6.779*» 1.021 10.326** 1.871 
D2 5.879** 0.836 8.184** 1.728 
D3 6.212** 1.169 
D4 6.006** 0.958 10.628** 1.795 
DS 5.881** 0.895 8.860** 1.789 
D6 6.553** 1.029 11.166** 1.952 
D7 5.865** 1.037 8.164** 1.952 
D8 7.842** 0.851 11.537** 2.083 
D9 6.639** 0.501 
D10 8.263** 1.026 
Dll 6.472** 0.930 
D12 6.364** 0.980 
D13 5.810** 0.873 8.182** 1.771 
D14 5.375** 1.099 
D15 5.669** 1.364 
D16 7.325** 0.977 
D17 6.352** 1.350 10.239** 2.111 
D18 3.790** 1. 123 
019 4,049** 0.999 
020 6.476** 1.111 
D21 5.935** 1.030 
D22 6.344** 0.948 9.722** 1.840 
023 5.693** 0.870 9.151** 1.784 
024 5.276** 0.898 7.886** 1.835 
D2S 6.552** 0.888 10.151** 1.832 
026 6.748** 0.833 9.331** 1.707 
D27 5.381** 0.805 8.578** 1.636 
D28 6.063** 1.067 10.194** 2.227 
029 6.200** 0.825 9.136** 1.750 
D30 6.796** 0.830 9.800** 1.747 
D31 5.785** 0.883 9.013** 2.006 
D32 5.704** 0.826 8.016** 1.702 
033 6.230** 0.814 10.599** 1.682 
D34 6.90S** 1.315 
D35 6.783** 0.981 8.829** 2. 169 
D36 6.568** 0.939 7.507** 2. 152 
D37 6.152** 0.818 9.184** 1.649 
D38 6.674** 0.864 9.667** 1.807 
D39 5.577** 0.847 7.625** 1.818 
D40 5.718** 0.912 8.920** 2.072 
D41 5.889** 0.922 8.801** 2.018 
D42 5.849** 0.833 9.245** 1.755 
D43 6.259** 0.880 9.499** 1.916 
D44 6.022** 0.863 10.138** 1.802 
D45 8.988** 1.047 11.421** 2.159 
046 . 7.202** 1. 108 
























































Eguati on_OB Ì9"atign_ll 
egeííUUQt §ÜüÍ*cÍ_l!lC9C íSSÍÍUUüt 5Ìì!lÌà!lìl-SCC9!l 
5.438** 0.806 7.764** 1.657 
5.886** 1.344 9.055** 2.009 
5.858** 0.896 11.235** 2.042 
5.384** 1.011 7.668** 2.149 
7.744** 0.801 10.346** 1.646 
5.280** 1.036 
6.940** 0.842 10.761** 1.816 
6.363** 0.881 8.650** 2.014 
5.422** 0.808 8.969** 1.600 
4.854** 0.922 8.776** 1.928 
4.900** 1.147 
6.168** 1.083 8.806** 1.941 
7.948** 1.322 
5.452** 0.838 8.671** 1.698 
4.553** 0.864 7.554** 1.714 
4.947** 1.005 8.286** 2.097 
5.667** 1.080 9.890** 2.178 
5.103** 1.055 9.816** 1.952 
3.581** 1.215 7.508** 2.106 
5.210** 0.841 8.559** 1.673 
6.951** 0.784 9.063** 1.617 
6.097** 0.946 
6.300** 0.839 8.157** 1.673 
6.296** 0.869 8.806** 2. 191 
5.704** 1.688 12.736** 3.541 
5.388** 1.042 
5.472** 1.659 
5.434** 1.068 9.222** 2. 137 
8.004** 1.244 
8.219** 0.836 11.634** 1.703 
7.158** 1.209 
4.970** 0.944 8.737** 1.764 
4.688** 0.880 8.140** 1.779 
6.995** 1.363 10.317** 2. 165 
5.584** 0.857 8.018** 1.789 
5.848** 0.845 9.374** 1.699 
5.074** 0.949 8.188** 1.871 
5.927** 0.951 11.014** 1.901 
5.654** 1. 127 
5.133** 0.893 9.087** 1.757 
4.718** 0.993 8.266** 1 953 
5.311** 1.213 
4.560** 0.934 8.134** 1.942 
4.095** 1.028 8.790** 2.164 
5.106** 0.885 9.096** 1.799 
6.809** 0.848 10.459** 1.751 
6.602** 0.795 9.027** 1.652 
5.978** 0.822 9.701** 1.656 
4.762** 0.936 8.816** 2.115 
5.848** 0.978 
7.001** 0.979 
6.140** 0.870 8.373** 1.930 
Equation 08 Equation 11 
Variable coefficient standard_error E9ftiii.ci.ent standard^ 
D100 5.498** 0.802 8.458** 1.630 
D101 7.840** 0.750 7.355** 1.614 
0102 6.152** 0.880 8.255** 1.831 
0103 6.258** 1.081 9.424** 1.909 
D104 7.928** 1.051 11.375** 1.845 
0105 4.945** 1.213 7.895** 2.043 
D106 10.705** 1.058 14.655** 2.014 
D107 7.694** 1.217 
D108 8.370** 0.870 12.474** 2.070 
0109 6.418** 0.874 8.746** 1.864 
0110 7.672** 0.857 11.070** 1.697 
Dili 8.618** 1.002 14.046** 2.003 
0112 8.078** 0.875 11.442** 1.782 
D113 7.266** 1.017 12.651** 1.952 
D114 9.536** 0.896 12.708** 1.829 
D115 6.555** 0.870 9.057** 1.724 
Di 16 4.100** 1.086 7.113** 1.953 
D117 9.272** 0.853 13.254** 1.705 
Dl 18 5.276** 1.542 
Dl 19 3.331** 1.338 7.903** 2.163 
D120 8.282** 0.888 11.233** 2.074 
D121 4.846** 1.085 8.605** 1.950 
D122 4.783** 0.929 8.409** 1.745 
Dl 23 5.447** 1.357 
D124 5.960** 1.086 7.231** 2.031 
0125 7.517** 1.081 11.990** 2.307 
D126 4.917** 1.050 
D127 4.599** 1.008 7.551** 1.830 
0128 5.918** 0.978 8.962** 2.010 
0129 6.212** 0.912 8.052** 1.991 
D130 5.908** 0.980 10.432** 2.071 
D131 8.039** 1.081 
D132 6.329** 1.176 
D133 5.741** 1.228 
0134 6.804** 1.249 
D135 6.225** 1.290 9.309** 2.379 
D136 6.392** 1.156 
D137 5.751** 1.156 
D138 6.651** 1.085 10.313** 2.167 
D139 6.691** 0.816 9.078** 1.704 
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 
level of confidence. 
97 
T a b l a 0 - 6 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry Dummy Teres 
in Equations 09 and 12 
Eguat i on_0? Eguat ion_12 
YîCi*!!l§ £9®f Î Î£i?DÎ sIsDiistiLerrgr çoef f i ç i gnt standard_error 
D1 36.317** 9.961 34.037** 11.512 
02 9.820* 4.980 16.721 15.850 
03 35.157 58.090 
04 22.081** 3.953 24.764** 6.233 
OS 2.568 4.878 7.439 10.953 
06 14.338 8.079 22.046* 11.107 
07 2. 121 6.014 20.380 10.807 
08 -0.884 6.868 
09 -1.423 8.583 
010 0.688 7.100 
011 -10.560 5.737 
012 -11.430 8.371 
013 -5.848 5.397 2.641 10.878 
014 -17.795 13.866 
015 16.361 17.714 
016 13.758 7.224 
017 28.445** 7.035 29.804** 7.121 
018 24.047* 11.523 
019 -0.203 10.590 
020 4.794 14.018 
021 16.869 13.358 
022 -4.591 4.987 -4.147 6.076 
023 3.928 5.456 68.237** 20.243 
024 4.887 6.230 12.512 11.335 
025 14.409** 4.604 15.530 14.697 
026 0.682 4.251 8.810 8.458 
D27 2.635 2.691 -3.581 5.229 
028 5.083 11.254 
029 9.539* 3.933 14.641 8.256 
030 1. 190 3.865 23.815* 10.021 
D31 -1.508 7.553 -29.933 22.891 
032 -4.299 3.212 1.661 7.935 
033 0.458 2.697 3.485 5.240 
034 2.406 10.731 
D35 -2.344 6. 159 
036 -4.892 5.989 
037 2.442 2.876 10.138 7.487 
038 -2.400 4.508 17.903 33.357 
039 1.684 5.753 88.224* 38.142 
040 3.750 4.941 34.835 20.962 
041 -5.619 5.505 2.539 26.804 
042 2. 190 3.286 13.621* 5.506 
D43 10.087* 4. 126 33.731** 12.626 
044 -7.002 4.225 -0.045 9.758 
D45 9.573 6.316 
046 -12.04" 9. 158 
047 -5.44; 3.770 
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Eguation_0? Eguat i gn_12 
Vacii^L® E.9§ÍÍÍ£Lt!lt 5t*ndard_«rrgr ç9tliiçi.ent »tandard_errgr 
D48 -2.891 2.349 6.819 7.466 
D49 -37.938 75.887 -35.168 74.960 
D50 11.407 6.478 
DSI -13.006 7.689 
D52 6.075» 3.022 6.660 7.574 
D53 -28.267 24.893 
D54 15.067»» 4.152 34.001** 10.013 
DSS 9. 172 9.410 
D56 10.599»» 3.282 8.236 4.345 
D57 10.807 11.170 1.783 49.014 
D58 2.426 14.467 
D59 -17.715 14.426 -20.018 50.687 
D60 30.961» 14.955 
Dil 9.454»» 3.595 32.609** 6.553 
062 2.431 3.215 6.982 4.130 
Di3 -7.616 13.561 
D64 -4.074 6.977 16.075 121.027 
D6S 14.454 12.840 12.348 22.225 
D6i 19.470 16.788 
D67 6.570 4.691 5.300 7.442 
D68 6.389» 3.013 17.786** 6.057 
D69 -5.766 5.208 
D70 1.297 4.170 10.547 12.679 
D71 16.867»» 2.899 
D72 -10.515 8.044 -11.028 9.225 
D73 36.512»» 11.940 
D74 15.307 9.970 
075 5.886 5.887 
D76 9.207 19.040 
D77 9.418»* 2.569 15.837** 4.653 
D78 22.136» 10.556 
D79 0.999 5.422 -7.584 6.895 
D80 -0.571 5.911 4.355 12.543 
OBI 7.838 4.384 
082 11.138** 4.291 17.858 11.382 
D83 -3.369 3. 145 0.861 5.935 
D84 7. 115 4.659 10.585 7.292 
D85 7.056 3.988 4.315 5.222 
D86 7.506 11.613 
D87 -1.285 5.925 2.268 7.424 
DBS -1.620 6.994 -1.274 14.417 
089 -2.859 19.742 
D90 4.459 9.564 -53.602 48.408 
091 -12.723 8.208 
D92 0.829 5.877 -5.886 19.280 
D93 18.844** 3.999 12.572 8.617 
094 5.938** 1.941 15.390* 6.525 
D95 9.643* 4.033 10.926 6.833 
D96 -21.887 12.225 
D97 -6.342 8.277 
D98 3.008 9.726 
099 0. 141 5.467 -0.658 44.632 
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Eguation_0? l9ü»U9!l-i? 
¥SCU^LS cöäi ? i ci ent »tandard_error coefficient stand§rd_errgr 
0100 2.959 2.979 -0.212 5.872 
0101 15.275** 1.553 3.040 7.262 
0102 22.200** 5.275 -9.761 35.868 
0103 -6.806 16.023 -12.161 24.089 
0104 9.096 10.178 8.354 10.623 
0105 -1.182 11.780 
0106 7.215 15.173 18.695 20.058 
0107 7.966 8.423 
0108 12.226** 2.315 -10.287 17.474 
0109 12.156** 4.167 41.478** 12.832 
0110 17.678** 4.556 20.424** 6.077 
0111 5.379 6.791 20.567** 7.946 
0112 11.804* 5.532 -5.994 18.080 
0113 18.535** 4.495 20.899** 5.402 
0114 22.319** 4.890 22.822** 6.353 
D115 -1.969 6.418 -7.127 10.886 
0116 0.452 14.362 5.232 17.792 
0117 5.454 4.186 -8.182 9.118 
0118 27.114* 12.406 
0119 47.166 50.466 
0120 10.748* 5.483 
0121 10.870 10.305 9.276 12.726 
0122 17.677** 4.378 9.021 6.166 
0123 -16.296 68.749 
0124 3.941 7.668 
0125 7.136 3.827 11.926* 4.734 
0126 -14.292 10.426 
0127 6. 125 9.694 32.128 16.748 
0128 -5.051 9.413 -24.531 21.036 
0129 -13.178 7.873 34.729 72.978 
0130 -7.759 8.259 
0131 9.711 6.598 
0132 -33.718* 13.327 
0133 39.077* 19.104 
0134 -4.188 30.459 
0135 -23.749 24.560 
0136 0.574 12.328 
0137 -9.609 9.802 
0138 11.675 43.257 
0139 12.555** 2.286 -9.711 13.131 
Note: (»> indicates significance at the .05 level of confidence 
and <**) at the .01 level. 
100 
T a b l a D - 7 
Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Industry-Doaestic Sales 
Interaction Teras in Equations 09 and 12 
Variable Eguati on _0? Eguati on _ 15 1 
coefficient standard coefficient standai .error _§rror. 
NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
lnDS*Dl -2. 515** 0.579 -2.302»* 0. 668 
lnOS*D2 -0.999«* 0.266 -1.385 0. 882 
lnDS*D3 -2. 269 2.981 
lnDS*D4 -1. 669** 0.213 -1.777** 0. 373 
lnDS*D5 -0. 609* 0.257 -0.829 0. 594 
lnD8*D6 -1. 223** 0.452 -1.546* 0. 666 
lnDS*D7 -0. 574 0.335 -1.631* 0. 636 
BASIC IRON AND STEEL 
lnDS*D8 -0. 290 0.384 
lnDS*D9 -0. 353 0.431 
lnDS*D10 -0. 3S2 0.374 
lnDS*Dll 0. 048 0.277 
lnDS*D12 0. 153 0.437 
lnDS*D13 -0. 147 0.293 -0.581 0. 622 
lnDS*D14 0. 372 0.689 
lnDS*D15 -1. 334 0.915 
BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS 
lnDS*D16 -1. 108** 0.366 
lnDS*D17 -2. 024** 0.389 -1.989** 0. 384 
lnDS*D18 -1. 825** 0.594 
lnDS*D19 -0. 552 0.575 
lnDS*D20 -0. 686 0.749 
METAL PRODUCTS 
lnDS*D21 -1. 388 0.736 
1 nDS*D22 -0. 198 0.267 -0.119 0. 342 
lnDS*D23 -0. 690* 0.288 -4.223** 1. 138 
1 nDS*D24 -0. 766* 0.340 -1.159 0. 621 
lnDS*D25 -1. 219** 0.251 -1.197 0. 818 
1nDS*D26 -0. 456* 0.22B -0.877 0. 475 
lnDS»D27 -0. 635** 0.145 -0.216 0. 285 
MACHINERY 
lnDS*D28 -0. 730 0.598 
lnDS*D29 -0. 966** 0.211 -1.193** 0. 439 
lnDS*D30 -0. 470* 0.214 -1.688*» 0. 551 
lnDS*D31 -0. 1378 0.420 1.287 1. 281 
lnDS*D32 -0. 233 0.175 -0.532 0. 451 
1nDS*D33 -0. 462** 0. 146 -0.490 0. , 288 
1nDS*D34 -0.547 0.540 
lnDS*D35 -0. 315 0.312 
lnDS*D36 -0. 196 0.302 








,.. . . «tandai coefficient error 
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT. 
lnDS*D38 -0.295 0.239 -1 364 1.870 
lnDS*D39 -0.577 0.302 -5.134* 2.009 
lnDS*D40 -0.676* 0.265 -2.404* 1.205 
lnDS*D41 -0.201 0.278 -0.584 1.371 
InDS»D42 -0.582** 0.177 -1.150** 0.302 
lnDS*D43 -0.985** 0.216 -2.131*» 0.635 
lnDS*D44 -0.088 0.223 -0.338 0.529 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
lnDS*D45 -0.814* 0.324 
lnDS*D46 0.210 0.469 
lnDS*D47 -0.109 0.179 
1nDS*D4S -0.335** 0.122 -0.851* 0.409 
lnDS#D49 1.637 4.201 1.553 4.151 
lnDS*D50 -1.077** 0.340 
lnDS*D51 0.225 0.420 
NOOD 
lnDS«D52 -0.686** 0.172 -0.678 0.441 
lnDS*D53 1.090 1.389 
lnDS»DS4 -1.227** 0.226 -2.208** 0.555 
lnDS«D55 -0.942 0.533 
FURNITURE 
lnDS*D56 -1.079** 0.183 -0.857** 0.244 
lnDS*D57 -1.114 0.612 -0.502 2.787 
lnDS*D5B -0.644 0.787 
1nDS*DS9 0.530 0.794 0.762 2.921 
PULP AND PAPER 
lnDS*D60 -1.953* 0.760 
lnDS*D61 -0.994** 0.188 -2.264** 0.365 
lnDS*D62 -0.667** 0. 172 -0.864** 0.224 
lnDS*D63 -0.074 0.767 
RUBBER PRODUCTS 
lnDS*D64 -0.296 0.343 -1.231 6.473 
1nDS*D65 -1.316 0.725 -1.052 1.278 
lnDS*D66 -1.738 1.005 
lnDS*D67 -0.861** 0.259 -0.714 0.420 
lnDS«D6B -0.751** 0.170 -1.408** 0.356 
lnDS*D69 -0.100 0.299 
lnDS*D70 -0.487* 0.246 -1.046 0.773 
102 
102 
Variable Equat iqn_09 
, . . standard coefficient error 
Equatign.l? 













































































































































lnDS*0101 -1.233«* 0.086 -0.656 0.415 
103 
103 











lnDS*D104 -0.849 0.563 -0.715 0.586 
ln0S*D105 -0.467 0.606 
lnDS*D106 -0.585 0.870 -1.117 1.144 
lnDS*D107 -0.791 0.452 
lnDS*D108 -1.005** 0.130 0.368 0.968 
ln0S*D109 -1.103** 0.230 -2.771** 0.731 
lnDS*Dl10 -1.296** 0.230 -1.369** 0.300 
lnDS«Dlll -0.620 0.336 -1.230** 0.397 
lnDS»D112 -0.996** 0.308 0.056 0.993 
lnOS*Dl13 -1.369** 0.229 -1.356** 0.286 
lnOS*D114 -1.466** 0.255 -1.420** 0.314 
lnDS*01IS -0.327 0.345 -0.005 0.598 
lnDS*D116 -0.598 0.758 -0.800 0.924 
lnDS*D117 -0.582** 0.218 0.263 0.490 
lnDS«D118 -1.901** 0.633 
lnDS«D119 -2.960 2.511 
lnDS*D120 -0.921** 0.311 
BEVERAGES 
lnDS*D121 -1.122 0.577 -0.927 0.690 
lnDS#0122 -1.530** 0.248 -0.929** 0.3S6 
lnDS*D123 -0.220 3.171 
lnDS*D124 -0.673 0.434 
TOBACCO 
lnDS*D125 -0.768** 0.203 -0.897** 0.245 
PRINTING 
lnOS*D126 0.202 0.532 
lnDS*D127 -0.868 0.521 -2.285* 0.944 
OTHER MANUFACTURES 
lnDS*D128 -0.177 0.519 1.049 1.219 
lnDS*D129 0.302 0.440 -2.473 4.283 
lnDS*D130 -0.028 0.458 
lnOS»D131 -0.886* 0.422 
lnDS*D132 1.369 0.716 
lnOS*D133 -2.707* 1.099 
lnDS*D134 -0.186 1.659 
lnDS*0135 0.703 1.217 
lnDS*D136 -0.461 0.683 
1nDS*D137 0.034 0.520 
lnDS*D138 -1.067 2.429 
ln0S*0139 -1.117** 0.123 0.180 0.745 
Note: (*) indicates significance at the .OS level of confidence 
and (••) at the .01 level. 
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